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1.1  Background 
Sustainable development problems archetypally cut across policy domains, territorial 
jurisdictions, and socio-economic and political divides. Inducing global sustainable 
change is therefore at best challenging. Since the first UN Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, numerous governance arrangements from 
the public and private domain have been initiated to contribute to sustainable 
development and the implementation of agreements. Whereas state-centred approaches 
and intergovernmental organisations still remained at the heart of the Summit Rio+20 in 
2012, the contributions of private actors in the last two decades, both from civil society 
and the market domain have been momentous and cannot be overlooked. 
The emergence of private sustainability governance is viewed as a response to the 
inadequacies of interstate negotiations, institutions, and policies (Abbott, 2012). Its 
development coincides with neoliberal political and economic trajectories spurred on by 
many developed nations. Together with increased globalised processes of many of the 
world’s services and goods, the traditional perception of the state transformed in 
neoliberal societies and induced the notable shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. 
The concept of governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for 
ordered rule and collective action (Stoker, 1998). It refers to a new process of governing, 
a changed condition in ordered rule, or the new method by which society is governed 
which is attributed to the changing boundaries between public and private domains 
(Rhodes, 1996). The idea of governance for sustainable development embodies an explicit 
steering logic that also involves societal self-steering (Meadowcroft, 2007). Whether 
oriented towards the attainment of sustainable development as contributing to 
environmental protection, social development, or economic development, it is within this 
context that private actors have proliferated and have become increasingly engaged with 
transnational regulatory activities of diverse issue fields. 
What characterize nearly all collaborative arrangements for sustainable development 
are their voluntary and non-hierarchical features. These collaborations can take several 
forms, and governance scholars refer to multi-stakeholder partnerships when there is 
participation by actors from two or more spheres of society, which may be the state, market 
and civil society (Glasbergen, 2007). Collaborations between market and civil society 
actors are referred to as private arrangements (Paton, 2011) or sometimes more specifically 
as NGO-business partnerships (e.g., Pattberg, 2004). The inclusion of both public and 
private actors is also signified as public-private partnerships (e.g., Schäferhoff, Campe, & 
Kaan, 2009), or more broadly as collaborative governance (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008). 
The shift from government to governance has implicated a move away from traditional 
hierarchical forms of organisation and the adoption of network forms (Bellamy & 
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Palumbo, 2010), from an emphasis on laws to more flexible and voluntary forms of 
regulation and implementation (e.g., Abbott, 2012; Bartley, 2011) and having to deal with 
various sources of authority and power (Meadowcroft, 2007). In fact, many policy 
domains in international relations are not regulated, and often not dominated, by a single 
international regime but are characterised as fragmented (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, 
& Zelli, 2009). This fragmentation can refer to the character of institutions (from implicit 
norms to international organisations), the type of governance arrangement (public,  
private, public-private), the issue field (from sectoral concerns to human rights), and the 
spatial scope (from bilateral, regional to global). 
Fragmentation in global governance for sustainable development is not understood as 
problematic per se. Sustainability problems are complex and require specific responses that 
may not be delivered by a single arrangement. However, fragmentation becomes 
problematic when the capacity of governments or international organisations are weakened 
in their desired effects (Ivanova & Roy, 2007) or more broadly, if it hampers the efficient 
and effective realisation of generally accepted public values (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014). 
Contemporary academic and political debates converge on the urgency for a more 
enhanced, effective, and more coherent institutional framework for the governance of 
sustainable development. At the core of the debate lies uncertainty about whether the 
diversity and multiplicity in governance arrangements should be embraced, or if coherence 
should be promoted to actively constrain fragmentation (Ivanova & Roy, 2007). 
This area of tension between fragmentation and cohesion has remained largely 
unexplored, and this dissertation aims to analyse how this tension manifests itself, what 
its characteristics are, and what the implications are for sustainability governance. In this 
introductory chapter, the concepts of fragmentation and cohesion will be explored and 
embedded within different theoretical perspectives. Against this backdrop, the 
opportunities and limitations of both fragmentation and cohesion will be delineated. In 
the research approach several aspects of the conceptualisation of fragmentation and 
cohesion will be further specified after which the research questions of this dissertation 
will be articulated. In conclusion, the methodology - including concepts and methods - 
will be made explicit and the dissertation structure will be outlined. 
1.2  Fragmentation and Cohesion 
The new global public domain, characterised as the increasingly institutionalised 
transnational arena concerning the production of global goods and provision of services, 
has introduced opportunities and constrains upon both global and national governance 
that did not exist in the past (Ruggie, 2004). Once including sovereign states in the 
interstate realm only, the new global public domain has become the domain of private 
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actors and public-private partnerships as well. Global value chains quintessentially concern 
sustainable development, as the production of global goods and provision of services on 
the global level transcends national boundaries on social, environmental, and economic 
issues. Its emergence is closely connected to globalisation, and the opportunities and 
constrains presented to the governance of the global public domain are influenced by what 
Rosenau (2003) has described as the two basic contrary processes underlying globalisation: 
“One involves all those forces that press for centralization, integration, and globalization, 
and the other consists of those forces that press for decentralization, fragmentation and 
localization” (p.14).  
These two forces are at the centre of a general debate on fragmentation and cohesion 
of global governance. The concepts are used to describe the same empirical reality of the 
overall regulatory setting. However, whether reality is regarded as fragmented or cohesive 
is also dependent on the scale of analysis (local, national, regional, international,  
transnational) and is furthermore influenced by normative perceptions about the 
desirability of fragmented and cohesive governance structures. In the sections below, the 
concepts will be placed within the wider academic debate, and opportunities and 
limitations that derive from fragmentation and cohesion on global sustainability 
governance will be elaborated. 
Fragmentation 
The concept of fragmentation has gained prominence in several social scientific 
disciplines and has most widely been employed in international law and political sciences. 
Within the political sciences, the disciplines of international relations and global 
governance of environmental and sustainable development are most notable. In its 
broadest sense the term is used to signify the diversity, multiplicity, divergence and 
distribution of regulatory powers of the overall institutional settings and resulting policies  
of different international policy domains and transnational issue fields. 
The background of fragmentation in international law is traced back to the mid-20th 
century where conflicts between treaty regimes and legal instruments were anticipated 
(Jenks, 1953). This gained prominence due to the proliferation of international treaties, 
and the term treaty congestion was used as a concept to study overlaps among treaties 
and to describe the problems of treaty conflict (e.g., Brown Weiss, 1993; Hicks, 1999). 
Furthermore, the emergence of specialised and relatively autonomous legal institutions, 
complexes, and spheres of legal practices of contemporary international law has also given 
rise to the study of fragmentation. Particularly, the use of respective principles and 
institutions of specialised systems of law coupled with the unawareness of legislative and 
institutional activities in adjacent fields and of the general international law principles  
and practices posed serious concern (International Law Commission, 2006). 
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At the turn of the 21st century the term fragmentation was included in the work 
programme of the International Law Commission (2000, para. 729) and shortly the 
concept of fragmentation was taken up by the international legal community (e.g., 
Hafner, 2004; International Law Commission, 2006; Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002) where 
the term sparked debates about the opportunities and threats arising from the 
fragmentation of international law (van Asselt, 2014).  
Subsequently, the concept was adapted by international relations and global 
governance scholars. International regime theory had already laid the groundwork from 
the end of the 1960s onward, in which power was recognized as being dispersed among 
many different agents, including states, international organizations, and multi-national 
companies. These actors were then assumed to operate as tacit coalitions under similar 
understandings of procedures and desirable outcomes (Verbeek, 2011). The concept of 
fragmentation was particularly taken up by academics on environmental governance 
(e.g., Andresen, 2001; Bernstein & Ivanova, 2007; Biermann et al., 2009). In this field there 
is by-and-large a consensus that institutional fragmentation is a structural characteristic 
of contemporary international relations (Zelli & van Asselt, 2013) yet also here the 
perspectives differ on whether the causes and consequences are to be positively or 
negatively assessed (e.g., Abbott, 2012; Ivanova & Roy, 2007) and on its implications for 
effectiveness of governing (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015). 
In international trade theory and policy, the phenomenon of fragmentation in 
production and trade is understood to be a defining characteristic of global value chains 
(Stephenson, 2013). Particularly the geographical fragmentation of supply chains is 
considered to have benefitted multinational corporations. Cost-saving occurred through 
paying lower wages in non-industrialised countries, as well as through loose or non-existent 
regulation of labour and environmental practices (Sobel-Read, 2014). Furthermore, 
problems have been associated with private standards at the level of the multilateral trading 
system: first by posing unnecessary or unjustifiable restrictions on trade, and second by 
questioning the validity and effectiveness of the resulting system of (self-) regulation. Issues 
of fragmentation, overlaps, multiplicity, credibility, and varying degrees of transparency in 
relation to how standards are set have been identified. Furthermore, questions have also 
been raised on how the conformity of requirements is assessed and audited, and the extent 
to which traceability systems are reliable (Meliado, 2017). 
The analytical usage of the concept is not uniform, and an exploration of the 
definition sheds more light on the different uses of the word. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines the noun “fragment” (2014) in a figurative and transferred sense as: 
“A detached, isolated, or incomplete part; a (comparatively) small portion of anything; a 
part remaining or still preserved when the whole is lost or destroyed”. The suffix “-t-ion”, 
which forms nouns of action, is defined as “A breaking or separation into fragments” 
(2014). Three considerations come to the surface. First, there is an inference of a 
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‘complete’ or ‘whole’ in either the past, present or future tense. Second, the noun of action 
signifies there are forces causing it. Third, a differentiation can be made between the 
process (breaking) and a state of affairs (separation). 
In relation to the first consideration, the idea of complete or whole governance 
systems is only implicitly fashioned, particularly by use of concepts as policy coherence, 
harmonisation, equivalence, and metagovernance (which will be discussed in greater 
depth in the following subsection on cohesion). It remains mostly a conceptual and 
political construct, and non-fragmented or universal systems are rather mentioned in 
terms of theoretical conceivability (Biermann et al., 2009) and the organisation of 
governance systems is considered unstructured as it is not organised around a coherent 
set of rules and decision-making procedures in a hierarchical manner (Pattberg & 
Widerberg, 2015). 
With regard to moving or driving forces, global liberalism and neo-liberalism are 
mainly identified as the dominant ideological trajectory of globalisation that has shaped 
the outcomes of the political and social discourse of sustainable development in the last 
decades. International financial institutions, multinational corporations, and professional 
elites have, among others, contributed to neoliberal ideas, rules, and practices becoming 
dominant in international policy domains (Bartley, 2007).  
Above all, institutionalised rules of free trade and the ideas stressing faith in free 
markets have shaped the way in which social, economic, and environmental problems can 
be solved. It is within this context that the shift from government to governance has taken 
place. According to Bernstein and Ivanova (2007), the accompanying lack of progress 
within multilateral environmental agreements contributed to the (further) fragmentation 
of environmental governance.  
While academic disciplines from law and public policy allude more to fragmentation 
(or cohesion) as a process that can be (re)directed (by its practitioners indeed), governance 
scholars are more prone to regarding fragmentation as a state of affairs. The sum of the 
formal and informal rule systems at all levels, is considered a highly disaggregated and only 
a minimally coordinated system of governance (Rosenau, 2003). The institutional variety in 
the absence of hierarchical coordination (Benvenisti & Downs, 2007) is therefore considered 
a pervasive characteristic of the transnational domain. This point of departure does not 
necessarily problematize fragmentation as an important issue, but rather the coordination 
(or its absence) of fragmented or differentiated governance actors in global governance (Zürn 
& Faude, 2013). This is where the proponents of cohesion enter the debate. 
Cohesion 
The changes in global governance and the accompanying growth in regulatory 
complexity also spurred the quest for cohesion, sometimes also referred to as 
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‘convergence’ (e.g., Vogel & Kagan, 2002). The underlying arguments behind inquiries  
into cohesion stem from the observation that complexity and fragmentation can be 
unconducive in realising societal goals, as it may for instance sort contradictory effects. 
Different conceptions of cohesion in the social sciences propose different forms of 
partnership, cooperation and coordination to overcome the condition of fragmentation 
and enhance concerted aims and action. This conceptualisation has taken a variety of 
forms, and in the following different strands and conceptions of scholarly work on 
cohesion will be delineated. 
Policy coherence  
The pursuit for coherence in policy has been addressed in scholarly work of public policy 
and multi-level governance (e.g., May, Sapotichne, & Workman, 2006; Winship, 2006), 
particularly in issue fields such as development aid and multilateral environmental 
agreements (e.g., Jones, 2002; Mickwitz et al., 2009; Sianes, 2013).  
The term coherence in this context implies that policies are associated or can be 
grouped together because they share a set of ideas or objectives. While variations across 
policy domains are present, it is considered that many policy areas are marked by 
inconsistent policies and little commonality of goals. For this reason policy scholars 
generally agree that more coherence of policies is desirable (May et al., 2006).  
Although questions of cohesion in this body of literature are restricted to public 
governing and the efficient management of the public sector, it nevertheless offers a 
perspective on the intentions and meanings behind the quest for cohesion in policy 
domains. As Jones (2002) describes, policy coherence offers a positive vision on how to 
reach societal goals as it emphasises the cumulative value-adding potential “from 
efficiently interweaving the contributions by different policy communities” (p. 329). 
Through systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions, across 
departments and agencies, Jones envisions that synergies are created towards realising 
defined objectives.  
Policy coherence is thus essentially concerned with overcoming inconsistencies 
between policies and across departments and agencies, in order to realise consistency in 
action. 
Harmonisation 
Harmonisation is related to the concept of policy coherence, but is primarily a topic of 
scholarly discussion from different fields of law and has its roots in international law. In 
this domain, states are bound by the treaty obligations and are expected to try to 
implement them as far as possible, even in case of conflict in norms. In this regard, 
harmonisation is a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a single 
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issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of 
compatible obligations (International Law Commission, 2006). 
Harmonisation has been an important feature of modern legal systems. The role of 
harmonisation in the European Union is notable (Bhatia, 2010). Of particular significance in 
this regard is that the European Union’s official motto, that has been adopted in 2000, is 
“united in diversity”. This core value signifies the coming together of countries in the 
European Union for peace and prosperity, while still acknowledging the different cultures, 
traditions, and languages therein (European Union, n.d.). At the same time, the 
harmonisation of laws of the Member States is a core instrument (Andenas & Andersen, 
2011). It is intended to minimise the degree of variations and decrease the amount of 
significant underlying differences in order to achieve similarity between national 
jurisdictions (Andreadakis, 2011). In Europe, harmonisation served the purpose of political 
and economic creation of a regulatory environment for the European Union. Within this 
context, it has been purposefully endorsed as a policy of the European Commission to achieve 
uniformity in laws of member States to facilitate free trade and protect citizens (Bhatia, 2010). 
Harmonisation implies that diverse legal provisions or systems are coordinated resulting in 
a set of minimum requirements or standards. Harmonisation is not understood as the 
unification of law, with a system of similar or identical laws. The objective of harmonisation 
is rather the creation of a framework within which laws coincide and operate efficiently 
without inconsistencies or inequalities. Such a framework can be created through the 
introduction of a set of basic standards, of which the flexibility need to be agreed in advance 
to avoid problems if standards need alterations (Andreadakis, 2011). 
While harmonisation intends to give rise to a set of compatible rights and obligations, 
a differentiation can be made in the objectives of harmonisation. In international law, the 
purpose of harmonisation is to avoid or solve conflicts in norms, whereas in the European 
Union it is more instrumental as a means to facilitate free trade and the protection of 
citizens. Furthermore, within the legal literature, the concept is sometimes separated into 
two forms: procedural and consequential harmonisation. Procedural harmonisation refers 
to the manner in which the process of harmonisation is undertaken, and relates essentially 
to the techniques used for adoption of harmonised law or adaptation towards a 
harmonised law. Consequential harmonisation on the other hand, is about achieving 
desired outcomes. The different topics in which harmonisation is sought, are for instance 
on institutions, mechanisms, terms, principles and on processes (e.g. how laws will be 
implemented and interpreted) (Andenas, Andersen, & Ashcroft, 2011).  
The topic of harmonisation is not limited to legal literature. Outside the 
intergovernmental settings, the informal harmonisation processes have become more 
important. Model codes, standards, principles, and other outcomes of harmonisation 
processes, have received attention. Particularly the interaction with intergovernmental 
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institutions, and their reception in the private or national sphere has been accounted to 
merit further attention (Andenas & Andersen, 2011).  
For instance, the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS) was 
specifically developed as a platform of international dialogue on voluntary sustainability 
standards. A key issue on the agenda of this platform is harmonisation, which is 
understood as relating to processes that aim at the establishment of identical standards, 
technical regulations and conformity assessment requirements (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015). 
Due to the emphasis on identical standards, the concept of harmonisation differs from the 
interpretation as offered in the legal domain. Various other disciplinary fields have picked 
up on the concept as well, including international relations, European studies, and political 
theory but a common framework to analyse harmonisation is lacking, both within the legal 
domain as well as across the disciplines (Andenas et al., 2011). 
Equivalence 
Equivalence is sometimes referred to as the second model of harmonisation, also termed 
convergence, approximation, or less-than-full harmonisation (Donahue, 2000). Its 
origins have been both accounted to Europe's difficulties in achieving full harmonisation 
of standards (Donahue, 2000) as well as international harmonisation of standards as 
required by trade rules by WTO and NAFTA as “equivalence determinations” (Wallach, 
2002). Under the equivalence model, countries can accept each other’s disparate models 
without actually equalising the standards. It is only agreed that their different standards 
will be treated as if they are the same, signifying a functional equivalence. When countries 
pledge their standards as equivalent, a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) is 
constituted (Donahue, 2000). Once declared “equivalent”, goods are allowed free passage 
to the respective markets, also in case of significant differences (Wallach, 2002). This also 
means that weaker or less protective regulatory systems and standards can serve as a 
bypass route around more stringent standards, thereby invalidating stringent standards 
(Donahue, 2000; Wallach, 2002). 
Just as the concept of harmonisation has gained significance beyond the realm of 
international law and legal literature, equivalence has similarly become an important 
notion for transnational regulation which also pertains to private standards. Non-
governmental actors, including NGOs, retail consortia, manufacturers, producers and 
trade cooperatives promote and stimulate the use of standards and certification schemes. 
Among other issues, such as the use of only specified certification bodies and the costs of 
third-part certifications, the lack of equivalence between schemes is also recognised to be 
an issue that leads to a multiplication of certification processes and the lack of recognition 
of certificates issued within defined markets (Wouters & Geraets, 2012). 
Similar to the meaning in law, equivalence of standards denotes the acceptance that 
different standards or technical regulations achieve the same objectives, even if through 
Introduction 
17 
different means. Present day, both harmonisation and equivalence have gained 
prominence through various initiatives (see Bowen & Holmes, 2013) in order to address 
regulatory and trade challenges that arise from public, private and public-private efforts.  
Metagovernance 
The concept of metagovernance has also been advanced as potentially fulfilling a steering 
function to bring more cohesion in the norms and rules in policy domains. Most of the 
scholarly work on metagovernance, sometimes also referred to as ‘network management’ 
(e.g., Rhodes, 1997) is from public policy and management scholars (e.g., Klijn & 
Edelenbos, 2007; Peters, 2007). In these works, networks are widely recognised as a new 
form of public organisation and there is a focus on the strategic attempts to manage 
interaction processes between actors in networks.  
Defined as the ‘organization of self-regulation’ (Jessop, 1998) and as a way to govern 
private self-regulation (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009; Meuleman, 2006, June; Peters, 2007; 
Torfing, 2012; Vermeulen, 2015), metagovernance is conceptualised to designate 
processes of coordination intended to reduce different and sometimes conflicting 
governance modes (Jessop, 2002; Meuleman, 2006, June). Governance processes in 
networks can deliberately be guided on both content and process (Klijn & Edelenbos, 
2007), and metagovernance can cover different guidance mechanisms to stimulate change 
(Rhodes, 1997).  
The role of public actors has stood central in these works (see also Steurer, 2013). 
Although the involvement of governments in bringing more cohesion in the norms and 
rules in policy domains is considered to become less hierarchical and less centralised – 
that is, at least in liberal democratic societies, it is still imagined that governments should 
bring coherence among governance networks and provide the ground rules for 
governance. While private actors and networks are envisioned to act free, in 
metagovernance they are still under a ‘hierarchical shadow’ of states (Jessop, 1998). In 
analogous conceptions of metagovernance, governments and its officials have the ability 
and legitimacy to set a regulatory framework for governance actors, in which actors from 
the public and private sphere can act (Bell & Park, 2006; Christopoulos, Horvath, & Kull, 
2012; Parkins, 2008; Whitehead, 2003). 
In recent work on metagovernance, the importance of private actors as part of a joint 
effort for metagovernance is underscored (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009), and private 
metagovernance has been recognised to take on a steering role for sustainable development 
(Bitzer, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2012; Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; Glasbergen, 2011). 
A slightly distinctive concept of meta-organisations has also been employed in 
organisational theory, where meta-organisations are recognised to have other 
organisations as members. A similarity between members and certain common interests 
is here considered a vital prerequisite that enables the members of meta-organisations to 
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work together with horizontal relationships, voluntary membership, and equal influence  
(Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). 
The work of the non-governmental organisation of ISEAL Alliance is exemplar of 
private metagovernance. The objective of this arrangement is to strengthen sustainability 
standards systems. These standards may regulate production processes in different 
sectors and industries (ISEAL Alliance, 2015). Particularly the development, 
implementation, and stewardship of internationally applicable good practice and 
guidance on the implementation of credible standards systems is at the heart of ISEAL 
Alliance’s work (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014). 
1.3  The Fragmentation and Cohesion Debate 
There are many arguments identifiable within the general debate on fragmentation and 
cohesion that point towards possibilities and signal shortcomings on both sides of the 
debate. In this discussion, different terms are sometimes used to indicate fragmentation. 
For instance, variety (e.g., Stupak, Lattimore, Titus, & Tattersall Smith, 2011) is used to 
signify that regulatory frameworks on the same general topics are distinct in character or 
quality; multiplicity (e.g., Ivanova & Roy, 2007) is used to indicate the large number 
and/or wide range of regulatory frameworks; and organisational complexity (Gupta, 
Pistorius, & Vijge, 2016) is used synonymously to fragmentation. In the following, the 
two sides of the debate are delineated where after there will be a reflection on this debate. 
The advantages of fragmentation and limitations of cohesion  
One of the main arguments favouring fragmentation in global governance is that different 
needs can be catered to and different strengths can be capitalised. To start off with, the 
inclusion of private arrangements for sustainability governance can supplement 
traditional international regulation. This has contributed to governance at multiple scales, 
including the proliferation of agreements, agencies, partnerships, and alternative forms 
of governance. These could be advantageous in reaching sustainable goals (Bernstein & 
Ivanova, 2007). Furthermore, fragmentation may also contribute to context specific 
solutions, as non-centralised or decentralised governance is to some extent an essential 
condition for effectively addressing sustainability concerns through their locally 
manifestation and often necessitating tailored responses. The multiplicity of private 
arrangements allows for the adjustment of standards and procedures to local 
circumstances (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). The multiplicity may also foster specialisation and 
expertise. It is sometimes compared to a division of labour, where actors focus on specific 
strengths in response to different needs (Auld, 2014; Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014).  
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An interlinked argument in favour of fragmentation is that it leads to multiple routes 
of intervention. International norms are uniform and express what is esteemed and 
valued. Norms shape policy when they become translated into concrete governance 
programs (Berliner & Prakash, 2012) and diverse private arrangements can adjust for 
specific sectors or issues more than uniform norms (Abbott, 2012). If diverse stakeholders 
are proactively involved in sustainability governance, the same regulatory issues can be 
addressed in multiple and diverse ways as each actor has its own interests, values, and 
competencies (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014). The competition akin to this may function as 
a source of innovation (Glasbergen, 2009, December). On the whole, the cumulative effort 
of public and private governance exceeds that of either approach alone (Abbott, 2012).  
An advantage of multiple routes of intervention can be that it may also permit for 
the unregulated areas to become regulated. This argument particularly finds resonance in 
legal accounts, where the increased diversity in legal norms and the growth of 
international law to formerly unregulated fields is considered a positive sign (Lindroos & 
Mehling, 2005). On account of this, international law has grown to cover important new 
issue areas of international relations, including human rights and the environment (van 
Asselt, 2014), and has also stimulated multilateral environmental agreements. Also multi-
stakeholder arrangements thrive within this environment, as barriers to entry are low and 
not as costly or complex as pursuing international regulation. Particularly concerned 
private governance actors can easily experiment with and advance new methods and 
programs to persistent sustainability problems (Abbott, 2012).  
Cohesion does not promote the resilience that fragmentation offers in the previous 
arguments. For the sake of concerted and consistent action, variation and diversity would 
reasonably be less likely encouraged and would hence lead to limited routes of 
intervention. Next to the question of legitimacy - who should exercise this authority and 
dictate the terms for cohesion? -, creating the conditions for concerted action through 
regulation is time intensive and costly. Cohesion may then pose the risk that dominant 
views will be pursued or left unchallenged, and not inclusive of actors with lesser means. 
The advantages that fragmentation offers would be jeopardised. Particularly in the case 
that the diversity of regulatory frameworks reflects different interests and objectives, it 
promotes global regulatory pluralism, a value that according to some ought to pervade 
the institutional design of transnational space (Cafaggi, 2016). 
The fragmentation between private arrangements has also been hypothesised as 
stimulating a race to the top, possibly increasing the effectiveness of regulations on the 
whole (Bertels & Peloza, 2008; Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014). Private governance 
arrangements competing in similar issue areas may well apply pressure towards stricter 
standards and verification mechanisms, and more democratic or representative 
arrangements. Competition is conjectured to stimulate favouritism of consumers and 
Chapter 1 
20 
other concerned audiences, and private arrangements may raise their standards to 
distinguish themselves from others (Derkx, 2011).  
Regulatory competition may not only stimulate a race to the top, another line of 
argumentation is that the advancement of different solutions in different contexts will 
lead to the diffusion of best practice to other regulatory contexts (Jänicke & Jacob, 2006). 
When private schemes can learn from one another, this may lead to regulatory innovation 
(Cafaggi, 2016). A similar perspective to the diffusion of best practices proposes that 
regulatory diversity allows the governance system as a whole to learn and evolve faster 
because it allows for experimentation, demonstration effects, and the imitation or scaling 
up of successful programmes (Abbott & Snidal, 2009).  
In turn, more cohesion in regulation does not automatically imply better policy. It 
could even be detrimental, as learning and innovation through fragmentation could be 
hampered and lead to lowest common denominator outcomes (Fransen & Conzelmann, 
2014). Even more fundamentally, policy coherence in itself does not signify anything 
about the appropriateness of a given set of policies to the problem or issue at hand, also 
not in regard to the stringency level of regulation. In this sense, both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ can 
have varying degrees of coherence (May et al., 2006). 
The advantages of cohesion and limitations of fragmentation 
The main policy concepts for cohesion are by and large concerned with the need for 
consistency in norms, rules, and actions. At the core of arguments favouring cohesion 
lays dissatisfaction with the negative consequences emanating from fragmentation. The 
freedom that the largely uncoordinated global governance system allows for sustainability 
issues to be taken up, arguably also allows for limited or undesired effects.   
First of all, a fragmented state of governance is conducive for the poor use of existing 
information and resources, both across and between policy levels (Bernstein & Ivanova, 
2007). Concerted action is therefore an important driver of cohesion. In furtherance of a 
mutual cause or purpose, different actors strive to align efforts in the same direction.  
Beyond concerted action, coherence is also understood to allow for consistency in 
action (Winship, 2006) and policies (Bernstein & Ivanova, 2007). Through for instance  
meta-governance, activities are mutually reinforced ensuring that the efforts and activities  
of arrangements are aligned to achieving a common agenda. Through fragmentation, a 
serious threat is posed on the uniformity and coherence of laws and policies. Issues that 
are at the heart of sustainable development, such as environmental protection and human 
rights, are obscured through arrangements and policies that may only be paying lip 
service to the causes (a phenomenon also called ‘greenwashing’ (e.g., Ramus & Montiel, 
2005; van der Ploeg & Vanclay, 2013). As has been considered before, cohesion does not 
guarantee stringency in protecting values; nonetheless, the state of fragmentation is also 
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considered to not lead to a race to the top but to a race to the bottom in which lowest 
denominator options might prevail (e.g., Vogel & Kagan, 2002). Furthermore, where 
cohesion does not imply better policy, fragmentation in governance systems implies that 
within the same policy domain, inconsistency in objectives and differences in course of 
action are taking place. This is considered problematic particularly in cases where agreed 
upon core values, such as basic human rights, are breached and legitimatised through 
governance arrangements that obscure or redefine basic rights. A fragmented state of 
affairs may certainly also be exploited to the advantage of particular powers, whether 
governments or industry players, who may fear losing a vested interest. 
The range of different governance arrangements present in the current global system 
of governance – all with some power resources – in fact also offer the opportunity to build 
coalitions (Meadowcroft, 2007). Not a singular arrangement is considered to hold 
sufficient authority, resources, and knowledge to translate policy objectives into practice. 
The concerted efforts of multiple actors are vital, as each does not hold significant 
capabilities but are also dependent on other actors to strengthen policy intentions and 
translate it into action (Bernstein & Ivanova, 2007). Institutional interplay, or interaction 
among similar arrangements can be political and functional, and therefore supports 
achieving their goals by pooling resources (Oberthür & Gehring, 2004).  
Through coalitions and interplay, cohesion is in principle conducive for a more 
efficient use of resources as institutional demands can be either coordinated or better 
aligned. Numerous arrangements on the same issues increase the costs necessary for 
operations. Regardless of the source of funding, without alignment or some coordination, 
strong overlap in operations signify an inefficient use of resources. 
Reflections on the debate 
The conceptual divide between fragmentation and cohesion goes beyond a crude distinction 
of favouring one side of the debate over the other. It also goes beyond a consequential 
evaluation in which the state of regulatory fragmentation simply calls for cohesion. The 
academic debate rather exposes that there are different analyses and implications for the 
governance of sustainable development. Ontologically, the regulatory reality and the related 
problems are characterised differently (e.g. fragmentation hinders effective policy-making). 
Normatively, different conceptions of what is good or desirable are proposed (e.g. global 
regulatory pluralism is desirable). Strategically, different courses of action are endorsed to 
overcome regulatory problems (e.g. strategic alignment through equivalence). 
Furthermore, the fact that there are two sides to the debate does not entail that the 
two concepts are necessarily juxtaposed. As the different perspectives on prompting more 
cohesion in policy domains reveal, multiplicity or diversity is not considered as a problem 
in itself, but the calls for cohesion rather envision a system of governance in which 
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standards and regulations are not contradictory. For instance, under the equivalence or 
harmonisation model, disparate standards can be accepted as long as the amount of 
significant underlying differences is decreased. These models in essence oppose 
normative conflict, rather than for instance opposing multiplicity or diversity. 
Another observation is that there has been a stronger inclination from public policy 
studies towards cohesion than posited by governance scholars, where the latter is largely 
undetermined particularly concerning the question whether the diversity and multiplicity in 
governance arrangements should be embraced for sustainable development, or if coherence 
should be promoted to constrain fragmentation. Whether explicit or implicit, at the heart of 
the debate there are concerns and questions concerning efficiency and inefficiency, 
convergence or divergence of goals, road maps for action and cooperation, and power. 
1.4  Analytical Perspective 
The central focus of this dissertation is on fragmentation and cohesion of governance 
systems in environmental and social issue areas, particularly those that pertain to global 
value chains. Due to the economic interconnectedness of global value chains, the 
functioning of markets and trade conditions also plays a role in this investigation. A 
subsequent focus of this dissertation is to understand how fragmentation and cohesion is 
determined and influenced by the governance capacity of arrangements and issue-specific 
systems as a whole. The notion of governance systems will therefore function as the 
analytical perspective through which fragmentation and cohesion of different policy 
domains is investigated, whereas the concept of governance capacity functions as an 
evaluative concept. Several issue areas have been chosen as case studies. In the following, 
these concepts and issue areas will be explained in further detail. 
Governance systems 
The governance system approach is rooted in governance theory and is concerned with 
the governability of public issues. As a starting point, governance systems are comprised 
with governance actors that relate to each other and the issue. The affiliation to the same 
issue field in itself links the actors indirectly to each other; through interacting with each 
other the actors can have a direct linkage. Scholars have applied it to diverse issue fields, 
including the governance of forests (Guéneau, 2007), marine protected areas (Jentoft, van 
Son, & Bjørkan, 2007), and fisheries (Burns & Stöhr, 2011a, 2011b). 
The governance system of an issue field demarcates how rules and policies are made, 
reformed, interpreted, implemented, and enforced. Governance actors can both be 
subject as well as steering agents within the system. These actors can represent diverse 
interests, including the political domain (parties, states, international government 
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organs), the market domain (private companies, business alliances and associations), civil 
society (non-profit organizations, NGOs) and other groups and associations as for 
instance scientists, other experts, or any social entity that conducts activities of deciding, 
governing, coordinating, regulating, allocating resources, etc. (Burns & Stöhr, 2011b). 
The governance system approach relates to the concept of governance architecture, 
which is defined as “the overarching system of public and private institutions that are 
valid and active in a given issue area of world politics. This system comprises 
organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-
making procedures” (Biermann et al., 2009). This definition also explicitly refers to a 
system of an issue area. However, there is a slight difference in the unit of analysis in 
transnational governance as the term institutions is adopted which refers to broader 
structures and mechanisms of social order that guide behaviour. The unit of analysis 
within this dissertation lies explicitly on governance actors themselves, the governance 
system they comprise as a whole, and the rules and norms that derive from them. 
Governance capacity 
The concepts of capacity, capacity development, and state capacity have been particularly 
prevalent in international development literature from the late 1980s (Baser & Morgan, 
2008; Enriquez & Centeno, 2012). The definitions are closely related and sometimes 
interchanged with the term capability. Capacity generally refers to the overall ability of an 
organisation or system to create public value (Baser & Morgan, 2008) and capacity 
development is defined as the process through which individuals, organizations and 
societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own 
development objectives over time (UNDP, 2008). 
The concept of capacity has recently also been used by governance scholars who 
respectively imply regulatory or governance capacity (see table below).  
Table 1.1 Definitions for governance and regulatory capacity 
Definitions Authors 
Governance capacity are the capabilities (or lack of capabilities) of 
institutional arrangements to effectively carry out global policies which 
could generate desired changes. 
(Held & Young, 2013) 
The capacity of institutions to resolve problems of public policy and 
implement effective rules is a requirement for effective governance. 
(Biermann et al., 2014) 
Regulatory capacity is the sum of the resources available to actors (both 
public and non-state actors) within regulatory regimes for getting things 
done, including expertise.  
(Scott & Brown, 2010) 
 
From these definitions, several elements come to the fore. The first two are rather 
straightforward in that governance capacity is described as the ability to implement 
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policies (e.g. regulatory capacity) and the condition of contributing to policies (e.g. public 
policy). Due to the global focus of international development literature and governance 
theory, it is specifically envisioned that governance capacity has the ability to contribute 
to policies on the global level, which may be both international as well as transnational in 
scope. The other elements relate to whether capacity is defined in terms of available 
resources (input capacity), the ability to achieve certain outcomes (outcome capacity) and 
connected to this a criterion of success (e.g. effectiveness). 
The differentiation between ‘input capacity’ and ‘capacity as an outcome’ has also 
been a subject of international development literature. Input capacity refers to whether 
arrangements have the capacity, in terms of resources and capabilities, to achieve their 
stated objectives (Bitzer, 2010).  
This includes monetary and organisational resources and expertise from personnel, 
and can refer to the sum of all sources available to actors for getting things done (e.g., 
Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Scott & Brown, 2010). 
Outcome capacity on the other hand, is about the ability to achieve certain outcomes 
and results (Bitzer, 2010). Capacity is in this context understood as the resulting 
combination of individual competencies, collective capabilities, or overall system abilities,  
that enable systems to create value (Baser & Morgan, 2008), that is, contributing to 
economic, social, and environmental value for individuals, organisations and society 
(Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). Governance capacity in particular has been defined as “the 
capabilities (or lack of capabilities) of institutional arrangements to effectively carry out 
global policies which could generate desired changes” (Held & Young, 2013, p. 310).  
It is in this regard very much related to the question of effectiveness in addressing 
sustainability problems, as effectiveness is about producing the intended or expected 
results to solve the problems. Pattberg and Widerberg (2015) explain that effectiveness is 
however difficult to research for two main reasons. Firstly, even though many 
arrangements address an identifiable governance deficit, sustainability problems are 
embedded in broader socio-economic developments that arrangements can seldom 
control. Secondly, transnational arrangements often focus on information disclosure and 
raising public awareness, rather than targeting an environmental or sustainability 
indicator directly. While sustainability performance might be improved as a result of 
these mechanisms, making causality claims remains a research challenge. Due to these 
difficulties, this dissertation will therefore predominantly follow the definition of 
governance capacity as an outcome-oriented concept and operationalises governance 
capacity as the capabilities (or lack of capabilities) of governance systems to effectively carry 
out transnational policies which could generate sustainable changes in global value chains.  
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1.5  Research Aim and Questions 
Considering the analytical perspective and evaluation criteria, as described above, this 
dissertation seeks to address the following main research questions: 
i. What tensions between fragmentation and cohesion manifest themselves in various 
global governance systems? 
ii. How do these tensions influence the governance capacity of these systems? 
iii. What attempts have been made to handle these tensions and how are they able to 
contribute to the governance capacity? 
In the context of governance for sustainable development, the increasing prominence of 
particularly social and environmental standards in global value chains is unmistakable. 
With the intention to account for the broad range of both public and private actors 
involved in the policy domains, as well as to grasp the diversity in issue areas covered by 
governance actors, this dissertation focuses on four different cases, which are each 
presented as an empirical chapter. The ordering of the cases in this dissertation has been 
determined on the basis that the final empirical chapter dissertation can be better 
contextualised by readers as it expands on the findings of earlier chapters. Furthermore, 
each of the cases contributes to answering one or multiple research questions. 
The first case study is on private fair labour arrangements (chapter 2). Historically, the 
labour movement and the development of labour law broadly arose in parallel to the 
industrial revolution as the need to protect the common interest of workers developed. 
On the international level, after the first decade of the 20th century a tripartite organisation 
– the International Labour Organization – was developed bringing together governments, 
employers and workers representatives. This organisation sets and promotes standards 
and fundamental principles and rights at work. In the last decades of the 20th century 
however, non-governmental organisations arose also setting standards for private actors.  
The case study on private fair labour arrangements explores the dimensions along which 
fragmentation and cohesion of governance can be studied. It does so by focusing on the 
governance system for fair labour in global value chains. The analysis centres on the 
characteristics of the system as a whole, which is evaluated from three dimensions: a 
structural-organisational, a normative-cognitive, and a collaborative-relational 
dimension. It is then argued how these characteristics influence the governance capacity 
of the system as a whole. This chapter contributes to answering the first two research 
questions.   
The second case study is on regional standards for organic production (chapter 3). 
Historically, the concern for organic production arose during the second industrial 
revolution. While in ancient agriculture there were philosophies of agriculture being in 
harmony with nature, organic farming as we know it today can be traced back to the early 
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20th century and originated in reaction to the rapidly changing farming practices (Geier, 
2007). The organic movement was the first initiator of organic standards, but in the last 
decades of the 20th century, national and regional standards also arose to codify and legally 
protect the requirements for organic production and labelling. The case study on regional 
standards for organic production examines the role of regionalisation of standards, which 
are standards within geographical regions with at least two neighbouring countries. In 
particular, regional standards for organic production have been promoted and created in 
an attempt to make the regulatory field of standards on organic production more 
cohesive. In this chapter, the extent to which cohesion on norms and standards have been 
achieved and whether regional standards for organic production have been conducive for 
regional and international trade is investigated. This chapter contributes to answering all 
three research questions. 
The third case study is on private metagovernance (chapter 4). In many global value 
chains, voluntary standards arose to tackle sustainability issues. The plethora of initiatives  
and voluntary standards link many farmers and producers from developing countries 
with consumers from developed countries, and are used to assure that suppliers satisfy 
minimum norms, whether in the social, economic, or environmental sphere. The 
proliferation of these initiatives has brought forward diverse, and oftentimes overlapping, 
efforts for the voluntary regulation of different value chains. The case study on private 
metagovernance explores the potential of private metagovernance to bring more 
coherence into global value chain governance for agricultural production and fisheries. 
Four mechanisms are identified that enable arrangements to influence the conditions of 
self-regulation and steer governance in issue-specific fields. The opportunities and 
limitations of private metagovernance are assessed on basis of three case studies in the 
coffee, cocoa, and fisheries sectors. This chapter contributes to answering the third 
research question. 
The fourth case study is on tensions in global governance systems (chapter 5). Taking two 
issue fields discussed in earlier chapters, namely the global governance of labour rights 
and organic production, the case study explores tensions arising in the respective fields 
through efforts to foster cohesion. It is postulated that tensions are firstly dependent on 
the system characteristics of fragmentation of an issue field and secondly, dependent on 
the ways in which cohesion is sought. This chapter contributes to answering all three 
research questions. 
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1.6  Research Methodology 
The chapters in this dissertation are based on empirical studies. Although the methods 
that have been chosen for each study are delineated in the separate chapters, here the 
methodological approach, choice of methods, and approach to data analysis are discussed. 
Research in the social and political sciences are in general dominated by the 
methodological traditions of naturalism and constructivism (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). 
Scientific realism, the methodology and tradition within philosophy of science closest to 
my scientific disposition, blends both the naturalist and constructivist approaches to 
science. Ontologically, scientific realism relates most to naturalism in that it recognizes  
that there is a real world independent of our experience. However, there is also the 
recognition that there are many layers to the study of reality. To uncover the truth is 
therefore very challenging, because reality can only be accessed through human minds 
which - from a constructivist viewpoint - are not considered to be neutral or objective. 
Rather, the individual and social characteristics persons have may lead them to regard the 
same thing but perceive it differently (Moses & Knutsen, 2012).  
The choice for methods within the scientific realist tradition is very wide. It is mainly 
considered dependent on the nature of the study and what one wants to learn about it 
(Sayer, 2000). Given that this dissertation aims to explore and describe the way in which 
the governance systems for sustainability issues are structured, qualitative empirical 
studies were considered a suitable approach as they can provide rich contextual data to 
help understand the governance systems in different issue fields. In this dissertation, the 
main research methods which have been used are semi-structured in-depth interviews 
and document analysis. With regard to semi-structured in-depth interviews, in total more 
than seventy interviews were held with persons commonly involved in policy-making and 
strategic management. Relevant organisations and persons were identified across the 
different issue areas. Once granted access into the different organisations and networks, 
purposeful sampling was used for the identification of information-rich respondents to 
obtain insights. In addition, snowball-sampling was used to get into contact with other 
experts from the network of the respondents. As for document analyses, the collected and 
analysed documents were primarily public records, and generally consisted of relevant 
laws and regulations, annual reports, mission statements, and policy manuals. Personal 
documents were also examined, and comprised newspapers and articles on meeting 
proceedings. 
The qualitative data analysis of transcriptions was facilitated by the use of MAXQDA 
software. Particularly through the coding of individual components of transcripts, data 
was categorised to facilitate analysis. Codes, such as a word or short phrase were used to 
symbolically assign a summative, salient, and essence-capturing attribute to the language-
based documents (Saldana, 2009). While interview questions were developed and 
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sometimes contextualised to interviewees within the broad methodological framework of 
governance theory, grounded coding was employed to the documents themselves which 
allowed themes and patterns to emerge from the transcripts themselves. Quotes from 
interviewees have been used relatively sparingly in this dissertation, essentially to 
illustrate findings, provide evidence and perspectives to the overall narrative.  
Everything considered, both primary and secondary data have been generated and 
used for the qualitative empirical studies. In the ensuing chapters, the sources are 
interpreted, features of phenomena are emphasised, and associations between variables 
will be highlighted. The scientific realist position, which in brief considers there to be a 
real independent world but recognises the difficulty in accessing it, requires an acceptance  
that knowledge can indeed be fallible. For this reason I underscore the realist’s position 
of Karl Popper, who stated that all laws and theories can be considered hypothetical or 
conjectural; that is, as educated guesses. 
1.7  Relevance of This Study 
This dissertation starts off with the observation that issue areas concerned with 
sustainable practice are characterised by a growing number of standards and regulations. 
Public and private standards on both environmental and social issues have gained 
significant prominence in international and regional value chain governance. While this 
trend can be observed for many different issue areas, they are nonetheless rooted in 
different institutional contexts and have developed in distinctive ways. The governance 
systems of some issue areas may demonstrate more regulatory cohesion, whereas other 
issue areas appear fragmented. It is assumed that some systems are more conducive to 
realise sustainable change than others. Elaborate explorations and convincing arguments 
are still lacking in this regard. 
The aim of this dissertation is to inform this discussion, both theoretically as well as 
pragmatically. It is sought to contribute to the (interdisciplinary) scholarly work on 
governance of sustainability, and in particular add to the conceptual and evaluative 
discussion on fragmented and cohesive regulatory issue fields. This dissertation 
specifically contributes to the current literature by emphasising the role of relations 
between actors within governance systems. Furthermore, the analysis goes beyond the 
environmental policy domain of sustainable development by incorporating a social policy 
dimension as well. Finally, by taking into consideration the historical development of 
issue fields, this dissertation also offers explanations for changes in the variation of 
fragmentation and cohesion over time.   
 Since the examined governance systems comprise actors and standards from the 
public as well as the private domain, this dissertation is furthermore intended to inform 
Introduction 
29 
policy-makers across the different societal domains. These include (inter-)governmental 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, and businesses. Particularly the role of 
collaborative efforts (and the absence thereof in specific issue fields), both between and 
across actors from the different societal domains, may specifically inform public and 
private actors on the possibilities and consequences of collaboration and coordination for 
sustainable development. 
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2.1  Introduction 
Violations of labour law and regulations continue to persist in the 21st century. In 2013 
alone, the world witnessed the collapse of Rana Plaza, an eight-storey commercial 
building, and numerous fires at manufacturing sites in Bangladesh (Burke, 2013), to 
mention only a few disastrous examples. While violations of fair labour standards occur 
throughout the world, they are predominant in manufacturing countries and could be 
prevented through compliance with national and international labour standards. 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a United Nations (UN) agency 
devoted to the promotion of social justice and internationally recognised human and 
labour rights. It is the most authoritative norm- and standard-setting body on the 
international level. It has a tripartite governing structure, meaning that workers and 
employers have an equal voice with governments in its deliberations. In voting 
procedures, governments offset worker and employer voting capacity because each 
member country is represented by two government delegates, an employer delegate, and 
a worker delegate. The core rights have been established in a total of 189 conventions, and 
deal with issues including child labour, forced labour, non-discrimination and equal pay, 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. Member countries become subject to 
the ILO’s regular supervisory system responsible for ensuring that ratified and binding 
conventions are applied. Enforcement of the conventions relies upon the jurisprudence  
of domestic courts, as there are no international courts on labour rights.  
A major shortcoming in the influence and power of the ILO is that it lacks 
enforcement mechanisms. The agency can register complaints against entities that are 
violating international rules. However, it does not impose sanctions on governments due 
to the principle of non- intervention in nation-state sovereignty and the influence of 
national self- interests on international institutions (Scherer & Smid, 2000). As a result, 
conventions are far from being fully institutionalised and core labour rights are still 
extensively violated in many parts of the world (Helfen & Sydow, 2013). 
The inability to enforce labour rights at the international level is a modern-day 
problem characteristic of a world that is globalised in its production processes. With the 
advance of economic liberalisation there has been a shift in sourcing practices by large 
corporations as they source from networks of global suppliers without legal ties 
(Barrientos & Smith, 2007). Commodities sold by brands and retailers in the developed 
world are often produced in long supply chains in which those at the bottom of the system 
incur cuts to their labour costs. The complexity of the supply chain and the manner in 
which the options of many of its actors are constrained epitomises a structural injustice  
(Young, 2006). Complicity to this structural problem is vast as some producers 
purposefully violate labour laws or are negligent. International brands, and suppliers or 
contractors who pressurise producers, contribute to cutting labour costs while largely 
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escaping responsibility for unfair labour conditions in supply chains. Southern 
governments compete for a ‘favourable’ investment climate which comprises low taxes 
and minimal regulation (Young, 2004). Consumers also sustain unfair labour practices as 
they remain unaware or are ignorant of the conditions in which commodities are 
produced or feel unable to change this. The problem is hence embedded in modern-day 
consumerism and economic sourcing models and is sustained by the scale of the problem 
(from local to global), the displacement of human rights responsibilities to manufacturing 
countries wanting economic prosperity (North and South divide), and the lack of 
regulatory authorities and enforcement mechanisms of national and international 
institutions (institutional incapacity). A facilitating factor to the lack of enforcement of 
fair labour by public actors is that within the neoliberal agenda public issues are 
increasingly left to private parties. While social relations within supply chains are 
politicised and conflicts on the normative principles for deter-mining responsibility for 
social conditions are contested (Macdonald, 2014), neoliberal ideas, rules and practices  
have become dominant in many domestic and international policy domains, in which 
faith is placed in free markets and the accompanying political agenda of removing 
impediments to flows of capital. The prolongation of unfair labour practices within the 
21st century is hence a structural problem for which responsibility not only lies with all 
the actors, but also with the political and institutional structures that sustain the system. 
Within this political environment private nongovernmental initiatives for fair labour 
have arisen from the mid-1990s onwards (Bartley, 2007) to fill the gap left by national 
governments that do not implement and enforce the standards of the ILO. These 
arrangements may be multi- stakeholder in nature when they are partnerships including 
actors from both civil society and the business domain, also referred to as intersectoral 
partnerships (Bitzer, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2012) or cross- sector partnerships (Selsky & 
Parker, 2005). They may be intra-sectoral when they are constituted of partners solely 
from civil society or the market domain. These arrangements are involved in regulatory 
activities that are voluntary in nature, and in this way they transform the nature of existing 
regulation (O'Rourke, 2003). Seeking to function along the lines of outsourced 
production, their strategies may encompass setting standards, providing training for 
businesses, monitoring the implementation of standards, certifying factories, and 
accrediting certification programmes. Within the private domain, there are at present 
numerous private arrangements which are involved with various modes of regulation for 
fair labour on the transnational level. The result is a rather pluralist governance system, 
in which each of these initiatives tries to gain competitive edge and market share (Derkx 
& Glasbergen, 2014).  
The effectiveness of these private arrangements has been called into question, and 
recent accounts have been critical about their governance potential (Locke, Amengual, & 
Mangla, 2009; Marx, 2008). In this chapter we argue that this ineffectiveness should not 
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be understood as a consequence of individual arrangements, but as originating from some 
characteristics of the system of arrangements as a whole, which impairs the 
transformative capacity of private arrangements in the issue field. We define 
transformative capacity as the ability to bring about substantial change in (un)fair labour 
practices. To analyse the transformative capacity of the system of arrangements, we will 
develop an analytical perspective that incorporates three dimensions: a structural- 
organisational, a normative-cognitive, and a collaborative-relational one (section 2). 
After an explication of our research methods (section 3), we analyse the system on these 
dimensions (sections 4–6). The last section offers overall conclusions of the study and 
formulates some suggestions to improve the system. 
2.2  Analytical Perspective 
In this chapter we take a systemic view on the private fair labour governance system. This 
view is based upon the closely connected governance system (Burns & Stöhr, 2011a, 
2011b; Guéneau, 2007; Jentoft, van Son, & Bjørkan, 2007) and organisational field 
approach (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; Machado-da-Silva, Filho, & Rossoni, 2006; Smith 
& Fischlein, 2010). The governance system approach has its roots in governance theory 
and addresses questions of governability regarding public issues. Its main premise is that 
no single organisational entity has the capacity to handle governing challenges effectively. 
Therefore, governance theory places the solution of these problems in the network of 
public and private actors that have a stake in the issue. The organisational field approach 
has been developed in organisation theory. It is based on the observations that 
organisational entities may fulfil similar roles, may recognise each other and may engage 
with each other. Because these actors are involved in a network of organisations, its main 
premise is that opportunities and limits to individual behaviour will be created, while the 
network as a whole may handle issues that the actors individually cannot. Both 
approaches have in common that they take an observable field of institutional life as their 
starting point. These institutions consist of organisational entities that relate both to an 
issue and each other. The qualification ‘institutional’ refers to the fact that participation 
of the organisations in the issue field is, at least in the short term, rather stable. Another 
commonality is that both approaches recognise relationships on three levels of analysis. 
On the first level, it is considered that the organisational structure of the 
institutionalised field is structured by the activities of participants in the same dialogue. 
The activities directed towards the achievement of the issue and the actors’ respective 
organisational aims, including task allocation, responsibilities and coordination, shape 
the organisational structure and possibilities for action of the issue field. On the second 
cognitive and normative level, actors in such an institutionalised area are considered 
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participants in the same dialogue or discussion, although variations may occur in their 
commitment to specific perspectives, problem definitions, or strategies to solve them. The 
third level of analysis regards an institutionalised field as a dynamic identity. Here it is 
assumed that through their strategic responses towards the issue and each other, the 
actors are able, to a certain extent, to induce changes in the institutional characteristics of 
the issue field. It is anticipated that participants in the same dialogue will most likely 
develop some specific relationships to each other: they will interact, collaborate and form 
alliances, although it is also possible that (coalitions of) actors develop a more hostile and 
adversarial relationship.  
In our study of the private fair labour governance system we have translated this 
systemic view into three operational dimensions to evaluate their characteristics: 
 
- The first dimension refers to structural- organisational relationships and focuses on 
definitions of roles, responsibilities and leadership in the issue area. 
- The second dimension refers to normative- cognitive relationships and focuses on the 
extent to which visions related to the standards for fair labour are shared by the 
participants in the issue area. 
- The third dimension refers to dynamism in the system and focuses on the 
collaborative-relational capacity of the actors in the field, understood as their 
inclination to collaborate for concerted change. 
 
Empirically, the boundaries between the three dimensions are not always clear-cut, as 
some characteristics enforce reaction in other dimensions or integrally span boundaries. 
The dimensions are meant as a conceptual tool to evaluate system characteristics. 
2.3  Research Methods and Data 
This chapter is based on a literature study, semi- structured in-depth interviews and 
online desk research of information available in 2013. The literature study comprised 
literature on partnerships and collaborative arrangements for sustainable development, 
governance and governance systems, with particular attention given to transnational 
regulatory arrangements for fair labour. The interviews were conducted with 
collaborative arrangements of both an intra-sectoral and multi-stakeholder nature. 
Examining the private governing arrangements as a system includes the setting of 
boundaries. The criteria for incorporating arrangements into the analysis were that 
arrangements must: (a) have the improving of fair labour as their main priority; (b) have 
been explicitly engaged with regulatory activities such as standard setting; and (c) have a 
transnational scope. A list of arrangements was established based on the literature study 
and online desk research, which was then complemented with the fair labour 
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arrangements mentioned by our interviewees. More than 20 arrangements were 
recognised to be involved in regulatory activities for fair labour, but only half of these met 
the criteria of having fair labour as its main concern and having a transnational scope. In 
total ten transnational private regulatory arrangements were examined, out of which 
seven interviews were conducted with representatives of the arrangements (BSCI, CCC, 
FLA, FWF, SAI, WRAP and WRC) and one ILO expert. All of the private arrangements 
are not-for-profit nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and all except for the CCC 
partner with businesses to enhance compliance with fair labour practices.  
The following arrangements have been incorporated into the governance system 
analysis: 
 
- Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), multi-sector focus; 
- Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), focus on the garment industry; 
- Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), focus on electronics;  
- Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), multi-sector focus; 
- Fair Labor Association (FLA), multi-sector focus; 
- Fair Wear Foundation (FWF), focus on the garment industry; 
- Global Social Compliance Programme (GSCP), multi-sector focus; 
- Social Accountability International (SAI), multi-sector focus; 
- Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP), focus mainly on the 
garment industry; 
− Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), focus mainly on the garment industry. 
 
While several arrangements focus on multiple sectors and industries, overall, the garment 
industry and sewn products receive greatest attention by the main arrangements.  
In addition to the interviews, the analysis was complemented through online desk 
research, and the various secondary sources consulted on the arrangements included their 
websites, codes of conduct, partnership and/or project reports, and annual reports.  
The arrangements were introduced from the mid-1990s onwards; with the exception 
of the CCC, as its establishment can be traced back to 1989, although they only developed 
a model code in 1998. The arrangement that was initiated most recently has been the 
GSCP in 2006. This indicates that the private regulatory frameworks on fair labour took 
off from the mid-1990s and reasonably stabilised around 2006. 
2.4  The Structural-Organisational Dimension 
The structural-organisational dimension of the fair labour system focuses on the manner 
in which the governance system is structured by the activities of the arrangements. The 
definitions of roles, responsibilities and leadership in the issue area shape the system 
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structure and affect possibilities for action by the arrangements. The characteristics we 
analysed are the stakeholder representatives included in governance boards, the roles 
arrangements take regarding businesses, accountability of the arrangements, and views 
on leadership. 
Stakeholder compositions 
The arrangements we studied are governed by different sets of stakeholders. Some are 
multi-stakeholder, including actors from civil society such as universities and unions, and 
from the market domain, including companies and industry associations, while others are 
intra-sectoral, including only civil society or market actors. Independence is reinforced 
in cases where arrangements have a multi-stakeholder structure as the different actors 
possess a more representative collection of motivations and a fuller array of 
complementary competencies. Private actors bring diverse interests and values, expertise 
and operational capacities together. Among other functions, civil society actors may 
contribute operational capacities for collecting, disseminating and analysing information, 
provide input to agenda- setting and policy development processes, assess conditions and 
monitoring compliance with agreements, and advocate (environmental) justice (Gemmill 
& Bamidele-Izu, 2002). Next to economic and management expertise (Van Huijstee, 
Pollock, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2011) business participation is expressed to strengthen the 
operational capacities for agenda setting, norm promotion and monitoring (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2009). While different competencies may be reconciled, the representation of 
these sectors presents contesting institutional demands, since they are guided by different 
incongruent core logics (for instance an economic versus a social rationale) (Parker & 
Selsky, 2004; Van Huijstee et al., 2011).  
A critical example of stakeholder representation is the composition of the governance 
boards. Members of the governance board have ultimate access to decision-making 
procedures. Board members are reflective of whose point of view is considered since 
members of the board of directors act on behalf of the organisation’s constituents, whether 
they are from the state, market domain or civil society. Among other responsibilities, non-
profit board responsibilities are described as deciding on the organisation’s mission and 
purpose, determining whether its programmes are consistent with its mission and 
monitoring the effectiveness of these programmes, and adhering to legal and ethical 
standards and norms (Ingram, 2008). Access to decision-making procedures enhances 
accountability and legitimacy, and may improve compliance and acceptance of the 
standards. It is argued that the absence of affected societal actors in the decision- making 
processes not only constitutes a lack of legitimacy but also poses a danger to the 
effectiveness of the arrangements (Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011; Zürn, 2004). 
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Within the different private standard- setting arrangements, we observe an uneven 
distribution of types of stakeholders who have access to decision-making in the 
governance boards. Next to collective representation by businesses, NGOs, unions, 
universities and colleges, there are also individuals on the boards who function in their 
own expert capacity. Predominantly represented, however, are business and industry 
representatives (in eight out of ten arrangements). Throughout all the governance boards, 
direct representation of workers by unions is minimal (in two out of ten arrangements). 
Having a multi-stakeholder coalition is, for some of the arrangements, a determining 
factor for accrediting a sustainable value to negotiating labour rights (for four out of seven 
interviewed arrangements). A multi-stakeholder input in the governance boards is 
described as moving towards more sustainable change, and a lack of union representatives 
on the boards is only by a few deemed to diminish the credibility and legitimacy of the 
arrangements (for two out of the seven interviewed arrangements). The analysis of 
governance boards shows that within the private governance system for fair labour, 
workers’ rights are currently more proposed by industry stakeholders and the corporate 
world than by unions. 
Roles 
Civil society is a generic label that covers several disparate and often contradictory and 
competitive forms of organisation and action (Castells, 2008). NGOs involved in global 
governance can take a variety of roles, including the mobilisation of public opinion, the 
representation of the voiceless, and service provisioning by delivering technical expertise 
on particular topics, as well as participating directly in operational activities, monitoring 
and assessment, and providing expert advice and analysis (Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu, 
2002). The organisations within the private governance system for fair labour share some 
characteristics but fulfil diverse roles. This was underscored by the representatives and 
explained in reactionary, dialectic, but primarily functionalist, terms. Even though it 
remains indeed ambiguous at whose demand new transnational regulatory institutions 
are established (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009), identity formation of 
organisations may be seen as an inherently social and inter-organisational process, and 
the creation of new arrangements essentially reactionary to the particular status quo. The 
representative of the FWF formulated the functionalist argument as follows: “All the 
organisations have a role, otherwise they would not exist.” The representative of the CCC 
understood the fulfilment of different roles in dialectic terms constituted in a dynamic 
political arena with purposeful strategies for power. The CCC has a unique position 
within the private governance system as it does not have corporate members and 
primarily fulfils a campaigning role by mobilising public opinion and representing the 
voiceless. The other arrangements are business–NGO partnerships that, as one source of 
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income, provide, for instance, expertise, advice, monitoring and assessment based on 
membership fees. Nonetheless, there are further variations, for instance the WRC that 
takes the representation of the voiceless as one of their primary roles. Although all 
arrangements underscore their differences, they are also critical of each other’s aims. As 
will be shown in the next subsections, within the business–NGO arrangements there are 
many variations in standards and enforcement. While some adhere to stringent standards 
and discontinue membership in case of noncompliance, other arrangements are toothless 
and merely provide a global platform for promoting the exchange of knowledge. On a 
strategic level, this question affects just how the arrangements regard themselves as 
change agents. Do they fulfil a consultancy role for businesses, or do they perform a more 
public role? Some of the arrangements are criticised for their impetuses towards industry, 
while others disapprove of naming and shaming businesses and making public attacks on 
their operating models. In turn, the more critical and stringent arrangements are critica l 
of the least stringent initiatives, lowering the bar for fair labour standards. The 
representative of the FLA reflected on the different roles: 
Everyone has its role to play and in a spectrum you need the name and shame 
[arrangements] because they raise a lot of issues, they serve the watchdog function. 
The threat that they pose forces a lot of companies to get out of their comfort zone 
and start thinking about social responsibility . . . But then you also need 
[arrangements] where the companies that decide to do something need to go. … 
I do get worried though that some of the organisations devalue the currency. … 
They make it harder for other groups who are trying to raise standards. 
Accountability 
Even though public opinion may at times influence the strategic course of the private 
arrangements, those based on the monitoring and assessment of businesses are not 
directly affected in their relationships with businesses. The reasons for this rest on 
shortcomings in accountability structures. First of all, the arrangements themselves do 
not have to fear the purchasing power of consumers. The monitoring arrangements do 
not have consumers as clientele, but businesses. In fact, the more pressure is applied to 
businesses, the likelier the chance that a business will opt for membership to a certifying 
or monitoring fair labour arrangement of their choice. Closely connected to the 
purchasing power argument lies a second argument, which is that the arrangements that 
fall within the scope of this research do not certify products, and correspondingly do not 
fear damage to their reputation on defectively certified products. Even accountability for 
audits is diffuse. For example, with the collapse of the Rana Plaza complex in Bangladesh 
in April 2013, with a death toll of 1129, BSCI social audits were performed in two of the 
factories in the complex. The audits did not include building construction or integrity. 
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Also in the case of the fire in Ali Enterprises in September 2012 in Pakistan, where nearly 
300 workers died, the certification body that issued the certification to the company was 
accredited by the Social Accountability Accreditation Services (SAAS), an accreditation 
agency used by both BSCI and SAI. While these and other tragedies have received 
considerable attention, insufficient private certification practices have received rather 
limited attention from civil society at large. Other arrangements within the governance 
system are critical of accreditation and certification practices and comment that more 
responsibility should be taken (according to three out of the seven interviewed 
arrangements). There is, however, no mechanism by which arrangements that outsource 
services are held accountable. In the current configuration of the governance system there 
are thus several identifiable problems that pertain to its accountability structures. 
Ascribed leadership 
Related to the fact that accountability is largely lacking and in the absence of a body that 
sanctions these organisations, we observe that there is also not one authority that leads or 
guides the arrangements. The private arrangements consider different public authorities 
to be relevant and influential for the issue field of fair labour, including: the ILO (e.g. 
conventions, subdivisions and programmes); the UN (e.g. Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights as endorsed by the Human Rights Council); the EU (e.g. Corporate 
Social Responsibility Strategy); and negotiations and agreements made on a national or 
local level (e.g. the Bangladesh Fire and Safety Protocol). Amongst these, the ILO is 
considered to be the most authoritative standard-setting body. It serves as a reference 
point for the arrangements as its conventions, recommendations and jurisprudence are 
generally appreciated. Some of these works are translated into standards, trainings, and 
other instruments as employed by the arrangements.  
While the former UN Secretary- General’s Special Representative for Business and 
Human Rights, John Gerard Ruggie, has been recognised as having played an influential 
role, particularly with regard to his proposition of the framework on the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2008, our research reveals that strong 
leadership qualities are currently not ascribed to any institution or person. Even though 
the ILO is considered to be the most authoritative standard- setting body, within the 
governance system there is not one leading arrangement that shows or sets out how the 
private arrangements can or should direct their efforts. What’s more, due to its tripartite 
structure, the private arrangements feel that they have very little, if any, influence on the 
ILO. The ILO does not employ preferential or specifically accommodating services for the 
private arrangements. However, there are more structural problems that inhibit the ILO 
from being perceived as a leader by the arrangements. Firstly, the ILO is considered to be 
almost a victim of its own democracy as a tripartite body. Member states, but also the 
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employer and worker federations, can restrict its ability to act. Secondly, because it is a 
tripartite organisation change occurs slowly and incrementally. Thirdly, there is a heavy 
focus on the national context, and the tripartite structure is seen to mainly serve the 
national levels, whereas many of the private arrangements are involved in global supply 
chain activities.  
Overall, the characteristics of the structural-organisational dimension show that the 
representation of market actors, particularly in relation to the more limited direct 
representation of workers, represents an uneven distribution of stakeholder 
representativeness. There is a further divide on the role arrangements take on businesses, 
from a more supportive and consultative role to an adversarial one. Since the 
arrangements do not certify commodities they do not fear reputational damage or 
accountability demands from consumers for ineffective enforcement of private standards. 
Finally, there are currently no leadership qualities ascribed to any private or public 
institution. 
2.5  The Normative-Cognitive Dimension 
Although variations may occur in commitment to specific perspectives, problem 
definitions or strategies to solve them, the normative- cognitive dimension of the fair 
labour governance system refers to the extent to which visions related to the standards for 
fair labour are shared by the participants in the issue area. We analysed the provisions in 
the standards, means of enforcement, and views on public and private responsibility for 
effective compliance to standards. 
Standards 
Standards set by the private arrangements are based on public regulations, primarily those 
established by ILO conventions, other human rights frameworks, and, in some 
arrangements, the benchmark of conduct must only be in line with national and local 
laws. The standards are typically incorporated into codes of conduct, and they stipulate 
the minimum norms and rules to which the arrangements envision that companies 
comply with, and on which performance of the supply chains can or must be evaluated. 
They are written statements in which a commitment to a conduct is expressed. 
Information about the codes must therefore be communicated externally to become 
known for businesses, suppliers and consumers. Ordinarily, many codes fall within the 
realm of general business ethics with no implementation methods, but businesses that 
adopt codes of conduct by the standard-setting arrangements, adopt them with the 
intention to apply them transnationally, particularly as sourcing guidelines (Diller, 1999) 
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in which the code applies to other enterprises in the value chain which are not directly 
owned, operated or controlled by the business having adopted the code.  
Codes related to labour standards were originally quite diverse, but are considered 
to have converged around the same ILO core standards and principles at the turn of the 
21st century (O'Rourke, 2003). Even though it is evident that all are inspired by the same 
core principles, the statements and details incorporated within the provisions vary 
considerably. In our analysis, several issues concerning the key provisions of the different 
arrangements come to the fore. Here we provide several examples. On the key issue of 
child labour, WRAP challenges the minimum age law of the ILO of 15 (unless the legal 
minimum is 14 which needs to be in accordance with the ILO developing country 
exceptions) by stipulating the age of 14 as a minimum. Even though the BSCI does refer 
to the ILO and UN Conventions, the minimum age is omitted from the provision. On the 
key issue of freedom of association the EICC, GSCP and WRAP refer to ‘lawful’ rights or 
the rights in accordance with ‘local laws’, which restricts the human right to freely 
associate and bargain collectively. On the key issue of wages, WRAP and the EICC refer 
to wages in compliance to local laws but leave out any provisions on living expenses, basic 
needs and discretionary income. The BSCI states that employers are encouraged to 
provide compensation in cases where the legal wage does not cover living expenses, but 
this remains provisional. On the issue of hours of work, WRAP ignores the ILO 
Conventions by referring to a country’s law. On the issue of employment relationships, 
the BSCI, EICC, WRAP and WRC do not have any codes. The analysis not only shows 
that there is clear diversity in the codes of conduct but also shows there is ambiguity about 
the ILO being considered as an authoritative model code. 
Enforcement mechanisms 
Similar diversity was also found in the enforcement of the standards. Enforcing standards 
is a means through which the arrangements want to accomplish their goals. Additionally, it 
also signifies strategic efforts as choices made on the enforcement of standards define how 
member companies will be treated and how producers in the supply chains will be affected. 
Systems for implementing and evaluating compliance to codes of conduct are critical to the 
credibility of the codes endorsed by the standard- setting arrangements (O'Rourke, 2003). 
Out of the ten standard-setting arrangements in our analysis, seven verify whether 
businesses implement the respective standards, out of which, three use certification. There 
is great diversity concerning the actual verification of the implementation of the standards, 
as arrangements vary on aspects such as who conducts the audits, which aspects of 
compliance are monitored, how noncomplying members or producers are treated, and 
whether they make audit results or noncompliant members public.  
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Our analysis of the enforcement mechanisms reveals that only the ETI does not 
require that companies have third-party auditing – that is, audits carried out by 
independent organisations outside the company and its supply chain to verify whether 
they meet standards, even though the ETI does make validation visits to verify 
management performance. All other monitoring organisations do commit businesses to 
third-party auditing, whether the arrangements coordinate audits themselves or have 
certification bodies for SA8000 management systems. Auditing of standards related to 
actual performance requires that companies demonstrate changed practices and have not 
just put a management system in place (Conroy, 2007). Performance-based standards 
therefore provide more assurance to businesses down the supply chain and to consumers 
that a company’s fair labour management meets the standard. The FLA, FWF, WRAP and 
WRC require that auditors visit factories and actually verify standard implementation.  
Further distinctions are found regarding noncompliance of members and producers. 
WRAP is the only arrangement that directly audits producers without necessitating 
membership involvement of brands. In case of noncompliance they do not certify the 
factory. The ETI, FLA and SAI terminate brand membership to their organisation in cases 
of noncompliance. They hold their own members accountable for failing to address 
noncompliance within their own management system or for failing to terminate relations 
with a noncomplying producer. The BSCI, FWF and the WRC, on the other hand, assign 
responsibility for noncompliance at the producing level, and take into consideration 
whether to continue or discontinue relationships between producer and brand at the 
brand level. Whether this is out of consideration for brand autonomy or for fear that 
workers might be worse off without jobs, they ultimately hold producers accountable for 
noncompliance, and not the brands at the end of the supply chain. Similar strategic 
considerations can be found in keeping audit results or noncompliant members 
confidential or making them public. Publicising may be regarded as a punishment as it 
can have a detrimental effect on business performance and does not improve the situation 
of workers. Nonetheless, not making results public also has detrimental effects in that 
unfair labour practices may continue, thus also not improving the situation of the 
workers. 
Views on responsibility 
While the arrangements aspire to improve labour conduct, there is wide 
acknowledgement that responsibility and capacity to solve the issue is diffuse and rests on 
everyone, from states, intergovernmental agencies, businesses, trade associations, NGOs 
and unions, to consumers. None of the arrangements considered their own organisation 
as bearing the most responsibility in resolving unfair labour conduct. Most often 
responsibility was placed with businesses and with states.  
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Reasons for businesses to carry this responsibility firstly derived from the 
consideration that labour rights abuses happen specifically because of the way brands and 
retailers do business. Placing severe price pressures and strict deadlines on manufacturing 
suppliers necessarily puts a negative burden on labour. Secondly, the solutions to unfair 
labour practices must be grounded on business principles to be effective. Addressing the 
business motivations that drive the incentives that sustain unfair labour practices is 
argued to be more successful in getting rid of the problem. Brands and retailers would 
need to commit to working with certified manufacturers, and this is projected to create 
incentives for the rest of the manufacturers.  
Ensuring commitment to ethical sourcing through the force of law is the main reason 
why states are envisioned to regulate the private domain. The failure of business 
compliance is seen as the responsibility of the state. Many national institutions are 
considered at a loss due to limited capabilities because global supply chains are 
transnational. Next to the fact that arrangements consider many states to fail at regulating 
the labour market, international institutions in turn do not have the ability to regulate the 
global supply chain. The arrangements, in their own operational capacities, try to force 
business actors to deliver public goods. Interestingly, the regulatory activities by the 
private arrangements were placed at an intermediate level between businesses and states, 
though the responsibility to alleviate unfair labour conduct was ultimately placed at the 
door of state and business conduct. Overall, the characteristics of the normative-cognitive  
dimension show that there are different visions of the adaptation of core conventions and 
principles as set by international institutions, and diverse approaches in enforcement 
methods. Furthermore, final responsibility to solve unfair labour conduct is primarily 
given to businesses and public institutions rather than taken by themselves as 
intermediaries. 
2.6  The Collaborative-Relational Dimension 
The final dimension of the system refers to the collaborative capacity of the actors in the 
field, understood as their inclination to collaborate for concerted change. This has been 
examined on two levels of analysis: firstly, the extent to which the private arrangements 
cooperate with core international institutions; and secondly, how and to what extent the 
arrangements collaborate with each other. 
Relationships between the ILO and private arrangements 
As previously discussed, different international public authorities are considered to be 
relevant and influential for the work of the private arrangements. Nonetheless, 
relationships and cooperation between private and public arrangements are seldom 
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formalised, nor do they occur habitually. Consultation or collaboration with the ILO is 
stated to be project driven and not embodying a larger affiliation. Examples provided were 
consultation and training in the leather sector in Ethiopia by WRAP, consultation and 
adoption of the fair wage concept by the FLA, or the provision of a neutral chair by the 
ILO for the steering committee of the Bangladesh Accord to which the CCC and WRC 
are witness signatories. The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh was 
designed in 2013 by Bangladeshi and international unions, together with other civil 
society labour groups, including the WRC and CCC. It was signed by over 50 
international brands and retailers, who agreed upon a five- year commitment to invest in 
safer factories. Among other provisions, the accord includes independent inspections by 
experts, public reporting, mandatory repairs and renovations financed by brands, and a 
binding contract to make all commitments enforceable. Public support by the ILO of the 
Bangladesh Accord is considered by the WRC and CCC to have advanced their efforts. 
With the exception of one arrangement, the arrangements are not frequently in contact 
with the ILO, nor do they expect to be. The mandate of the ILO is widely considered to 
precede engagement with the private arrangements. 
Collaboration between the arrangements 
At present, attempts for enduring collaboration have hardly been found within the private 
governance system. The arrangements collaborate with a small selection of other 
arrangements, and efforts are initiated on an individual basis depending on ideological 
and circumstantial reasons. The ideological argument refers to like-mindedness or as one 
representative (WRC) stated: “we collaborate with organisations we feel make similar 
commitments and have similar enforceability mechanisms.” It was particularly 
considered that the operating models between industries led arrangements, and 
organisations without worker representatives were too distinct for real collaborative 
efforts to take off. Circumstantial motivations refer to factors such as whether 
arrangements are involved in the same projects, particular countries or regions, brands, 
factories, or thematic topics such as the living wage concept. Collaboration is particularly 
valued in cases where duplication of effort is decreased, for example running training on 
freedom of association or fire and safety. The type of content exchanged is primarily 
informative, advisory and supportive.  
Most of the collaborations are intangible exchanges and take place along informal 
lines of communication. The only tangible exchanges between the arrangements were 
noted in those instances where the partners were represented in the governance board, 
and in cases of joint projects between different standard-setting and monitoring 
partnerships that are formalised, with, for instance, a memorandum of understanding. 
From the interviews it became apparent that the latter does not occur often. The most 
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common type of collaboration was along informal lines, such as attending consultation 
rounds convened by one of the arrangements, attending the same seminars or webinars 
and congresses, and direct lines of personal communication such as email 
correspondence and telephone conversations.  
While collaborative efforts were perceived as valuable and the arrangements were 
open for more efforts to be undertaken, they recognised that next to a common 
ideological or circumstantial purpose, two of the biggest constraints were time and being 
understaffed. This was also reflected in a more strategic attempt at collaboration that had 
been explored in the past with the initiation of the Joint Initiative on Corporate 
Accountability and Workers’ Rights in 2003, when a total of six arrangements (CCC, ETI, 
FLA, FWF, SAI, WRC) convened as a first formalised effort between the different 
organisations to collaborate. Supported by grants from the European Commission and 
the US State department, the project was initiated to determine whether and how the 
participating arrangements could enhance efficiency and effectiveness (Derkx & 
Glasbergen, 2014). It was an attempt to establish a metagovernance arrangement, or, as it 
was broadly defined, establishing an ‘organisation of self-organisation’ (Sørensen, 2006). 
In an effort to maximise the effectiveness of the regulatory approaches, reduce duplication 
of efforts, explore possibilities to cooperate and share learning the initiative conducted a 
‘trial project’ in Turkey where they wanted to test various aspects of the collaborative 
effort. The project ran until 2007 and has not evolved into an active organisational 
structure or platform in use today. In several studies (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; 
Glasbergen, 2013) it is explicated that the initiative has been valuable as a learning 
experience and that it was an important first step towards cooperation. However, it was 
not very effective in its efforts to change company policy or in achieving actual 
improvements in the Turkish context. These aggravations spilled over into the 
convergence element of the collaboration, and also complicated relationships between the 
Joint Initiative’s members. The lack of coordinated effort shows that these hurdles have 
not been surmounted.  
The characteristics of the collaborative-relational dimension show that public-
private interaction is limited, and although the private arrangements cooperate with each 
other, this lacks clear coordination and occurs for ideological and circumstantial reasons. 
2.7  Conclusions 
In this chapter we have identified system characteristics of the fair labour governance 
system which we operationalised on three dimensions. On the structural-organisational 
dimension, the distribution of representatives across governance boards on the whole 
includes more industry representation, and the roles the arrangements take on regarding 
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businesses varies. There are certain identifiable shortcomings in relation to accountability 
structures, and there is no leadership in the governance system. On the normative-
cognitive dimension, many variations exist in the provisions taken up in the standards 
and in their enforcement. While responsibility to solve unfair labour was considered 
diffuse, final responsibility to solve unfair labour was not placed with the arrangements 
in the private governance system, but primarily at state or corporate level. On the 
collaborative-relational dimension we found that private actors generally have sporadic 
collaboration with core international labour institutions. While the arrangements share 
knowledge and expertise to some degree with other arrangements that have similar 
operational models, the incentive to collaborate is weak, and, as a result, collaboration is 
largely uncoordinated and limited.  
We argue that the fragmentation recognizable on the three dimensions impairs the 
transformative capacity of the governance system of the fair labour issue field. While there 
are several arguments for why the existence of diverse regulatory arrangements may be 
positively assessed, including the potential for innovation and covering niche or different 
parts of the market, our findings indicate that high levels of fragmentation from a systemic 
point of view brings limited potential for structural change. Even though the potential for 
transformative capacity is present as arrangements are, to varying degrees, actively 
involved with standard setting, monitoring, training and education, systemic change has 
not occurred. As one representative stated: “Arguably [the industry] is just as bad, just as 
dangerous as it was 10 years ago when all these programmes had just started.” While 
positive results are noticeable regarding the ground work, particularly in the 
dissemination of training, implementing complaints mechanisms, and generally in 
creating awareness about all the different labour rights and conditions, a sense of 
frustration across the arrangements was noticeable regarding the effectiveness of the 
work. In particular, the existence of more lax approaches undermines the efforts of more 
stringent approaches. Whether this contributes to the confusion on the ends of businesses 
and civil society at large, it certainly offers businesses the opportunity to choose the 
stringency level of standards and audits.  
The new fulfilment of global corporatism raises serious questions about the 
representativeness of corporatist arrangements, and the extent to which they function as 
instruments of co-optation rather than representation. One important characteristic that 
supports this is the predominant representation of industry and corporate interests in 
decision-making processes and the scarce direct representation of workers. Furthermore, 
since the distribution of arrangements has reasonably stabilised and remained secure, the 
incentive to change conduct is low. The predominant focus on the garment sector and 
sewn products limits the potential for change across sectors. In addition, lacks in 
accountability structures, particularly for the certifying arrangements, is a system 
characteristic that sustains the problem of diffuse responsibility. Certification of 
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commodities could be one solution. However, regulatory arrangements are currently not 
able to guarantee a supply chain that is completely fair. As long as the public or private 
transnational governance system cannot guarantee fair labour nor effectively penalise 
noncompliance, only individuals will be held accountable and no systemic 
transformations will occur.  
The failure to effectively alleviate fair labour violations on an international level by 
governments and intergovernmental agencies has not been solved hitherto by the private 
transnational arrangements in the governance system. This raises questions about the 
effectiveness of the governance system given that its characteristics do indicate problems 
related to the fragmentation of the system. Example of this are: the variety amongst the 
private actors themselves, the lack of accountability and the uncoordinated efforts 
amongst various arrangements, and weak public-private links. Without more coherence 
the transformative potential of the arrangements may not be accomplished. More 
structured intergovernmental support would advance the efforts of the private 
arrangements, as, in addition to expertise and support, leadership could be provided and 
authoritative leverage would be brought to the table. A private implementation institution 
of the ILO could, for instance, by means of authority and capacity lending, fill this 
governance gap. Without addressing these issues, the transformative capacity of the 
private fair labour governance system will remain challenging. 
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3.1  Introduction 
Organic production is a highly regulated policy domain. The label ‘organic’ has 
increasingly become legally protected, as not only private standards but also public 
regulations specify the exact requirements for organic production and labelling. Organic 
regulation is unique among self-regulatory regimes because organic labelling was once 
the exclusive domain of private organizations, but has since evolved into a regime where 
the establishment of minimum standards has become the prerogative of public actors in 
a growing number of countries (Arcuri, 2015). The plethora of available standards, labels, 
and certifications (e.g., Castka & Corbett, 2016; Janssen & Hamm, 2011) has led to a 
complex and fragmented system of regulations. Of serious concern is that the 
duplications and overlaps between the systems have led to compliance problems and 
barriers to trade (Courville, 2006). Consequently, debates in the organic field during the 
last decade were characterized by the need to harmonize organic standards (Fouilleux & 
Loconto, 2017). 
In the meantime, the absence of global harmonization has induced governments, 
traders, and certification institutions to develop complex pathways to facilitate  
cooperation in trade. These include compliance, equivalence, and mutual recognition 
based mechanisms (Winickoff & Klein, 2011). Another pathway that has gained interest 
from international organizations and developing countries is the regionalization of 
organic standards. These regional arrangements are public or public-private partnerships 
within geographical regions with at least two neighboring countries. Through either a 
common regional standard or the harmonization and recognition of each other’s national 
standards, regionalization is assumed to bring more cohesion - here understood as unity 
- in the norms and values that underlie organic production and its codification. 
Regionalization of organic standards thus enables countries to deal with complex 
regulatory realities (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015a), which can stimulate intra- and inter-
regional trade. 
The European Union’s (EU) common framework for organic production is the most 
notable example of this regionalization as it integrates regulations in its central legislative  
structure. However, several other regional standards that are not placed in an economic-
political union with an internal single market have been initiated in the last decade. This 
phenomenon, including the causes and effects of regionalization of standards, has thus 
far received scant scholarly attention. Filling this gap, this article will evaluate if regional 
standards and the system as a whole make the regulatory field of organic production more 
cohesive, and whether it is conducive to regional and international trade. It will provide 
an analysis of regional attempts thus far, and identify drivers for regionalization. Then, 
the ability of regionalization to reduce regulatory fragmentation will be assessed. 
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The article first provides an overview of the regulatory field on organic production 
and places it within the context of fragmentation and cohesion in global governance 
theory. It will then focus on what regionalization is, and its advantages and disadvantages 
in relation to organic standards. After an overview of the research methods, a comparative 
analysis will lay the basis for the discussion and conclusion. 
3.2  The Organic Regulatory Field 
The rise of private and national standards 
The origins of modern organic agriculture can be traced back to the 1920s when initia l 
concern was raised about the direction of industrial agriculture (e.g., Kristiansen, 2006; 
Lockeretz, 2007). Organic agriculture developed as an alternative form of farming 
compatible with natural systems. The first organic standard (Demeter) was introduced in 
1928. Other informal regulatory tools developed in the 1950s (Courville, 2006), and 
associations of farmers and consumers started to develop guidelines and standards based 
on organic principles. From the 1970s onwards, the first private organic labels spread 
across Europe and the United States. Around this time, organic farmers founded growers’ 
associations with the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM) as their transnational umbrella organization (Schmidt, 2011). IFOAM became 
the main organization to set organic standards, and it issued its ‘Basic Standards for 
Organic Agriculture’ in 1980. The need for an independent guarantee of compliance - 
spurred on by consumer demand - increased the amount of private certification bodies 
(Courville, 2006). 
The patchwork of differing organic standards and certifications appeared to be an 
obstacle to move organic foods into mainstream marketing channels (Ikerd, 2006). This 
stimulated organic communities to initiate political movements to advance national 
organic standards. The harmonization of organic standards came on the political agenda 
in order to stimulate trade based on different national and transnational standards. With 
the adoption of organic regulation by the EU in 1991, more countries followed suit. At 
present, there are 87 countries with organic standards, although not all countries have 
adopted them into national legislation or even have production standards (Huber, 
Schmid, & Möller, 2016; Möller & Huber, 2016). In principle, national organic regulations 
are binding for domestic producers and for foreign producers interested in entering the 
market. If national standards are not turned into national legislation or if regulations are 
not enforced - whether due to a lack of resources or political support - their binding 
authority is eviscerated. Nonetheless, national standards provide a national definition of 
organic products and serve as a reference point for certification activities (Huber et al., 
2016). In the EU, national certification labels can still be used as long as they comply with 
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(supranational) EU regulations. Private organic standards, which are voluntary in nature, 
also continue to operate in domestic markets but in countries where national standards 
are in place, a product can only be labelled as organic if the publicly enacted standards are 
respected (Arcuri, 2015). National and supranational regulations, therefore, function as 
benchmarks. 
International demarcations and transnational guidance on organic regulation 
In addition to private standards and national regulations, there are also various 
international provisions on organic regulation. These can be categorized in public,  
private, and public-private sources that are either binding or voluntary. To start off with 
public sources of law, two legally binding instruments that do not specifically detail 
organic law but provide the context in which organic regulations are made, are trade 
agreements and international environmental agreements. The Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) Agreement and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are two trade 
agreements that are particularly important. The TBT Agreement aims to ensure that 
technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures are 
nondiscriminatory and do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade, while the SPS 
Agreement sets constraints on Member States' policies relating to food safety and animal 
and plant health with respect to imported pests and diseases. The purpose of the 
agreements is to ascertain whether barriers to trade based on health and safety standards 
should be regarded as compatible or incompatible with trade regulations. 
International environmental agreements, on the other hand, generally deal with 
some aspect of the environment to prevent or manage human impacts on natural 
resources. The protection and sustainable use of biodiversity and the prevention of land 
degradation are enshrined in two internationally legally binding treaties, which are the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) and the Convention to Combat Desertification 
(1994). All voluntary international instruments on organic agriculture principally include  
these issues (Morgera, Caro, & Durán, 2012). 
Recommendations for voluntary application are enshrined in the Codex 
Alimentarius (Codex), a public source first established in 1999 by the Codex Alimentarius  
Commission of the joint program by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The Codex 
specifically covers guidelines for the production, processing, labelling, and marketing of 
organically produced foods. The guidelines are intended to facilitate the harmonization 
of requirements for organic products at the international level, and to provide assistance 
to governments for developing national regulations (Codex Alimentarius, 2007). 
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Transnational voluntary private instruments that provide guidelines to organic 
regulation and good managerial practices are the Conformity assessment (ISO/IEC 
17065: 2012) requirements set by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), the IFOAM Standard, and other standards set by transnational accreditation and 
certification bodies, such as the Standard-Setting Code by the ISEAL Alliance. ISO is the 
main developer of international standards and particularly ISO/IEC 17065 is of 
importance for organic certification bodies. The standard does not specifically deal with 
organic regulations but with technical requirements for certification. Certification bodies 
need to fulfill the described requirements in order to be recognized by ISO as reliable and 
reputable. The ISO standard allows them to demonstrate their competence and perform 
against reference standards, such as national or private organic standards. ISO/IEC 17065 
accreditation is provided to organic certification bodies by accreditation organizations, 
such as the International Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS) founded by IFOAM. It is 
of particular importance for the trade of organic produce, since certain countries only 
permit the trade of organic products which have been certified by an ISO/IEC 17065 
accredited certification body. Through this public-private interplay, voluntary standards 
can become mandatory, then referred to as legally-mandated private standards (Henson 
& Humphrey, 2009). 
Differently, the IFOAM Standard can be used by standard setters and certification 
bodies to certify operators globally. It is intended to enable the trade of organic products 
between operators certified by different certification bodies (IFOAM, 2014b). The 
Standard-Setting Code of the ISEAL Alliance defines effective standard-setting processes 
for social and environmental standards and the ISEAL Alliance has become a global 
authority regarding the requirements for credible standards and certification systems 
(Bernstein & Van der Ven, 2017). Next to that, there are also numerous standards by 
certification bodies that either focus on organic agriculture or on organic components 
and ingredients used in products and services (see ecolabelindex.com for further 
reference on private and public organic standards and labels). Overall, despite all the work 
on conformity assessment and accreditation of certification bodies, the overall assurance 
processes of certification schemes exhibit remarkable differences (Castka & Corbett, 
2016) and the public and private divide to accreditation and certification has created 
tensions and inconsistencies in its global application (see discussion in Fouilleux & 
Loconto, 2017). 
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3.3  Fragmentation and Cohesion in the Global Governance of 
Organic 
A crucial factor fundamentally reconstituting the global public domain has been the 
inclusion of non-public actors in the transnational area concerned with the production of 
global public goods (Ruggie, 2004). Scholars have recognized that this reconstitution can 
result in making regulatory issue fields fragmented (Bernstein & Ivanova, 2007; 
Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009) or cohesive (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; 
Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014; Ivanova & Roy, 2007). The concept of fragmentation 
signifies the diversity, multiplicity, and distribution of regulatory powers of the overall 
institutional settings of different international and transnational policy domains. Evident 
from the multilayered regulatory field for organic production (see also Table 3.1), global 
governance is characterized by the proliferation and diversity of governance actors and 
mechanisms. Fragmentation can be unconducive to realizing societal goals as it may 
diffuse, or be counterproductive for, concerted aims and action. The term cohesion 
functions as its counterpart and the pursuit for cohesion in policy originated in 
scholarship on public policy and multi-level governance (May, Sapotichne, & Workman, 
2006; Winship, 2006). Partnerships and cooperation can overcome the condition of 
fragmentation, enhance concerted aims and action, and result in regulatory coherence. 
Fragmentation, at least in the sense of co-existence of both public and private 
regulations, is broadly supported by the organic movement. Where regulations nowadays 
provide the benchmark for organic production, private standards are lauded for strong 
stakeholder involvement, leading the way as sources of innovation, local identity, 
producer and consumer education, improved public trust and market development 
(Blake, 2009). However, beyond the public and private divide, the fact that standards and 
regulations and their corresponding assurance systems are diverse has also led to 
complications. The duplication and overlap of organic standards and regulations has 
resulted in a complex regulatory system, where integration and coordination between 
regulatory systems is often lacking. Uneven enforcement, consumer confusion, and 
fraudulent claims made by farmers attempting to pocket organic price premiums have 
caused reason for concern (Winickoff & Klein, 2011). The lack of recognition by national 
regulations of private multilateral agreements (Bowen, 2003) augments the requisite for 
certification bodies in particular to get accredited and meet regulatory requirements for 
each import market (Courville, 2006). This inevitably raises accompanying costs. The 
increase in regulatory burden generally creates barriers for uptake and compliance with 
organic standards and certifications, particularly for many smallholders (Gould, 2015). 
There are, furthermore, also concerns about the limitations of ensuring consistency, 
legitimacy and stringency in assurance systems, while at the same time it is sought to allow 
for locally appropriate adaptations (Courville, 2006; Kristiansen, 2006). 
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Table 3.1 The regulatory field of organic production and trade 
Level/Source Public Public-Private Private 
Global - International Trade Agreements 
(TBT, SPS) 
- Environmental Agreements 
(CBD, UNCCD) 
- Codex Alimentarius 
- COROS 
- EquiTool 
- IROCB 
e.g.: 
- IFOAM Standard 
- ISEAL Standard-
Setting Code 
- ISO/IEC 
17065:2012 
Regional - EU: Council Regulation No 
834/2007, Commission Regulations 
No 1235/ 2008 and No 889/2008 
- Central American Standard 
- ASOA 
- ARS 
- EAOPS 
- AROS 
 
National e.g.: e.g.: e.g.: 
 - Japanese Agricultural Organic 
Standard 
- Organic Products Regulations, 
2009 (Canada) 
- Lao Organic Standards 
- National Standard on 
Organic Food System 
(Indonesia) 
- Biogarantie® 
(Belgian) 
- Bio Suisse (Swiss) 
 
Harmonization and equivalence 
Regulatory coherence in organic has been sought through harmonization and 
equivalence. Harmonization is a process that aims at the establishment of identical 
standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment requirements. 
Harmonization was first envisioned to develop through the Codex. However, because the 
main importing countries rely first on national legislation for importing organic products, 
it has not played a concrete role in harmonizing the different regulations (Fouilleux & 
Loconto, 2017). Since conditions for organic agriculture may be detailed for national or 
local circumstances and practices, harmonization has proven to also be unattainable 
based on differences between countries relating to stages of development, cultural factors, 
and geography (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015a). 
Equivalence on the other hand is a process that aims for the acceptance that different 
standards or technical regulations on the same subject fulfil common objectives. It has 
been easier to support and utilize than harmonization, because it allows for differences 
across national and local divides. The EU import regime is the most prominent example 
of having established equivalency agreements with exporting countries. Besides public 
equivalence agreements, which have higher diplomatic status in the form, usually, of a 
treaty (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015a), equivalence arrangements have also been established 
between private and public standards (see IFOAM, 2014a). 
Several international organizations have stimulated harmonization and equivalence. 
Organizations of the United Nations included the FAO, WHO, and the United Nations 
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). From the private sphere, IFOAM 
has been very influential in normative debates on the content of standards. Because of the 
multitude of organic standards worldwide and IFOAM’s recognition of problems 
concerning non-credible, inadequately written, and non-transparent standards, it 
established the IFOAM Family of Standards. It includes all organic standards they 
officially endorse and is envisioned to facilitate equivalence agreements between organic 
standards and regulations (IFOAM, 2016a). 
The most preeminent initiatives in trying to bring coherence in public and private 
organic standards resulted from a partnership between IFOAM, UNCTAD, and FAO. 
First the International Task Force on Harmonization and Equivalence in Organic 
Agriculture (ITF, 2003–2008) was created with the main objective to stimulate access of 
developing country producers to international markets and facilitate international trade 
of organic products. The WTO, and in particular the TBT and SPS rules, served as the 
general framework to approach the opportunities for harmonization, recognition, 
equivalence, and other forms of cooperation within and between private organic 
standards and government regulations on organic agriculture. Equivalence between the 
existing organic schemes was considered a core solution by the ITF initiative. Two 
practical tools were developed to offer a means for standardizing equivalence assessment 
processes: The Guide for Assessing Equivalence of Standards and Technical Regulations 
(EquiTool), which focuses on production and processing standards, and the International 
Requirements for Organic Certification Bodies (IROCB), which focuses on the 
requirements for certification (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015b). [Although the EquiTool and 
IROCB are included in Table 3.1, these are practical tools rather than being standards or 
regulatory agreements]. The successor of the ITF initiative was the Global Organic Market 
Access (GOMA, 2009-2012), which focused on the practical implementation of the two 
tools at the level of country and regions. Together with IFOAM, which also had developed 
tools for assessing equivalence of organic standards, they harmonized the tools into a 
single one named Common Objectives and Requirements of Organic Standards 
(COROS). The development of geopolitical regionalization in organic standards 
refocused the efforts of GOMA. While the tools were initially envisioned to function more 
for equivalence assessment, they later also served as a benchmark in support of 
harmonization of standards and technical regulations (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015b). 
Policy-makers have in the meantime also identified mutual recognition agreements 
and arrangements as particularly conducive to permitting trade. Today, several importing 
countries, including the EU, the United States and Japan, have bilateral recognition 
agreements of organic products. These agreements confirm that another country’s 
standards and assurance system are in line with domestic requirements, and that the 
products certified in those countries can be sold on the national market. These types of 
agreements are based on technical assessments. However, they are largely also political 
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agreements, which for their realization depend on political will and negotiations between 
the governments involved (Huber, Schmid, & Mannigel, 2015). Despite strong similarity 
between regulations (see Seufert, Ramankutty, & Mayerhofer, 2017), some differences in 
organic practices point towards the inherent political nature of these standards. For 
instance, compared to other organic regulations, the EU standard has some unusual 
exceptions to the prohibition of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which fail to 
sufficiently protect operators serving the organic market according to the polluter pays 
principle. The exceptions are contested within the organic community (IFOAM EU, 2013). 
Furthermore, even though bilateral mutual recognition agreements start to account for a 
higher percentage of trade between developed countries, relatively few of these have been 
signed between developed and developing countries. Bowen and Hoffman (2015a) explain 
that this is because these agreements require a level of trust in a country’s technical 
competence and its certifying bodies that not many developing countries are likely to be 
able to provide. As an alternative to bilateral agreements, some countries have sought 
regional approaches to reach equivalence and trade of organic products. 
3.4  Regionalization of Organic Standards 
Regions have become a major concern of international relations (Fawn, 2009), and while 
there are ample studies on security and economic integration, most studies of 
international environmental politics pay little attention to the regional dimension 
(Balsiger & Prys, 2014). Fawn explains that although definitions and approaches within 
the field are contested, there are also commonly used interpretations and observations. 
First, regionalism usually denotes state-led regional programs whereas regionalization 
denotes those substantially influenced by private actors. Secondly, a region needs self-
declarations of its scope and identity. The degree to which it is institutionalized, i.e. the 
formal procedures and structures that regulate and facilitate the functioning of the region, 
depend on the nature of the regional project. It equally serves as a means to determine the 
group’s aims and evaluate them and the strength of the grouping in practice. Finally, its 
practice implies a policy of cooperation and coordination among actors ‘within a given 
region’, whereby this coordination in itself can further define the region. 
In relation to organic standards, ‘regional’ or ‘local’ may generally denote an 
overseeable geographical region like a district, county or province that might extend 
across borders (Fuchs & Hoffmann, 2013). As employed in this article, regional 
arrangements denote public or public-private partnerships within geographical regions 
with at least two neighboring countries. Regionalization then might refer the utilization 
of (1) common organic standards; (2) equivalence mechanisms or regional recognition of 
organic certification; or may involve and result in (3) regional agreements. Apart from 
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rules on production, certification and equivalence, countries may agree to include other 
elements in regional standards, such as a common label or indicators or harmonized 
procedures for the registration of organic producers (Morgera et al., 2012). 
Although it is uncertain whether current levels of regional cooperation are adequate 
to address global environmental challenges and whether they contribute to the 
fragmentation or cohesion of governance (Balsiger & Prys, 2014), the organic movement 
calls attention to the benefits of regional cooperation and particularly the regional 
adaptation of organic standards (e.g., IFOAM, 2014b). Local or regional production can 
address conditions unique to the region, such as specific climate or labor issues, in a way 
that a readymade standard could not (Morgera et al., 2012). If supply and demand are 
regional, it can also reduce accompanying costs of transportation. Also, using surplus 
produce for home consumption and trade is a more sustainable mode of production from 
a reproductive angle (Fuchs & Hoffmann, 2013). In terms of trade, regional organic 
standards help achieve equivalence and may facilitate trade with countries external from 
the arrangement (Morgera et al., 2012). Politically, it can foster and stimulate further 
(intra)regional collaboration and enhance a sense of community. 
There are, however, also reasons for skepticism. Regionalization can possibly add 
another layer to the already complex regulatory framework, which may lead to the further 
fragmentation of the organic governance framework. Regions might turn into trading 
blocs, which can lead to diverted trade where non-member countries to the arrangement 
can be hurt economically or politically. Sovereignty issues may arise as well when 
countries begin to legislate jointly or delegate power. If the regional organization already 
harmonizes common trade agreements, the issue likely has been addressed; however, 
countries that only agree to a common standard need to decide how to recognize  
equivalence with third countries (Morgera et al., 2012). The conventionalization debate 
on organic production (see Guthman, 2004; Rosin & Campbell, 2009) points towards 
other dilemmas that regional standards pose to ecological farming. The fact that national 
and regional regulations function as benchmarks for organic standards and as such may 
promote a shallower form of organic farming, can also stimulate organic production into 
mass markets and agricultural intensification which poses a threat to ecological farming 
strategies as issues of cost and efficient production are considered more pertinent. 
3.5  Research Design and Methods 
The following analysis explores all regions that have developed an organic standard, 
which are: the European Union Regulation (EU), the East African Organic Products 
Standard (EAOPS), the Pacific Organic Standard (POS), the Central American initiative , 
the Asia Regional Organic Standard (AROS), the African Regional Standard (ARS), and 
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lastly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Standard for Organic 
Agriculture (ASOA). The cases have been analyzed on several dimensions, including the 
reasons for the standard initiation, involved stakeholders, and the governance 
frameworks (see also Table 3.2). After a delineation of each case, a comparison across the 
contexts on the basis of the governance system approach will answer the question if the 
standards and the system as a whole make the regulatory field of organic production more 
cohesive and whether it is conducive to regional and international trade. 
Table 3.2 Regional arrangements’ characteristics 
 
 
The scale and structure of global contemporary production has contributed to the pivotal 
role of governance approaches in global value chains. The topic has been central in 
literature on globalization and global value chains (e.g., Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 
2005; Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002; Nadvi, 2008). Seen as an interactive  
process that involves various forms of partnerships (Stoker, 1998), it is associated to the 
relative decline of national regulatory governance and the growing significance of both 
international and private actors (Nadvi, 2008). Although the term governance has become 
a catch-all concept and various typologies exist in different research strands (see Steurer, 
2013), it brings the involvement of non-state actors, next to state actors, into the analysis 
of societal steering. Ultimately, governance is concerned with creating the conditions for 
ordered rule and collective action (Stoker, 1998). Considering the involvement of a variety 
of actors, the processes underlying the outputs of governance are therefore of specific 
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relevance. Accordingly, governance is here operationalized as describing the patterns that 
emerge from the activities of social, political, and administrative actors (Jordan, 2008). 
The ensuing empirical analysis positions the governance system for regional organic 
agriculture within this context. In an earlier paper (see Pekdemir, Glasbergen, & Cörvers, 
2015), a systemic approach was developed combining governance systems (as defined by 
Burns & Stöhr, 2011a, 2011b; Guéneau, 2007; Jentoft, van Son, & Bjørkan, 2007) and the 
closely related organizational field approach (as defined by Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; 
Machado-da-Silva, Filho, & Rossoni, 2006; Smith & Fischlein, 2010). In this paper, this 
approach is applied to the regional regulatory system for organic production. The approach 
takes an observable field of institutional life as a starting point for analysis and is concerned 
with the governability of public issues. Rooted in governance theory, its main premise is that 
no single organizational entity has the capacity to handle governing challenges effectively. 
Solutions to problems therefore rest within the network of actors, both public and private, 
that have a stake in the issue. Relations within this system can be observed from three levels. 
Firstly, - on the organizational level - the governance system is structured by actors that 
share a stake in the issue. Possibilities for action are created through the activities the actors 
undertake and their respective organizational goals, which may or may not be coordinated. 
Secondly, - on the normative level - although actors in the governance system participate in 
the same dialogue, differences in ideas and norms may exist. These can relate to how 
problems are defined and different strategies on how to deal with them. Thirdly, - on the 
relational level - the governance system is considered to be a dynamic field that is shaped by 
the power dependence between actors and their strategic responses towards the issue and 
towards each other. Actors will expectedly develop relations with one another, which may 
be collaborative and result in partnerships, but may also be adversarial. 
Together, the different levels offer an integrative method for analysis from an 
organizational-level, normative-level, and relational-level perspective (see Fig. 3.1). The 
operationalization of this framework on the governance system of regional standards will 
be applied on: (1) the organizational level by examining the stakeholders, the regional 
framework structure (i.e., certification, labelling), and adoption of standards into national 
legislative frameworks; (2) the normative level by examining the framing of regionalization, 
and the level of acceptance of normative organic references; and (3) the relational level by 
examining intra-regional and inter-regional collaboration, including trade results. 
Information about the cases was acquired through desk research and interviews. The 
examined primary sources included official regulations, project reports, newsletters and 
websites. In addition, between April 2015 and July 2017, a total of twenty experts were 
interviewed. The selection criteria for the interviews was that the experts had been 
involved in the process of establishing a regional standard and/or had worked towards 
harmonization and equivalence efforts across the different regions. Several of the 
interviewees had worked on multiple regional efforts, which results in the following 
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distribution over the cases: EU (2), EAOPS (3), Central America (3), POS (4), AROS (9), 
ARS (2), and ASOA (5). Their affiliation can be further categorized as follows: public 
actors (5 from governments, and 6 from inter-governmental organizations) and private 
actors (5 from civil society organizations, and 4 from companies). Although the 
interviewees have here been categorized in terms of the most relevant affiliation with 
regard to the organic standard, it must be noted that almost half of the interviewees have 
a dual affiliation regarding their work on organic production (e.g., they are or have been 
affiliated to an inter-governmental organization and a civil society organization, or 
affiliated to a civil society organization and a company), which is assumed to also 
influence their opinions. Seventeen of these were semi-structured in-depth interviews, 
and three respondents answered interview questions by email. For purposes of quoting, 
each interviewee has been coded with a unique number. The coding numbers refer to the 
order in which the interviews were held. Interview questions focused primarily on the 
topics of the drivers of the regional standard, the processes that underlay its development, 
the (anticipated) results of the standard, and reflections on the processes and outcomes. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Governance systems framework for regional organic standards 
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3.6  Regional Arrangements 
EU Regulations – from 1991–present 
The increase of organic food and farming in Europe in the mid-80s brought the topic of 
organic regulations to the attention of European authorities. With many benefits being 
claimed by organic retailers of organic products and premium prices paid by customers, 
the European Commission started to consider what controls were necessary to ensure the 
reliability of organic products for consumers (Schlüter & Blake, 2009). Right from the 
early years of the development of the EU regulation, the Commission turned to IFOAM 
as the primary source of organic expertise. In particular, the IFOAM EU Group is the 
unified voice of organic stakeholders concerning organic decision-making of the EU. Ever 
since the early 1990s it has held regular and official meetings with the Commission, but 
also informal meetings with Commissioners, to discuss progress concerning the 
regulations and upcoming issues (Schlüter & Blake, 2009). 
In 1991, the European Council of Agricultural Ministers adopted Regulation (EEC) 
No 2092/91 on organic farming and the labelling of organic farm produce and foods in 
the context of EU farm policy reform, which came into force in 1993 and became binding 
for all EU Member States. The EU was the first region in the world to determine a 
common standard for organic production that would become subject to legal definition 
and control. A control and labelling system is in place, and the EU organic logo can be 
used on products that (almost) only contain organic ingredients. National or private logos 
may simultaneously be used. 
The regulation also provides detailed criteria and inspection systems that allow for 
the import of organic products from non-EU countries. Because imports from outside 
the EU are a considerable part of the market, the regulation became the benchmark for 
organic farming in the world as many market actors had to conform to the regulation 
(Schlüter & Blake, 2009). 
Throughout the years, Commission Regulations were adopted to set requirements 
for organic animal production (EC No 1804/1999), and implementing rules for imports 
from third countries (EC No 1235/2008 under EC No 834/2007). Based on the premise 
that existing regulation could be simplified and improved, and in light of new 
developments and technical progress, the EU’s legal framework on organic production 
was extended in scope (Fladl & Hiulot, 2009). In 2007, the Council adopted the new 
regulation (EC No 834/2007), which came into force in 2009. Resulting from the 
continuous additions and amendments to European law, the regulation has become 
extremely long and complex (European Commission, 2014). A revision has been 
proposed by the European Commission in 2014, which has now been preliminary agreed 
upon. 
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East African Organic Products Standard – from 2007–present 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UNCTAD selected 
organic agriculture in 2004 as the focus of joint work. In 2005, they launched the initiative  
‘Promoting Production and Trading Opportunities for Organic Agricultural Products in 
East Africa.’ The project advanced from and built on the Export Promotion for Organic 
Agriculture Products for Africa (EPOPA) which started in 1997. Through the EPOPA 
project national organic agriculture movements emerged. In partnership with IFOAM, a 
part of the UNEP/UNCTAD project focused on promoting regional cooperation 
including the development of an East Africa Organic Standard. At the start of the 
initiative, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had different organic standards developed with 
the support of national organic movements (AgroEco & Grolink, 2008; Taylor, 2006). 
Additionally, also several private and international organic standards were used in the 
region. The proliferation of standards in East Africa mirrored the development of organic 
standards at the global level, in that they were not harmonized and ran the risk of 
fragmenting the East African organic market (Twarog, 2011; UNEP, n.d.). This posed 
significant problems for local organic farmers because they had to meet different 
requirements to access regional or international markets. Compliance costs were high and 
complying with one standard meant that they risked being excluded from markets that 
demanded a different standard. Moreover, the standards were not well adapted to local 
agro-ecological conditions. Consequently, this also posed problems for producers seeking 
to target the regional market (UNEP, n.d.). Stakeholders were concerned that this 
multitude of standards could eventually become a technical barrier to trade within the 
region and placed unneeded restrictions (Twarog, 2008). The creation of a common 
standard was envisioned to address these disadvantages. It was also considered that 
market access for East African organic agricultural products could be improved through 
successful negotiations with the European Union and other major markets for 
equivalence or mutual recognition of standards (UNEP, n.d.). 
The Regional Standard Technical Working Group was established with the specific 
mandate to develop an East African organic standard. In 2006, Burundi and Rwanda 
joined the regional activities (Naqvi, 2009). This group was composed of a cross-section 
of stakeholders, which included representatives from the participating governments, 
certification bodies, national organic agricultural movements, the East African Business 
Council, and facilitators from IFOAM and UNCTAD (Muwanga, 2011). The East African 
organic standard (EAS 456:2007) was officially adopted in 2007. The EAOPS established 
a label (“Kilimohai”) and the implementation of the standard is carried out by various 
private certification companies and export outlets. The UNEPUNCTAD project ended in 
2010. The standard has been accepted to the IFOAM Family of Standards. Since the East 
African Community was not a legal entity recognized by the EU to apply for equivalence, 
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a certification body applied for equivalence in 2011. The European Commission rejected 
the application and found the standard inequivalent on several issues including 
conversion periods and livestock provisions. Experts involved in the East African project 
reflected that differences were surmountable and were suspicious of underlying 
motivations by the Commission’s rejection. However, they recognized that the 
certification body did “not follow through very well on the application,” and that in the 
project “more energy should have been spent on just lobbying with the EU.” [Interview 
16 – EAOPS, private affiliate] The importance of establishing mutual trust for equivalence 
is also reflected by an expert working for the European Commission, as assurance is 
needed to “have a very competent authority in front to negotiate [equivalence] and a 
competent authority responsible for the correct implementation and enforcement of the 
rules.” [Interview 15 – EU, public affiliate] 
Pacific Organic Standard – from 2011–present 
The promotion of organic agriculture in the Pacific region eventuated with the 
recognition of a number of region-wide challenges, including the effects of climate 
change, the degradation of ecosystems due to unsustainable use of land and marine 
resources, and the need to generate livelihoods to maintain populations in the islands. It 
was considered that organic agriculture could contribute to dealing with these challenges 
(Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2008). Before the start of the project to develop a 
region-wide organic standard, there was no legal framework on organic agriculture, a lack 
of supporting policies and an absence of an overall development strategy under which the 
main actors could cooperate with each other (Mapusua & Maccari, 2007). 
With the financial support of the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) and technical assistance of IFOAM, the Pacific Regional Organic Task Force 
(ROTF) developed the Pacific Organic Standards (POS). The ROTF was a technical group 
representing all sectors and twenty-two countries and territories of the Pacific Island that 
were involved in organic. Another group consisted of Pacific leaders, called the Pacific 
High Level Organics Group (PHLOG), providing high-level political support and 
advocacy (Mapusua, 2012). The standard was endorsed in 2008 by the PHLOG. 
The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) introduced the Pacific Organic and 
Ethical Trade Community (POETCom), which developed an organic guarantee and 
labelling system. In 2013 an export support scheme was implemented as part of the Pacific 
Organic Guarantee System with a Memorandum of Understanding signed between 
POETCom and certifying bodies to provide certification services to the Pacific Organic 
Standard and allowing the commencement of the marketing of a regional brand “Organic 
Pasifika” (Mapusua, 2016). Although supportive policy frameworks are starting to 
develop, the POS has not been legally recognized and adopted to national legislation yet 
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by any of the countries. An expert involved in the POS reflected that for the adoption of 
POS into national legislation the respective governments, civil society actors and private 
enterprises do not collaborate enough “to ensure there is recognition and collaborative 
support.” [Interview 11 – POS, private affiliate] 
The POS was accepted by IFOAM into the Family of Standards, and its approval was 
based on an equivalence assessment against the COROS, which were developed by the 
ITF. It was also found to be equivalent to the requirements of the EU regulations by the 
International Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS). 
Central American Initiative – approved in 2012 
Impetus for creating a common organic regulation came from authorities from Central 
American countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic. The main aims for harmonization were to facilitate  
intra-regional trade and to allow the countries to negotiate equivalence agreements as a 
bloc (GOMA, 2012). A regional standard-setting process started in 2004, but stalled by 
2007 (Schwindenhammer, 2015). With financial and some technical support of GOMA 
and operations support by the Inter-American Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the 
project resumed work on the regional standard-setting process (Bowen, 2011). GOMA 
anticipated that it would have an advisory role in the development process of the 
standard, but the involved authorities saw the role of GOMA primarily in terms of 
funding. This resulted in GOMA not being represented during the development 
meetings, although comments of private sector stakeholders from consultations were 
taken into account (Bowen, 2013). 
The Harmonized Regional Organic Regulation was completed in March 2011, which 
was officially approved in 2012 by the Central American Agricultural Council. The 
regulation includes standards for organic production and processing, requirements for 
conducting organic certification, and a system for supervision of the regulation by the 
governments (Schwindenhammer, 2015). After finalization, the regional regulation was 
intended to replace the individual country regulations (GOMA, 2012), but this has not 
happened to this date. The standard has also not been accepted to the IFOAM Family of 
Standards. Nonetheless, with the exception of the Dominican Republic, all countries 
submitted a Central American Technical Regulation on Organic Agricultural Products 
(RTCA67.06.74:16) to the WTO Secretariat in 2016. This document expands on the 
organic standard approved in 2012, as it includes provisions for beekeeping and the 
collection of wild products, as well as provisions for labelling and certification. In case the 
proposed technical regulation will pass the review stage, the Council of Ministers for 
Economic Integration (COMIECO) of the SICA will need to ratify the regulation. Once 
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the regulation is published in the respective government gazettes, the organic regulation 
will be binding. 
Asia Regional Organic Standard – approved in 2012 
The Asian region hosts a wide range of organic sector development settings and regulatory 
frameworks, ranging from developing to highly regulated. The market has been growing 
in the last decade, and while exports remain a dominant feature of sector development in 
the majority of developing countries, local markets have also emerged (UNCTAD, FAO, 
& IFOAM, 2012). Under the auspices of the GOMA Project, a Working Group for 
Cooperation on Organic Labeling and Trade for Asia was created, which in turn decided 
to develop the Asia Regional Organic Standards (AROS). The vision was that it should be 
an inclusive project of all or most countries in the East, South-East, and South Asia regions, 
and be based on common regional requirements. It was envisioned that the standard would 
be adopted or adapted as a national standard, above all by countries that had not yet 
developed their own standard, and that equivalence between organic standards and 
certification programs within and beyond Asia would be facilitated. 
Both public and private stakeholders participated in the initiative. The GOMA-Asia  
Working Group approved the final draft at its meeting in February 2012. When complied 
with, the standard enables producers to label their products as organic. The standard does 
not cover procedures for verification, such as inspection or certification of products. The 
working group issued a declaration in 2012 calling for such recognition (formally by 
governments in the region) and recommended that AROS should be adopted as the 
common standard for the region. It also called for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to accept 
AROS as a regionally harmonized organic standard (UNCTAD, 2012). A Chinese expert 
involved in the AROS project reflected that the standard has not been useful across the 
entire Asian region, even to the point where it is doubted if government officials have 
even read the standard: “no-one said that there is a big difference [between AROS and the 
Chinese national organic standard], so there was no need for them to read it.” [Interview 
4 – AROS, private affiliate] The standard has been accepted to the IFOAM Family of 
Standards. Yet, none of the participating countries adopted the standard into national 
legislation. Nonetheless, the work proved to be the groundwork for the next Asian 
regional agreement, the ASOA. 
African Organic Products Standard – approved in 2013 
The intergovernmental organization for the African Organization for Standardization 
(ARSO), whose mandate is to develop and harmonize African standards, started an 
initiative on a common organic standard in 2012. Many different organic standards are 
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used in Africa and the purpose of the standard was to have a single organic standard for 
organic agriculture production, and to further the development of organic production 
and trade in the African region (ARSO, 2012). 
The standard was prepared by the ARSO Technical Harmonization Committee on 
Agriculture and Food Products (ARSO/THC 1), and participation to the technical 
committee was open to all African country representatives member to the ARSO, whether 
from the public or private sphere. At the national level, member states held country 
consultations during which private stakeholders were consulted. In line with the 
principles on the African Standards Harmonization Model of ARSO, the EAOPS served 
as a major source document for the harmonization. The EAOPS standard was not directly 
adopted and there are differences between the standards (e.g. on the aspect of animal 
husbandry). Furthermore, the standard was also based on the IFOAM Basic Standards 
and the Codex (ARSO, 2012). In 2013, the organic products standard (ARS: 751) was 
approved with consensus. 
The standard has, however, not been assessed against the COROS and an application 
for its evaluation for purposes of inclusion into the IFOAM Family of Standards has not 
been made. To date, the standard has also not been in use. ARSO, with the support of the 
African Development Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, is 
currently developing extension material and simplifying provisions in order for 
requirements and benefits of the standard to be understood by all relevant stakeholders. 
The standard’s conformity assessment system is also being developed, and a verification 
system is projected to be in place by the end of 2017. 
ASEAN Standard for Organic Agriculture – from 2014–present 
After the AROS was established as a regional benchmark for equivalence, the Task Force 
on ASEAN Standards for Horticultural Produce established a Special Task Force for 
further consultation amongst the ASEAN member states, which include Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam. An expert involved in both the AROS and the ASOA stated that the “AROS was 
used as a referent [for the ASOA]. But we also worked on modifying it to be suitable to 
the national standards of ASEAN member states.” [Interview 5 – AROS and ASOA, public 
affiliate] The ASOA is for the most part similar to the AROS, but has been made more 
specific to the ASEAN conditions. For instance, some items have been agreed to be put 
on the exclusion list. This includes the use of pig manure as raw material for the 
production of organic fertilizer, since this is not allowed and considered Haram under 
Islamic law. The ASOA also expands on the AROS by including provisions on the 
traceability and recordkeeping of the whole organic operation process. 
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Although private stakeholders do have some influence in the form of (informal) 
consultation, the process is governmentally steered. The ASOA was completed in 2014 
(Wai, 2015) and in September 2014 a Strategic Plan of Action of the Task Force was 
approved by the ASEAN Ministers for Agriculture and Forestry. The main aims of this 
strategic action plan include the establishment of a common understanding of the organic 
standard and its requirements. These requirements would then serve as a guide for the 
authorities in assessing equivalence amongst the member states. The ASOA is a 
mandatory standard for the ASEAN member states; however, most members still use 
their own national standards. Some countries do not have a national standard, but it is 
envisioned that they will adopt the ASOA as a national standard. Countries with a 
national standard will align it to the ASOA in order to stimulate harmonization and 
equivalence between member states. Member states are currently in the process of 
carrying out the strategic plan. 
3.7  Governance System Analysis 
The organizational level 
Although both public and private actors have been crucial for the development of regional 
standards, the role of public authorities has been quintessential through their categorical 
involvement in all of the regional governance frameworks. This is unsurprising, as these 
initiatives transcend geographical borders and jurisdictionally fall within the mandate of 
public authorities, requiring initially political and then legal endorsement. Their absence 
or lack of support would seriously imperil the initiatives’ operability due to a lack of legal 
enforceability. Nonetheless, the influence of private actors and public-private  
partnerships to the initiation and expansion of the regional organic standards has been 
decisive. The work of IFOAM has been paramount from the start, but after the turn of the 
21st century the work of other international organizations, notably UNCTAD, UNEP, 
FAO and in particular the ITF and GOMA projects, has also been crucial. Recognized as 
institutional entrepreneurs for organic agriculture standards (Schwindenhammer, 2015), 
these actors have organized projects and invested issue-specific expertise to the 
promotion of regional cooperation on harmonization and equivalence. Where 
governments are characterized by their political and legal authority, the private and 
public-private actors represent moral and technical authority. First by the credibility they 
brought to pursue their goals in the field of harmonization and equivalence, and second, 
by bringing in knowledge-based expertise and funding to support the projects. 
Underscoring the importance of political and legal authority, the institutional-
entrepreneurs always sought the collaboration of public authorities in organic 
regionalization projects. Four out of the seven regional arrangements were the result of 
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public-private partnership, although consultations with private actors have also taken 
place in the three other arrangements. In five of the arrangements, private actors were in 
attendance for working groups or technical committee meetings, albeit sometimes as 
representatives of member state delegations. The formal character of the regional 
arrangements is predominantly public. Interviewed private stakeholders generally 
expressed their need to be included (more) in decision-making processes. The lack of 
competency and know-how by public actors was an often named critique across the cases. 
One private actor formulated it as follows: “I'm a very strong opponent to theoretical 
standards making. I always think that standards should be written by practitioners that 
know what they are talking about.” [Interview 16 – EAOPS, private affiliate] Altogether, 
continued exclusion of civil society can undermine the credibility and legitimacy of 
institutions governed by member states (Green, 2005). 
With the exception of the governance framework of the EU, the regional organic 
standards are not widely enforced. This appears to stem from two main causes. First, 
certification and the labelling of products to the standards, the regulatory form of 
standards (e.g., Bartley, 2011), have not (yet) taken off. The EAOPS and POS have, 
however, started to introduce certification and labelling, which for the POS was mainly 
realizable because costs were reduced through the use of Participatory Guarantee System 
schemes. Such schemes certify producers within locally focused quality assurance systems 
and are built on a foundation of trust, social networks and knowledge exchange (IFOAM, 
2016b). In the case of the POS, certification bodies were also willing to lower their 
certification fees. Second, the standards are largely not adopted into national regulations, 
nor are they enforced. Organic regionalization projects do not only require political and 
legal involvement, but also the development and maintenance of its infrastructures. For 
instance, legally, public standards need to be adopted into national regulations and 
enforced, while political commitment to the project by stakeholders needs to be created 
and maintained. The inadequate allocation of legal, political and funding resources 
appears to result in ineffective regulation. 
The normative level 
The pursuit of regulating organic production by the private sphere stems from 
environmental and production values underpinning organic farming, whereas public 
actors have been particularly motivated by safeguarding public interests. To a large 
degree, these motivations are time and context specific. For example, in Europe, the 
original incentive for organic regulation came from the organic movement as to provide 
a more effective basis for enforcing labeling claims, against free-riding and fraud (Gibbon, 
2008), which was taken up in the EU regulation as a way to provide fair competition (EEC 
No 2092/91). In the Pacific, public interests were also paramount as it was envisioned that 
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the standard would be a key contributor to the sustenance of culture, improve livelihoods, 
people’s health and the environment, and specifically address the mitigation of negative 
effects of climate change (Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2008). Friction between 
the two spheres can also be seen in the more recent concern by the European organic 
movement that organic production has allowed some level of GMO contamination. 
Particularly, a point of criticism from the organic movement is not so much the 
adaptation of the provisions in the EU organic regulation allowing GMO contamination, 
but rather the general EU legal framework which is considered to not sufficiently protect 
organic production from contamination and its consequences (IFOAM EU, 2013). 
A prominent incentive shared by the regional arrangements is the facilitation of 
inter- and intra-regional trade. Arrangements from developing countries specifically 
envisioned that the regional standards would enable them to negotiate equivalence 
agreements as a bloc and that it would increase the likelihood of success in negotiations 
with the EU and other major markets (GOMA, 2012; UNCTAD, 2012; UNEP, n.d.). This 
anticipation rests mainly on two assumptions. Firstly, harmonized or equivalent regional 
standards facilitate the recognition and acknowledgement of national standards internal 
to the agreement. Secondly, the different countries together represent a bigger organic 
market, which enhances their appeal as a serious trading partner for major markets. 
In terms of the production and harvest areas that the standards cover, the 
arrangements vary from a limited scope on primarily horticulture to the inclusion of 
provisions on animal husbandry, beekeeping, and the collection of wild products and 
aquaculture as well. The success of the regional standard is expected to expand the scope 
of the standard by, on the one hand, leading to market expansion of organic sectors, while 
on the other hand, encouraging policymakers to regulate more organic sectoral fields. 
This occurred in the EU, where the organic regulations expanded with rules for organic 
aquaculture (Regulation 710/2009), whereas the EAOPS has yet to materialize its plans to 
expand its scope to include aquaculture. 
Even though regional standards account to some extent for differences specific to 
the regional environment and local context, regional standards do stimulate the 
cohesiveness in terms of the content of the standards across the regions. Several reasons 
account for this. Above all, in the preparatory stages of the regional standards in 
developing countries, the Codex guidelines (1999) and IFOAM standard (2005) for 
organic production and processing served as guidance sources. The so-called institutional 
entrepreneurs also stimulated the use of these normative references. Furthermore, policy 
coherence is presumed to enable acceptance of the regional standards by external parties. 
With the exceptions of the Central American initiative, the ARS, and the newly 
established ASOA, the standards have undergone equivalence assessments by IFOAM 
and have been accepted to the IFOAM Family of Standards (IFOAM, 2016a). This 
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indicates that although differences between the standards are noticeable, the regulatory 
field is reaching more cohesion. 
The relational level 
Through its organizational structure, intra-regional collaboration evidently intensifies at 
the preparatory stages as task forces and working groups from different countries are 
established. Collaboration continues in cases where the standards become operational. 
Furthermore, regionalization is expected to intensify the intra-regional trade of organic 
products. Since the countries recognize each other’s legal regulatory frameworks, 
obstacles to trade, in the sense of using other types of certifications and having to deal 
with import protocols, will be alleviated. Therefore, the introductory texts to the regional 
organic standards specifically refer to the purpose of facilitating or promoting intra-
regional trade, or are proposed from a governance framework that explicitly stimulates 
regional integration. Since four of the standards were adopted in 2012 or more recently, 
their results are too preliminary to draw strong conclusions in terms of effectiveness for 
cohesion and trade facilitation. Information on the impact of the standards before 2012 
shows mixed results. The organic sector in the EU has risen considerably in the past 
decade, however, the results in terms of sales and (international) trade is lacking due to 
insufficient data and official statistics on particularly sales and (international) trade at EU 
level (European Union, 2016). In East Africa, a baseline report conducted in 2015 on the 
organic trade and value chain development established that although organic products 
were not certified nor had the Kilimohai label, considerable trade was taking place across 
the borders among the organic actors (Ndungu, Unpublished results). It showed the 
potential for further building of the regional organic market but also identified several 
barriers per country participating in East African trade, which included, among other 
issues: border delays and bureaucracy; lack of supplier and market information; and lack 
of harmonization of pesticide registration. In the 22 Pacific countries and territories, 
organic trade is reportedly in its infancy, but small quantities of organic products are 
exported throughout the different markets (Mapusua, 2017). For the regional standards 
that were developed more recently, impact results are not available to determine 
intensified trade relations. 
Motivations for intra-regional trade were integral to ambitions to trade with major 
markets. One interviewee explained it as follows: “The testing ground will always be the 
regional partnership or regional trade. Once it is accepted in the region, you can also sell 
[on the international market].” [Interview 6 – AROS and ASOA, private affiliate] 
Although trade with countries from other regions was considered a major stimulus for 
the initiation of the frameworks, inter-regional collaboration has not lifted off and 
equivalence with countries outside the region is very limited to non-existent. Not 
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adopting organic standards into national regulations has been particularly obstructive in 
this regard because it does not provide a legal basis for trade with other countries beyond 
private certification. For equivalence agreements with other countries, however, 
applications are necessary on country level. A further complication is the preliminary 
agreement on an overhaul of the existing EU rules which details a move away from 
equivalence agreements for non-recognized third countries and replace it with a 
compliance system, which means that private certification bodies in third countries have 
to comply with EU production and control rules when deciding whether a product to be 
exported to the EU market is organic or not (Council of the EU, 2017). The option to 
allow for equivalent production methods in third countries would remain possible under 
trade agreements (European Parliament, 2017). A consequence of this system, which has 
been used by all countries with operational organic regulations, is that it replaces the 
potential for organic trade between countries without trade agreements with a system that 
creates financial burdens for producers and exporters. 
3.8  Discussion 
To what extent has the regionalization of organic standards contributed to cohesion of 
regional and global regulation on organic? Before a regional standard is adopted, the 
content of national standards - if in place - is at minimum mutually recognized, and 
otherwise harmonized. If on the basis of the regional standard equivalence agreements 
with countries or other regional standards are established, regionalization significantly 
contributes to regulatory cohesion on the global level. The Codex and the IFOAM Basic 
Standard have contributed to cohesion, as the arrangements have underscored them as 
normative references in the formulation of the regional standards. Functioning as 
references for the establishment of more specific standards on organic (Schmid et al., 
2007), the data show their institutionalization on the regional level. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates the influence of international and transnational voluntary sources of 
guidance on organic regulation. 
Institutional entrepreneurship has also been significant for processes of institutional 
change in the regional arrangements (Schwindenhammer, 2015) as for instance the ITF 
and GOMA initiatives contributed technical and moral authority to several of the regional 
arrangements. The roles they fulfilled in this regard relates to that of meta-governors 
(Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; Pekdemir, Glasbergen, & von Gagern, 2016). Specifically,  
they engaged in framing the global discourse (e.g. promoting harmonization and 
equivalence through regionalization), capacity building (e.g. providing technical 
assistance), networking (e.g. involving relevant stakeholders to the regional projects), and 
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mainstreaming (e.g. providing normative documents). Advances made in the regional 
regulatory landscape undoubtedly resulted from their involvement. 
The observed normative coherence alone, however, provides insufficient ground for 
the institutional harmonization of organic standards. If regional standards are not 
adopted as national regulations and are therefore not enforced, nor used for equivalence 
arrangements with external countries, they will not provide a sufficient basis for effective 
inter-regional trade of organic products. The necessary legal, political, and technical 
infrastructures underlying institutional harmonization would be lacking, resulting in the 
anticipation by developing countries of equivalence arrangements with big market 
players to remain unfulfilled. Thus far, a lack of true political and economic integration 
at the regional level certainly has been conducive to the fact that regional organic 
standards are not effectively endorsed. In the current governance system for organic 
trade, import regulations generally do not allow for the recognition of regional standards 
(Twarog, 2013). In the EU for instance, regions are not part of the so-called third 
countries whose organic standards are accepted and none of the countries participating 
in the regional arrangements are part of the EU third country list that are recognized as 
having equivalent organic production rules and control systems. Paradoxically, without 
genuine institutionalization within or beyond the regions, regional standards only add to 
regulatory fragmentation. Inclusion in the IFOAM Family of Standards abates this 
complication, as it identifies the possibility for equivalence agreements between (regional) 
standards and regulations. 
Contrary to the intentions of the regional arrangements of developing countries, a 
preliminary agreement has been reached on the European Commission’s proposal to 
move away from equivalence rules, which have proven to be highly contested. Although 
equivalent production methods in third countries could be recognized under trade 
agreements, it is arguable in how far the compliance focus contradicts TBT and SPS 
requirements by the WTO and calls for facilitating harmonization and equivalence of 
standards that have the same objectives. While trade remains possible under a compliance  
regime, it undercuts the potential and advantages for trade by means of regionalization. 
More fundamentally, from the perspective of organic values, regional standards as a 
governance framework offer an acceptable alternative to compliance regimes. In 
particular, through regional harmonization and inter-regional equivalence, it allows for 
variations in local agricultural circumstances, which may emanate from biological,  
ecological, social, and economic contexts. Nonetheless, the focus of many actors within 
the regional arrangements reportedly revolves around issues that would permit trade. 
This supports the theory that the conventionalization and particularly the structure of the 
standards regime of governance constrain the direction of organic production debates to 
predominantly trade and market compatible options (Fouilleux & Loconto, 2017). Trade 
in turn, puts further pressure towards harmonization which has undesirable 
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consequences (Rundgren, 2014). Particularly in relation to the compliance regime, 
exporters and exporting countries are required to go along with the demands of major 
markets. Organic standards largely reflect process characteristics, since production and 
processing principles rather than the attributes perceivable in the product itself are 
emphasized. Even so, organic standards also reflect both product and process 
characteristics (Loureiro, McCluskey, & Mittelhammer, 2001; Nadvi & Wältring, 2004). 
Actors along the value chain are apprehensive that the shift from equivalence to a 
compliance regime implies that the EU regulation is becoming a product standard. Since  
compliance provides entrance into only one specific market, it burdens particularly 
farmers with additional certification requirements. In this way, compliance augments 
regulatory fragmentation through adding a layer of control rules to certification bodies in 
third countries. As particularly developing country firms and farms are confronted with 
a variety of both process and products standards, non-compliance will result in exclusion 
(Nadvi, 2008). Coupled with the fact that environmental problems are often local or 
regional in scope, the advantages of regional standards disappear. 
Although the promise of regional standards for international trade may be short-
lived or far-off, efforts have not been in vain as many countries have common or 
harmonized standards that are applicable to the local and regional conditions. The recent 
interest in regional organic regulation by Central America and Southeast Asia, two 
regions committed to further regional integration, may in fact revive the case for regional 
organic standards. They may prove to be useful in future multilateral agreements, as 
multilateral processes are currently proposed to address challenges with developing and 
managing multiple equivalence arrangements (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015a). A global 
multilateral system, in which many countries accept the organic regulations of each other 
based on equivalence of technical regulations and mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment, would contribute to policy cohesion and international trade of organic 
production. Each country would only need to be assessed once, and it would not impose 
different burdens for developed or developing countries. Major organic market players, 
including the EU and US are at present considering such an agreement. Although 
promising in its potential, stakeholders outside of this process are wary of possible 
limitations in the short or long term, which may include lock-in effects and the exclusion 
of small export markets. 
Beyond the regulatory and legal framework that needs to be in place for regional 
organic trade, or technical discussions concerning mechanisms that permit trade, the 
findings also underscore the role of trust and reputation in international trade 
coordination. Indeed, standards are insufficient to overcome quality uncertainties in 
trade (Bernzen & Braun, 2014). Formal guidance mechanisms and informal 
arrangements are both important to reaching agreements. People with organic and 
alternative movement conventions, which are linked to personal relationships of trust, 
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ecological diversity, and social justice (see Raynolds, 2004), operate alongside 
technocratic and bureaucratic government officials, who do not necessarily share this 
personal affiliation or have the same level of expert knowledge on organic production. 
The fact that not many developing countries are able to provide the level of trust in their 
technical competence and certifying bodies (Bowen & Hoffman, 2015a) adds to this 
predicament. It therefore calls for serious and delicate bridging of expectations and in 
order for trade to commensurate, the role of relationship management, trust building, 
and partnership more broadly are not to be underestimated. 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the regionalization of organic standards as a mode of 
governance in the quest for cohesion and trade. Based on a governance systems analysis 
of all the regional arrangements thus far, the findings reveal that on the organizational 
level, the public-private characteristic of the arrangements has been a key factor for their 
development. Where governments provided political and legal authority, public and 
private international organizations and national organic movements represented moral 
and technical authority. Aside from the EU, the enforcement of the regional standards, 
however, falls short due to the limited certification and labelling of the regional standards 
and because regional standards are largely not adopted into enforceable national 
regulations. On the normative level, public actors framed the pursuit of regionalization 
in defense of public interests, whereas private actors underscored production values of 
organic farming. While private values have been more or less constant, public interests 
have to a large degree been context and time specific. The facilitation of inter- and intra-
regional trade is an incentive shared by all arrangements. Variations in terms of 
production and harvesting areas the standards cover are ascribed to the relative success 
of the standards. While attentive to local and regional conditions, regional standards 
improve coherence among the content of the standards as similar normative references 
have been used and promoted by institutional entrepreneurs. On the relational level, 
stimulating trade in organic products has been a strategic aspect of regional standard 
development and collaboration. However, comprehensive official statistics on account of 
all regions is indispensable for corroborating effectiveness and future analysis of organic 
trade. Nonetheless, it is clear that the often hoped pursuit of inter-regional collaboration 
and equivalency has not yet been fulfilled. 
As a conceptual tool, the governance systems analysis can lay bare the multi-layered 
governance architecture and interdependencies between different actors and 
organizations. Alliances, as well as the ways in which actors can hamper each other’s 
activities may come to the fore. In this way, it can be indicative of how a governance 
system could be efficient or effective, for example by increasing cohesiveness in policies.  
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Several observations relating to the role of regional organic standards to reduce regulatory 
fragmentation and to facilitate cooperation in trade then arise. To start, comparable to 
private multilateral agreements, regional standards are public and public-private efforts 
in pursuit of the same reducing the regulatory burden for both producers as well as 
countries. On a global level, regulatory complexity will be reduced through inter-regional 
equivalence and multilateral agreements. Their success rests on the commitment and 
implementation of participating national governments. It is therefore uncertain whether 
current levels of regional cooperation are adequate to contribute to reduce the 
fragmentation of governance for organic production. The EU is the most effective in this 
regard, but remains a unique political entity as it functions similar to states with a 
legislative, executive and independent judicial branch that can enforce compliance. 
Evidently, the other regionalization efforts on organic do not carry the same politica l 
authority. The commitments of Central America and Southeast Asia to further regional 
integration are the most promising cases to contribute to cohesion in organic regulation, 
but whether the same level of regulatory power will be achieved is not certain. 
In addition, the ability of powerful actors to define the boundaries of trade practice  
and constrain the actions of others is evident. In this regard, the recent decision of the EU 
to enforce a compliance system for non-recognized third countries may also temper the 
adoption of regional standards seeking equivalency with the EU. While compliance is a 
widely used system for standards, they add a layer of governance and consequently further 
fragment the global system as exporters in foreign markets need to comply with these 
standards. Compared to the regulatory tool of equivalence, it disregards other local 
conditions in organic production. 
Finally, the absence of central coordination offers multiple pathways for future 
development. Realistic options may include multilateral agreements, whether this will be 
inclusive or beneficial for less powerful countries remains to be seen. Options for inter-
regional agreements are also viable, and private coordination through for instance the 
IFOAM Family of Standards could be directive in that. Regional standards in this regard 
function as a building block. Historically the development of organic standards has been 
incremental, requiring both political and consumer momentum. If regional standards are 
adopted as national regulations and enforced, the regulatory potential may still unfold. If 
future solutions to fragmentation in organic standards and trade are indeed offered in 
multilateral agreements, harmonized regional standards constitute compatible regulatory 
mechanisms. 
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4.1  Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, we have seen the emergence of many initiatives by businesses and civil 
society arrangements, often in the form of collaboration, to induce the sustainability of 
global value chains. Through standards or more general normative guidance, these private 
actors have become more and more involved in regulating the behaviour of transnational 
actors (Pattberg, 2007). The proliferation of these initiatives has brought forward diverse, 
and oftentimes overlapping, efforts for the voluntary regulation of different international 
policy domains and transnational issue fields. The result is a very fragmented field of 
(global) standards, claims and certifications (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014). 
Although fragmentation may spur competition and innovation, scholars of global 
governance generally regard it a major concern (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 
2009). For instance, it can increase conflicts between regulatory schemes, lead to 
inefficient regulatory competition (Cafaggi, 2016), create confusion among involved 
stakeholders and consumers (Bitzer & Glasbergen, 2015), and increase costs for 
organisations that provide funding to regulators (Fransen, 2011). 
This paper focuses on attempts that have been developed to handle this 
fragmentation, which are generally characterised as meta-governance. Meta-governance 
has been defined as the ‘organisation of self-regulation’ (Jessop, 1998), as a way to govern 
private self-regulation (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009; Meuleman, 2006, June; Peters, 2007; 
Torfing, 2012; Vermeulen, 2015). Through a wide array of guidance mechanisms 
(Rhodes, 1997), meta-governance addresses fragmentation problems by bringing in more 
cohesion in the activities and regulatory processes within an issue field. 
Meta-governance has often been ascribed to public actors with arguments based 
upon their centrality in public affairs and their responsibilities for the common good (Bell 
& Park, 2006; Christopoulos, Horvath, & Kull, 2012; Parkins, 2008; Whitehead, 2003). 
However, in more recent studies, private meta-governance has also become a subject of 
investigation of governance scholars (Bitzer, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2012; Cafaggi, 2016; 
Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; Fransen, 2015; Glasbergen, 2011). Rather than requiring 
actors to accept substantive norms in advance, from above, and on behalf of a specific 
organisation (e.g. a firm) or an imagined collectivity (e.g. the nation), private meta-
governance is concerned with solving fragmentation problems on the basis of a 
commitment to a continuing dialogue. This dialogue is assumed to establish the grounds 
for negotiated consent, resource sharing and concerted action (Jessop, 2011). 
Like public meta-governance, private meta-governance is inherently political. The 
different stakeholders involved may have different priorities, which leads them to 
different diagnoses of regulatory challenges and to support different meta-governance 
solutions (Fransen, 2015). While the term meta-governance is used to denote a higher 
level of decision-making, including the development of an institutional design and 
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behavioural rules for partnering (Beisheim & Simon, 2015), the reciprocal and negotiated 
character of private meta-governance (Jessop, 2011) also make it easily subjected to 
influence and power plays. 
This paper aims to further contribute to our knowledge about specific private meta-
governance practices. Research until now mainly studied the potentials and limitations of 
private meta-governance as a particular mode of governing. However, little is known 
about how meta-governors fulfil their roles in terms of the activities they employ. 
To answer the question in what ways private meta-governors fulfil meta-governance 
roles and to what extent their efforts reduce fragmentation, we developed a framework 
representing potential mechanisms of change. These are confronted with the practices of 
three meta-governors that have the ambition to become a key actor for the advancement 
of sustainable production in a global value chain: the sustainable fisheries partnership 
(SFP), the Common Code for Coffee Community Association (4C) and the World Cocoa 
Foundation (WCF). 
The next section unfolds the repertoire of potential activities of meta-governors 
ordered in four categories, based on a literature study. The resulting framework is applied 
in a study of the three meta-governor arrangements in the following sections. The last 
section reflects on our findings in terms of their fulfilment of meta-governance 
mechanisms, and in terms of handling fragmentation in their issue field. 
4.2  Meta-Governors Potential Repertoire  of Change Mechanisms 
Meta-governors aim to bring more cohesion into their issue fields in various ways. Based 
on a literature study on (private) meta-organisations and meta-governance, we 
categorised the different meta-governance activities into four mechanisms: (re)framing 
the (global) discourse, capacity building, networking and mainstreaming. In the following 
subsections, each mechanism and the different types of activities that comprise them are 
separately delineated. An overview is included in Table 1. The boundaries between the 
different mechanisms are not always clear-cut, because some activities may enforce 
reaction in other mechanisms or generally span boundaries. The mechanisms are meant 
as conceptual tools to define the different meta-governance processes employable by 
governance actors. 
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Table 4.1 Meta-governance mechanisms and associated activities 
Mechanism Activities References in literature (e.g.) 
(re)Framing the 
(global) discourse 
Agenda setting Derkx and Glasbergen (2014), Torfing (2012) 
Establishing discursive power Kooiman and Jentoft (2009) 
Setting terms of global debate Glasbergen (2011) 
Producing new knowledge Glasbergen (2011) 
Capacity building Providing rules for governance Beisheim and Simon (2015), Jessop (1997, 
1998) 
Provision of information and 
knowledge 
Ahrne and Brunsson (2008), Beisheim and 
Simon (2015) 
Advance chain-wide competency  Beisheim and Simon (2015), Fransen (2015), 
Torfing et al. (2012) 
Networking Inclusion of (new) actors into the 
network 
Beisheim and Simon (2015), Glasbergen (2011), 
Jessop (2009) 
Connecting initiatives and identifying 
opportunities for collaboration 
Ahrne and Brunsson (2008), Cafaggi (2016) 
Intermediating  Fransen (2015) 
Identity formation  Ahrne and Brunsson (2008) 
Mainstreaming Standard setting Fransen (2015), Glasbergen (2011) 
Supporting harmonisation  Cafaggi (2016), Derkx and Glasbergen (2014), 
Jessop (1997) 
Lobbying Bitzer, Glasbergen and Leroy (2012) 
(Re)framing the (global) discourse 
The mechanism of framing the discourse consists of activities that are directed towards 
shaping the dominant political and normative discourses of the issue field. Framing 
activities can determine or contribute to the specification of problem-definitions, the 
terms and norms surrounding the sustainability discourse and the ways to solve the 
problems in an issue field. Among other things, meta-governors can regulate or attempt 
to control which issues and options can be included in the system (Torfing, 2012). 
Processes of framing are continuous efforts, and new findings and insights may 
contribute to reframing the discourse. Several activities are discernible within this 
mechanism, namely, agenda setting, establishing discursive power, setting the terms of 
the global debate and producing new knowledge. 
Meta-governors function as deliberative sense-making enterprises, where common 
views on issues are shaped and on which convergence can be pursued (Derkx & 
Glasbergen, 2014). Examples of the different ways in which meta-governors can be 
involved in agenda setting is by influencing which issues members do and do not discuss, 
deciding on what is needed for sustainable change in the issue field, setting priorities for 
on-site implementation and creating willingness to work on them. 
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Discursive power can be established by shaping and disseminating politically 
relevant values, norms, theories and stories. Although these may often remain implicit,  
they underpin governance practice. According to Kooiman and Jentoft (2009), meta-
governance particularly ensues when norms, principles and values are discussed, 
formulated and applied in governing processes. 
Meta-governors do not only set the agenda with members and partners directly, but 
in effect also (attempt to) influence a wider audience and shape the terms of the global 
debate. For instance, this can take place by discussing (novel) public and/or private 
regulations with reference to the meta-governor’s frame. Next to that, the standards set 
by the meta-governor can also serve as a role model for other regulatory forms of private 
global governance (Glasbergen, 2011). 
A meta-governor can also (re)frame the global discourse by producing new 
knowledge. Non-governmental organisations and businesses can broaden the 
information base (Glasbergen, 2011), and professional knowledge and research can be 
acquired on, for instance, local circumstances, applicable technical standards and 
implementation conditions. 
Capacity building 
The mechanism of capacity building involves activities aimed to improve the capacities  
of meta-governors’ members and partners for sustainable change. The main 
distinguishable activities are as follows: providing rules for governance, provision of 
information and knowledge and advance chain-wide competency. 
Activities aimed at capacity building can firstly be realised by establishing inter-
organisational expectations and rules (Jessop, 1998) through which governance partners 
can pursue their aims. For instance, power can be delegated to some members, through 
which existing strengths may be capitalised. Meta-governors can also mediate among 
parties that are in dispute and may serve as a ‘court of appeal’ (Jessop, 1997). Formalised 
and binding rules of conduct may also require particular activities by members and 
partners (Beisheim & Simon, 2015). 
Activities can also be aimed at the provision of information and knowledge. Meta-
governors can collect information and research, provide access to information and 
disseminate knowledge and research. Members may add to the information pool and 
provide information to each other (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). 
Chain-wide competency, understood as the competencies of various actors within 
value chains from producers to retailers, can be strengthened by meta-governors by, for 
example, facilitating technical and peer support, reviews and internal conformity 
assessments. Assessments can be made on the impact and performance of the system and 
its partners (Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 2012). The provision of capital can also 
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allow partners to access third-party funds (Beisheim & Simon, 2015). Producer capacity 
may be built through trainings and on-site assistance. Providing market information to 
producers can lead to economic empowerment. Furthermore, institutional structures can 
be established where voiceless or weaker actors are provided a forum and may for instance  
take part in decision-making. 
Networking 
The mechanism of networking refers to the processes that link various actors in an issue 
field. Networking can be realised in existing institutionalised forums, in more loosely 
structured forums and projects, or in informal conversations. By seeking to enforce 
coordination and coherence of the actors involved (Peters, 2007), networking activities  
aim at constructing a sphere where collaboration can turn into shared visions on goals to 
induce change in the issue field. The various activities of networking are as follows: 
inclusion of (new) actors into the network, connecting initiatives and identifying 
opportunities for collaboration, intermediating and identity formation. 
Activities aimed at networking by the meta-governor will firstly be concerned with 
efforts to include (all) the relevant stakeholders through membership or partnership to 
the meta-organisation. Networking is not a neutral process: it often includes subjective 
selectivity of, among other things, actors, interests, spatio-temporal horizons, alliances, 
strategies, tactics and practical contexts (Jessop, 2009). For instance, inclusion of both 
North and South actors can be considered a criterion for success (Glasbergen, 2011). 
Meta-governors can engage in activities that connect initiatives and identify 
opportunities for collaboration; for instance, the meta-governor may serve as an umbrella 
organisation and a focal point for all the initiatives. It may offer an arena where actors can 
meet and facilitate interaction and increase cooperation among each other. It may devise 
a form of collaboration but also competition among members (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). 
Closely connected to the previous activity of networking is the intermediary role of 
the meta-governor. Through mediation, or ‘brokering’ (Bitzer et al., 2012), linkages can 
be established between suppliers and buyers through which market access can be created, 
or supply chain access can be secured (Fransen, 2015). 
Identity formation can also be an essential element of networking activities, here 
understood as close similarity or affinity with the meta-governor by virtue of being a 
member. Through membership or partnership, member identities may be created, 
reinforced or at least confirmed among its members. Being associated with the meta-
governor may in turn provide members a convincing case for identity, status and 
legitimacy within their environment (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). 
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Mainstreaming 
The mechanism of mainstreaming describes those activities that aim at acceptance, 
inclusion and harmonisation of the meta-governor’s normative and regulatory 
framework, or those it supports. Meta-governors can promote regulatory coherence and 
convergence (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014) both on policy and operational levels. The 
activities directly pertaining to mainstreaming are as follows: standard setting, supporting 
harmonisation and lobbying. 
Meta-governors are rife with recommendations, guidelines, policies, benchmarking, 
rankings, codes of practice and the like (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). The activity of 
standard setting can involve a recommendation, or the development of specific standards. 
The latter is done, for example, by establishing a sector-wide minimum standard, or by 
selecting an existing one such as the gold standard. 
Activities may also pertain to enhancing harmonisation of different governance 
mechanisms and regimes (Cafaggi, 2016; Jessop, 1997). This may also concern standards, 
which means that processes of verification, certification and understandings of 
sustainability are similar or comparable in different standards. In addition, meta-governors 
may also support equivalence, a formal recognition of the criteria and requirements of 
different standards (Marx & Wouters, 2015), as fulfilling common objectives. 
Another activity the meta-governor can undertake is lobbying (Bitzer et al., 2012). On 
behalf of its members and partners, the meta-governor can act as a representative and 
advocate in the relevant forums and discussions, for instance, in trade and policy domains. 
4.3  Research Methods 
This article is based on a literature study, semi-structured in-depth interviews and online 
desk research. The literature study served as the basis for the conceptual framework, 
which was developed by categorising the mechanisms of (private) meta-governance. 
Subsequently, case studies were sought to apply the framework on. The criteria for 
incorporating meta-governors into the analysis were that arrangements must: 
 
1. be civil society organisations 
2. have the improvement in sustainable development in value chains in their respective 
sector as their main priority 
3. have an ambition for concerted action for sustainable change 
4. exercise their raison d’être by having members and partners from other organisations 
active in the same sector 
5. have a transnational scope. 
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The characteristic that sets meta-governors apart from more common standard setting 
NGOs for sustainable value chains is their ambition for concerted action from member 
and partner organisations that may or may not already have private standards and other 
partnerships for sustainability in place. 
The five criteria led us to the recognition of three different arrangements across 
sectors. While scholars have recognised multiple meta-governors in same issue fields 
(Fransen, 2015; Williams & Rushton, 2011), we opted for a cross-case analysis to yield 
knowledge from individual cases, and to inform on the similarities and differences across 
cases. The case studies selected were the SFP, 4C and WCF. These arrangements function 
along the lines of supply chain governance of fisheries, coffee and cocoa supplies, 
respectively, and serve as representative case studies for commodities of transnational 
supply chain governance in which sustainability issues have gained prominence. Although 
the terms meta-governance or meta-governor are not used by the arrangements, given 
their ambition, the 4C and WCF have previously been identified as meta-governors in 
scholarly work (Bitzer et al., 2012; Fransen, 2015). SFP is similar in its ambition. 
The purposive sampling of the meta-governors was complemented with snowball 
sampling of potential members (actors who have a membership with the meta-governor) 
and partners (actors who collaborate or attend meetings organised by the meta-governor) 
for the execution of semi-structured interviews. Since the three arrangements are not all 
membership organisations, for purposes of consistency members will henceforth also be 
referred to as partners. One meta-governor strictly controlled public relations about the 
arrangement, which rendered attempts to contact potential partners and members 
outside of the involvement of the meta-governor fruitless. Between June 2013 and 
October 2014, 16 semi-structured in-depth interviews were held, and an additional five 
respondents answered interview questions by email. The total of 21 respondents consisted 
of interviews with representatives of the three meta-governors, and with six of their 
partners. These can be categorised as follows: civil society organisations (9), companies 
(6), state-owned enterprises (2) and intergovernmental organisation (1). 
The interviews included questions regarding the context and background for the 
initiation of the meta-governor; the different activities the arrangements undertake with 
consideration to mechanisms of framing the discourse, capacity building, networking and 
mainstreaming; the influence the organisations are perceived to have by stakeholders in 
the relevant sectors; and organisational arrangements and ideational perspectives to 
further understandings on the effectuation of mechanisms. In addition to the interviews, 
the analysis was complemented through desk research, and the various secondary sources 
consulted included websites, newsletters, partnership and/or project reports, documents 
and annual reports. 
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4.4  Introduction of the Cases 
The three case studies are introduced below. The descriptions delineate why these 
arrangements have been established, what their missions and goals are, and the issue-
specific challenges they need to address. 
Sustainable fisheries partnership 
The SFP (www.sustainablefish.org) is a business-focused civil society arrangement that 
was initiated in 2006 to solve sustainability problems in the seafood sector, including the 
fisheries sector and aquaculture. The arrangement is not involved in standard setting, but 
within the seafood sector there are multiple, often-competing market-based approaches. 
Early examples include single species eco-labels and seafood guides, while more recent 
initiatives (Marine Stewardship Council, Global Aquaculture Alliance, Global Good 
Agricultural Practice, Friend of the Sea, Aquaculture Stewardship Council) operate at the 
global level and target multiple environmental problems including overfishing and by-
catch (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013). The reason for SFP’s initiation lies in the problems 
that remained unsolved. Firstly, interviewees pointed towards the problem that most 
governance actors make insufficient differentiations between fishes and regions, thereby 
being largely inconsiderate of specific sustainability challenges. Secondly, for an efficient 
and responsible fisheries management, information on fish population dynamics is 
needed but often not available (Gagern & van den Bergh, 2013). Finally, market-based 
initiatives often concentrate their activities either on wild fisheries or on aquaculture, 
whereas decoupling is problematic due to the interconnectedness of the two chains. With 
a mission to catalyse global seafood supply chains in rebuilding depleted fish stocks and 
reducing the environmental impacts of fishing and fish farming, SFP addresses the 
aforementioned issues in several ways. For example, SFP maintains an extensive and 
publicly accessible database of fisheries named FishSource (www.fishsource.com), which 
contains assessments of sustainability and improvement needs. The FisheriesWiki 
website (www.fisherieswiki.org) offers experts and analysts the chance to contribute 
materials on various aspects of fisheries, and functions both as an online contributor 
network and a common shared database. SFP Metrics, a software package linked to 
FishSource, can advise corporate partners about the sustainability status of the fish they 
are ordering. SFP also works on fisheries and aquaculture through improvement projects, 
in which relevant stakeholders in supply chains collaborate to influence policies and 
management practices, and improve the sustainability of fishing and fish farming 
operations. The arrangement does not campaign or provide eco-labels, but instead aims 
to reduce the barriers to action by industry. 
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Common Code for Coffee Community Association 
The 4C (www.4c-coffeeassociation.org) is a multi-stakeholder organisation. After the 
coffee crisis of 2001–2002, the organisation was established in 2003 to address the main 
sustainability issues affecting the coffee sector. In its ambition for concerted action, the 
arrangement aims to provide a platform for all actors committed to addressing these issues 
in a pre-competitive manner. 4C is one initiative amongst others, as with the liberalisation 
of the coffee markets in the late 1980s, numerous private and public-private initiatives tried 
to balance the de-regulation with private regulation. Certification schemes were initiated, 
for instance, by Fairtrade, International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, 
UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance. Partnerships between NGOs and trade and 
industry emerged. From 2004 onwards, more initiatives developed, including other inter-
sectoral partnerships. More members of civil society started to change their strategy from 
campaigning against companies to cooperating. Yet, strong competition between the 
standard setters led to compliance problems for producers, confusion for consumers and 
competition between partnerships and members of the supply chain who rely on 
sustainability standards (Bitzer, 2012). The mission of 4C is to achieve 100% coffee sector 
compliance with at least baseline sustainability standards. To meet this goal, the 
organisation advances sustainability by setting and maintaining the 4C Code of Conduct, 
which is a set of baseline standards to start producers on the path to sustainable production; 
providing access to tools and information for coffee farmers for implementation; setting 
rules and a verification system; actively promoting sustainability standards and initiatives  
in the market to create greater value for verified/certified coffees; and providing an open 
and dynamic platform for exchange where stakeholders can work together. In this role, the 
4C organises forums or workshops on a regular basis and helps setting up joint projects 
between different stakeholders to tackle particular sustainability issues. 
World Cocoa Foundation 
The WCF (http://worldcocoafoundation.org) promotes a sustainable cocoa economy 
through economic and social development and environmental stewardship in cocoa-
growing communities. Founded in 2000, the WCF is an international membership 
organisation and embodies more than a 100 partner companies, representing 80% of the 
global corporate market. Membership is open to manufacturers and cocoa processors, 
supply chain managers, ports, allied industries and trade associations. WCF is an 
arrangement that was part of the shift that took off from public to private and public-
private initiatives for cocoa in the late 1990s. WCF works through partnerships that bring 
together donors, industry members, producing country governments, research institutes 
and NGOs to achieve its goals. It also organises twice-yearly partnership meetings where 
these actors and development agencies convene. Through these efforts, WCF strives for 
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concerted action in the cocoa sector. Since 2005, other multi-stakeholder collaborations 
emerged including a wide range of stakeholders (Bitzer et al., 2012). Currently, different 
initiatives strive for sustainability in the cocoa chain. These include stakeholder 
organisations for producing and consuming countries, traders, processors and 
manufacturers, the value chain and other international multi-stakeholder organisations 
for economic, social and/or environmental sustainability (including WCF, International 
Cocoa Initiative, Roundtable for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy; TCC, 2008), and global 
standard setting and certification organisations (e.g. Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest 
Alliance, UTZ Certified). Although WCF is not a certifying body, the arrangement 
considers that their sustainability principles and goals have much in common with those 
of transaction-oriented product certification systems. WCF specifically tries to bridge the 
needs of cocoa farmers with those of the cocoa industry and the environment. To achieve 
its goals, the organisation focuses among other things on building partnerships with 
cocoa farmers, origin governments and environmental organisations; supporting and 
applying demand-led research that improves crop yield and quality; supporting training 
and education that improves well-being of cocoa-farming families. 
4.5  The Practice of the Meta-Governors and its Application to the 
Conceptual Model 
Our analysis of the cases shows that the arrangements employ a wide array of meta-
governance mechanisms, albeit often in different ways and to varying degrees. In the 
following, characteristic examples have been chosen to illustrate their specific 
operationalisation and these are summarised in Table 4.2. 
 
92
 
Ta
bl
e 4
.2
 C
om
pa
ris
on
 o
f m
eta
-g
ov
er
na
nc
e m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s a
nd
 as
so
ci
ate
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 em
pl
oy
ed
 b
y W
CF
, S
FP
, a
nd
 4C
1  
O
rg
an
isa
tio
ns
 
W
CF
 
SF
P 
4C
 
Se
ct
or
 
Co
co
a 
Fi
sh
er
ie
s a
nd
 A
qu
ac
ul
tu
re
 
Co
ffe
e 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
A
ct
iv
iti
es
 
(r
e)
Fr
am
in
g t
he
 
(G
lo
ba
l) 
D
isc
ou
rs
e 
 
A
ge
nd
a s
et
tin
g 
Pl
at
fo
rm
 fo
r d
isc
us
sio
n 
an
d 
co
op
er
at
io
n;
 fo
ru
m
s a
nd
 d
isc
us
sio
ns
 
or
ga
ni
se
d 
to
 d
isc
us
s r
ele
va
nt
 an
d 
pe
rti
ne
nt
 to
pi
cs
. 
Pr
ov
isi
on
 o
f o
ve
rv
ie
ws
 o
n 
su
sta
in
ab
ili
ty
 
sta
tu
s a
nd
 ch
al
le
ng
es
. S
om
e p
er
tin
en
t i
ss
ue
s 
ar
e t
ak
en
 u
p 
in
 fo
ru
m
s a
nd
 p
ro
je
cts
. 
Pl
at
fo
rm
 fo
r d
isc
us
sio
n 
an
d c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n;
 
fo
ru
m
s a
nd
 d
isc
us
sio
ns
 o
rg
an
ise
d 
fo
r o
n-
sit
e i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
 
Es
ta
bl
ish
in
g 
di
sc
ur
siv
e p
ow
er
 
Ex
cl
ud
in
g i
ts 
m
iss
io
n,
 p
ol
iti
ca
l v
al
ue
s 
an
d 
no
rm
s a
re
 n
ot
 ex
pr
es
sly
 
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
. F
oc
us
 o
n 
iss
ue
s e
.g
. c
hi
ld
 
la
bo
ur
 an
d 
ge
nd
er
 co
nt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 n
or
m
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
Ex
cl
ud
in
g i
ts 
m
iss
io
n,
 p
ol
iti
ca
l v
al
ue
s a
nd
 
no
rm
s a
re
 n
ot
 ex
pr
es
sly
 d
iss
em
in
ate
d.
 
Sp
ec
ifi
c f
oc
us
 o
n 
iss
ue
s h
as
 co
nt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 
no
rm
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
e.g
. fi
gh
t a
ga
in
st 
oc
ea
n 
ac
id
ifi
ca
tio
n.
 
Ex
cl
ud
in
g i
ts 
m
iss
io
n,
 p
ol
iti
ca
l v
al
ue
s a
nd
 
no
rm
s a
re
 n
ot
 ex
pr
es
sly
 d
iss
em
in
ate
d.
 
Is
su
es
 to
 b
e a
dd
re
ss
ed
 ar
e b
ro
ug
ht
 to
 th
e 
ta
bl
e b
y m
em
be
rs
 of
 th
e 4
C.
 P
re
ss
in
g 
iss
ue
s (
e.
g.
 ge
nd
er
 eq
ui
ty
) a
re
 p
lac
ed
 o
n 
th
e a
ge
nd
a.
  
Se
tti
ng
 te
rm
s o
f 
gl
ob
al
 d
eb
at
e 
N
o 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t o
f r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
fra
m
ew
or
k a
nd
 n
ot
 a 
fo
ru
m
 to
 in
te
rp
ret
 
pu
bl
ic
 o
r p
riv
at
e r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
. 
N
o 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t o
f r
eg
ul
at
or
y f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
an
d 
no
t a
 fo
ru
m
 to
 in
te
rp
re
t p
ub
lic
 o
r 
pr
iv
at
e r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
. 
In
vo
lv
ed
 in
 st
an
da
rd
 se
tti
ng
, b
ut
 in
 
re
fe
rr
al
 to
 ‘s
us
ta
in
ab
le
’ c
of
fe
e p
ro
du
cti
on
 
re
fe
re
nc
e i
s u
su
al
ly 
m
ad
e t
o 
str
ic
te
r 
sta
nd
ar
ds
. 
Pr
od
uc
in
g n
ew
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
Re
se
ar
ch
 p
ro
jec
ts 
ar
e f
un
de
d a
nd
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e o
n 
lo
ca
l c
irc
um
sta
nc
es
 an
d 
pr
oj
ec
t i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
ar
e p
ro
du
ce
d.
  
Kn
ow
le
dg
e o
n 
lo
ca
l c
irc
um
sta
nc
es
 an
d 
pr
oj
ec
t i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
ar
e p
ro
du
ce
d.
 
Co
nt
rib
ut
es
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l k
no
wl
ed
ge
 to
 
pr
oj
ec
ts.
 
  
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
1 O
w
n 
as
se
ss
m
en
t a
nd
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 d
at
a b
as
ed
 o
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
av
ail
ab
le 
fro
m
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
ns
’ w
eb
sit
es
, d
oc
um
en
ts 
an
d 
in
ter
vi
ew
s 
Chapter 4 
93
 
Ta
bl
e 4
.2
 C
om
pa
ris
on
 o
f m
et
a-
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s a
nd
 as
so
ci
ate
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 em
pl
oy
ed
 b
y W
CF
, S
FP
 an
d 
4C
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
O
rg
an
isa
tio
ns
 
W
CF
 
SF
P 
4C
 
Se
ct
or
 
Co
co
a 
Fi
sh
er
ie
s a
nd
 A
qu
ac
ul
tu
re
 
Co
ffe
e 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
A
ct
iv
iti
es
 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 B
ui
ld
in
g 
 
Pr
ov
id
in
g r
ul
es
 fo
r 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Ta
sk
s a
re
 o
n 
a v
ol
un
ta
ry
 b
as
is 
de
le
ga
te
d 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 ex
ist
 fo
r d
isp
ut
es
. 
Ta
sk
s a
re
 o
n 
a v
ol
un
ta
ry
 b
as
is 
de
le
ga
te
d.
 
Ta
sk
s a
re
 o
n 
a v
ol
un
ta
ry
 b
as
is 
de
le
ga
te
d 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 ex
ist
 fo
r d
isp
ut
es
. 
Pr
ov
isi
on
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
pr
ov
id
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
ne
w
sle
tte
rs
, d
iss
em
in
at
io
n 
of
 re
se
ar
ch
 
fin
di
ng
s, 
an
d 
pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 m
ee
tin
gs
. A
 
da
ta
ba
se
 to
ol
 C
oc
oa
M
A
P 
is 
in
 th
e 
m
ak
in
g.
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
re
se
ar
ch
 o
n t
he
 se
ct
or
 is
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
Fi
sh
So
ur
ce
, 
Fi
sh
er
ie
sW
ik
i, 
su
sta
in
ab
ili
ty
 o
ve
rv
ie
ws
, 
br
ie
fin
gs
, n
ew
sle
tte
rs
, a
nd
 h
an
db
oo
ks
.  
Tr
ai
ni
ng
s, 
a l
ib
ra
ry
, a
nd
 o
th
er
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
ol
s a
re
 ac
ce
ssi
bl
e f
or
 
m
em
be
rs
. 
A
dv
an
ce
 ch
ai
n-
wi
de
 
co
m
pe
te
nc
y 
M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
is 
ai
m
ed
 to
 ad
va
nc
e 
co
m
pe
te
nc
y f
or
 al
l m
em
be
rs
, d
iff
er
en
t 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t p
ro
gr
am
m
es
 ar
e e
sp
ec
ial
ly 
ai
m
ed
 at
 fa
rm
 le
ve
l. 
Fi
sh
ou
rc
e i
s a
 p
ub
lic
ly 
av
ai
lab
le 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
ol
 d
es
ig
ne
d 
fo
r t
he
 
in
du
str
y t
o 
ad
va
nc
e a
 su
sta
in
ab
le 
se
af
oo
d 
se
ct
or
.  
M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
is 
ai
m
ed
 to
 ad
va
nc
e 
co
m
pe
te
nc
y f
or
 al
l m
em
be
rs
, v
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 o
n 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
le
ve
l.  
N
et
w
or
ki
ng
 
 
In
cl
us
io
n 
of
 (n
ew
) 
ac
to
rs
 in
to
 th
e 
ne
tw
or
k 
O
nl
y i
nd
us
try
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p,
 an
d n
ot
 
in
cl
us
iv
e t
ow
ar
ds
 m
em
be
r p
ar
tic
ip
ati
on
 
of
 sm
al
l, 
m
om
-a
nd
-p
op
 co
m
pa
ni
es
 o
r f
or
 
fa
rm
er
s. 
O
nl
y p
ar
tn
er
s f
ro
m
 th
e i
nd
us
try
. 
M
em
be
rs
 in
cl
ud
e c
ha
in
-w
id
e 
sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s, 
ci
vi
l s
oc
iet
y o
rg
an
isa
tio
ns
, 
an
d 
in
di
vi
du
al
s. 
 
Co
nn
ec
tin
g 
in
iti
at
iv
es
 an
d 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s f
or
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n 
M
em
be
rs
 ar
e s
ou
gh
t f
or
 p
ro
jec
ts.
 
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 m
ee
tin
gs
 ar
e a
 fo
ru
m
 fo
r 
ne
tw
or
ki
ng
. 
Th
ro
ug
h 
va
rio
us
 p
ro
je
cts
, t
oo
ls,
 fo
ru
m
s 
an
d 
ro
un
dt
ab
le
s, 
SF
P 
br
in
gs
 ac
to
rs
 al
on
g 
th
e s
ea
fo
od
 su
pp
ly
 ch
ai
n 
to
ge
th
er
. 
Th
ro
ug
h 
or
ga
ni
sin
g f
or
um
s, 
wo
rk
sh
op
s, 
(s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
) m
ee
tin
gs
 ac
to
rs
 al
on
g t
he
 
co
ffe
e c
ha
in
 ar
e b
ro
ug
ht
 to
ge
th
er
. 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
tin
g  
N
ot
 a 
fo
ru
m
 fo
r e
xp
lic
itl
y l
in
ki
ng
 
su
pp
lie
rs
 an
d 
re
ta
ile
rs
 fo
r m
ar
ke
t a
cc
es
s, 
th
ou
gh
 fo
ru
m
s a
re
 at
te
nd
ed
 b
y s
up
pl
ier
s 
an
d 
re
ta
ile
rs
. 
W
ith
in
 im
pr
ov
em
en
t p
ro
jec
ts 
ro
un
dt
ab
le
s a
re
 o
rg
an
ise
d 
to
 co
nn
ec
t 
sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s. 
Fo
ru
m
s a
re
 at
te
nd
ed
 b
y 
su
pp
lie
rs
 an
d 
re
ta
ile
rs
.  
Re
gu
la
rly
 li
sts
 ar
e s
en
t o
f l
ic
en
ce
d 
4C
 
un
its
 to
 fa
ci
lit
at
e s
up
pl
y a
nd
 d
em
an
d f
or
 
4C
 c
om
pl
ai
nt
 co
ffe
e. 
Id
en
tit
y f
or
m
at
io
n 
M
em
be
rs
 m
ay
 u
til
ise
 W
CF
 lo
go
. 
Pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 im
po
rta
nt
 an
d 
in
flu
en
tia
l 
N
o 
fo
rm
al
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
or
 lo
go
 u
til
isa
bl
e 
fo
r p
ar
tn
er
s. 
Pa
rtn
er
s c
an
 re
fe
r t
o 
to
ol
s 
M
em
be
rs
 m
ay
 u
til
ise
 4C
 lo
go
. 
M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
pu
rp
or
te
dl
y c
re
at
es
 b
et
te
r 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 fi
na
nc
e. 
Private meta-governors and their practices: An inventory of their mechanisms of change 
94
 
O
rg
an
isa
tio
ns
 
W
CF
 
SF
P 
4C
 
Se
ct
or
 
Co
co
a 
Fi
sh
er
ie
s a
nd
 A
qu
ac
ul
tu
re
 
Co
ffe
e 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
A
ct
iv
iti
es
 
m
em
be
rs
 co
nt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 W
CF
’s 
re
pu
ta
tio
n.
 
an
d 
pr
oj
ec
ts 
of
 SF
P 
as
 a 
sig
n 
of
 
su
sta
in
ab
ili
ty
 co
m
m
itm
en
t. 
 
M
ai
ns
tre
am
in
g 
 
St
an
da
rd
 se
tti
ng
 
N
ot
 a 
sta
nd
ar
d 
se
tti
ng
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n.
 D
oe
s 
no
t a
ct
iv
el
y p
ro
m
ot
e s
us
ta
in
ab
ili
ty
 
sta
nd
ar
ds
. 
W
hi
le
 n
ot
 a 
sta
nd
ar
d 
se
tti
ng
 in
iti
at
iv
e, 
the
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
pa
rti
ci
pa
te
d 
in
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f o
th
er
 ce
rti
fic
at
io
n 
sc
he
m
es
. P
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 re
co
m
m
en
ds
 M
SC
 
ce
rti
fic
at
io
n.
 
In
vo
lv
ed
 in
 st
an
da
rd
 se
tti
ng
 an
d 
be
nc
hm
ar
ki
ng
. D
ev
elo
pe
d 
th
e 4
C 
Co
de
 of
 
Co
nd
uc
t. 
A
ct
iv
ely
 p
ro
m
ot
e s
us
ta
in
ab
ili
ty
 
sta
nd
ar
ds
 
 
Su
pp
or
tin
g 
ha
rm
on
isa
tio
n 
Su
pp
or
ts 
ha
rm
on
isa
tio
n 
of
 ce
rti
fic
at
io
n 
sc
he
m
es
 an
d 
ta
ke
s d
iff
er
en
t s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
in
to
 co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
in
 o
wn
 p
ro
jec
ts.
 
In
vo
lv
ed
 in
 p
ro
jec
ts 
to
 u
nd
er
sta
nd
 an
d 
su
pp
or
t e
qu
iv
al
en
ce
, h
ar
m
on
isa
tio
n 
an
d 
be
nc
hm
ar
ki
ng
 fo
r c
er
tif
ica
tio
n 
sc
he
m
es
.  
St
ro
ng
 em
ph
as
is 
on
 eq
ui
va
len
ce
, a
nd
 
en
ga
ge
s i
n 
ef
fo
rts
 to
 al
ig
n 
au
di
ts 
an
d 
be
nc
hm
ar
ki
ng
 w
ith
 o
th
er
 ce
rti
fic
at
io
n 
sc
he
m
es
. 
Lo
bb
yi
ng
 
Pl
at
fo
rm
s b
ot
h 
in
 an
d 
ou
tsi
de
 co
co
a a
re
 
so
ug
ht
 to
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e W
CF
’s 
m
es
sa
ge
. 
En
ga
ge
m
en
t f
ro
m
 st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 so
ug
ht
 fo
r 
to
ol
s a
nd
 p
ro
je
ct
s b
ut
 n
ot
 ac
tiv
ely
 
en
ga
ge
d 
in
 lo
bb
yi
ng
. 
Es
pe
ci
al
ly
 p
la
tfo
rm
s i
n 
co
ffe
e a
re
 so
ug
ht
 
to
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 4
C’
s m
es
sa
ge
. 
Chapter 4 
Private meta-governors and their practices: An inventory of their mechanisms of change 
95 
Framing the global discourse 
The arrangements influence the dominant political and normative discourse in their 
efforts to regulate and control the issue fields. Serving as a platform for discussion and 
cooperation, 4C and WCF engage in activities that set the agenda on what is needed for 
sustainable change. Actors along the chain discuss pressing sustainability issues in 
stakeholder and partnership meetings. Although SFP is not a forum for discussion, all 
three organisations set priorities for on-site implementation by organising forums, 
workshops and/or projects regarding some of these challenges. SFP, for instance, sets the 
agenda for responsible management of mixed-trawl fisheries in Southeast Asia, where 
mixed-trawl fisheries are common practice but certification is often problematic, because 
standards such as MSC and IFFO’s Responsible Sourcing standard focus on single fish 
fisheries. In partnership with IFFO, SFP started discussions with scientists and industry 
representatives on possibilities for responsible management of mixed-trawl fisheries to 
develop a tool to drive improvement in this area. 
More than propagating and disseminating explicit political values and norms on 
sustainability issues, the arrangements establish discursive power in an indirect manner 
primarily by taking up issues they consider unvalued. For the SFP, the discourse on 
sustainable marine management serves as an example. Together with the National 
Fisheries Conservation Center, it initiated the ‘Global Ocean Health Program’, where 
scientists and carbon experts disclosed problems and potential solutions to producers, 
vessel owners, policy makers, citizens and industry participants (SFP, n.d.-b). The fight 
against ocean acidification became a relevant norm for actors along the chain. Personal 
communications with stakeholders reveal that SFP’s discursive power mainly works in 
the industry, and that the scientific community and other stakeholders do not necessarily 
take notice of SFP’s endeavour. 4C includes so-called ‘topics of interest’ into the agenda 
of its meetings, such as gender equity in the coffee sector. WCF also takes up sustainability 
values and norms as gender empowerment. 
The extent to which the arrangements are able to set the terms of the global debate 
varies but is marginal, as none of the arrangements is leading in discussing public and/or 
private regulatory interpretation, nor serve as a regulatory role model in their respective 
sectors. Interviewed partners referred to SFP as an independent expert that has been able 
to include new aspects regarding issues such as sustainable feed, best practices of  
by-catch, regional farm management and trawled fisheries. Where SFP specifically 
endorses MSC certification, WCF takes a neutral stance towards certifications. 4C has a 
baseline standard and does not serve as a role model for other regulatory forms of 
governance in the coffee sector. 
All three arrangements produce new knowledge, by bringing particularly 
professional knowledge into the (mainstream) discussion. Distinctive in its sector is SFP’s 
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focus on local fish stock because of its knowledge regarding differences of species in 
different regions. Moreover, all arrangements base their information on scientific 
findings. SFP provides a database within which scientists can develop fish-profiles and 
has a research and data division for maintaining FishSource and the information base 
FisheriesWiki. WCF funds research and collaborates regularly in research roundtables 
where research outcomes and needs are discussed. 4C involves scientists in forums and 
as members. 
Capacity building 
All arrangements seek to build and improve the capacity of their members and partners 
for sustainable change. The organisations have general rules for governance and delegate 
tasks to members and partners involved to make projects (largely) self-supporting. SFP 
has changed its role from implementing to steering improvement processes and focuses 
on providing guidance, advice and tools to actors interested in improvement projects. 
WCF also delegates tasks, and while members may lend their expertise to projects, they 
are primarily funding partners. 4C has increasingly delegated tasks to other actors in the 
chain. An example of this is the ‘Training of Trainers workshops’ where participants learn 
how to conduct farmer trainings. Different from SFP, 4C and WCF are membership 
driven and also have systems for conflict and dispute settlements in place. While both 
focus on finding amicable solutions, 4C recommends settlements and has a mediation 
panel to solve enduring disputes. At WCF, taskforces can be created to determine the 
differences that lead to conflict. 
Although all arrangements make information and knowledge available in the 
respective sectors, SFP specifically focuses on information dissemination. SFP collects  
information, conducts research and makes it publicly available. FishSource summarises 
fisheries experts’ information on fish stocks and sustainability statuses. SFP also 
developed tools where buyers can measure their sustainability progress. These provide 
only a rough guide to how individual fisheries are performing, and SFP does not define a 
level of sustainable fish stock but provides information on how international standards 
would rate the fisheries (FishSource, n.d.; SFP, 2010). A point of criticism raised by an 
interviewee is that some of the data in FishSource are not up-to-date, but are accepted by 
its users because there are no lot of specific information available beyond it. This shows 
the significance and also the responsibility of such efforts. 
Common Code for Coffee Community Association provides information and 
knowledge with trainings, illustrated guides for illiterates, a 4C Tool Library that includes 
training manuals and other information tools. WCF brings topics to the attention of their 
members through research updates, newsletters and partnership meetings. Its most 
current initiative under development, CocoaMAP (Cocoa Measurement and Progress), is 
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aimed at measuring and reporting progress towards sustainability in the cocoa value 
chain. WCF is currently developing a framework for a shared Key Performance Indicators  
tool, data collection tools and online dashboard to assist member companies, 
governments and others to better measure, understand and manage their investments in 
sustainability at the farm level through aggregated information (WCF, 2012a). 
Whether initiated or facilitated by the arrangements, all partners are invited to 
participate in different improvement projects. SFP projects mainly assess the 
improvement needs of fisheries, develop work plans and educate on how to catch trawled 
fish sustainably. With the publicly available database FishSource, SFP aims to reduce the 
barrier for industry and other interested actors for a sustainable seafood sector. 4C offers 
on-site assistance with trainings for farmers. While, for instance, roaster-members have 
to commit to buy increasing amounts of 4C compliant coffee over time, buyer-members 
of 4C need to make long-term contracts with 4C compliant coffee sellers, which can 
stabilise the producer’s environment. The 4C unit system also helps industry members, 
because it enhances transparency and traceability of the coffee (Kuit, Rijn, & Jansen, 
2010), which is the basis for responsible procurement policies. WCF seeks to improve 
chain-wide competencies through, for example, the CocoaMAP initiative, but the 
different programs endorsed by WCF are commonly aimed at the farm level. 
Generally, the work of the arrangements progressively reaches more of the 
stakeholders at the bottom of the value chains. With its baseline standard, 4C reached 
more than over 300,000 farmers and 900,000 workers in producing countries with an 
increase in 4C Units from 178 in 2012 to 263 in 2013 (4C Association, 2014). SFP has 
developed and/or facilitated more than 40 fisheries improvement projects and has 
aquaculture improvement projects running in three Asian countries (SFP, n.d.-a). WCF 
has reached over 540,000 farmers through its different programmes (WCF, n.d.-a). One 
of the main limitations of all three initiatives is the lack of evidence for an improved 
financial situation of producers through the activities. As profitability is a key for 
sustainability (Ibnu, Glasbergen, Offermans, & Arifin, 2015) for all actors along the 
supply chain, the connection must be recognised and aspired. 
Networking 
The arrangements link various actors in one issue field through networking. Throughout 
the years, the arrangements have expanded their network of partners. 4C is the most 
inclusive organisation of all, with partners covering all parts of the chain, including farmers 
and other private standard setting organisations. Small-scale producers can enter the 
network with relatively low implementation costs and efforts in implementing the 4C code 
of conduct. SFP and WCF are less inclusive, because they focus on partner companies. 
WCF also does not include small (mom-and-pop) companies or farmers as members. 
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However, WCF does represent 80% of the global corporate market on cocoa, therefore 
encompassing a large number of member companies (WCF, 2012b). WCF considers that 
having an established pool of member companies attract new members, because older 
members reach out to interested companies. Also partnerships entice companies to apply 
for membership, of which particularly the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is considered 
to have raised the profile of WCF and attracted other companies to join WCF. 
A possible challenge for all three arrangements is to expand their networks further. 
According to an interviewee, separating 4C’s function as a platform from its 
standardisation function would be valuable as it could lead to the inclusion of standard 
setters that do not support 4C’s baseline code and industry players who are already 
committed to other non-member standards. According to both SFP and WCF partner 
interviewees, the arrangements were advised to include (more) small-scale fishermen, 
farmers or their representatives into the decision-making. Such participation was deemed 
as possibly increasing the effectiveness of networking activities, and providing more 
legitimacy to decision-making processes. 
The arrangements serve as a platform for cooperation and joint action. Through 
various forums, projects, tools and roundtables, they bring together actors from the 
supply chains, scientific bodies and institutes, and local, regional and international 
institutions and organisations. WCF informs members about specific projects and gauges 
interest for sponsorship. Stakeholders from the cocoa industry come to WCF partnership 
meetings, including businesses throughout the chain but also civil society actors. SFP 
convenes an alliance of producers, processors, suppliers and buyers for improvement 
projects. To avoid overlap with other initiatives, SFP first considers and recommends 
existing initiatives, including certifications, to buyers. SFP also aligns efforts with other 
initiatives. With America’s Monterey Bay Aquarium, for instance, it shares the 
information system used to evaluate the sustainability status of seafood sources. In forums 
of 4C, stakeholders discuss sustainability challenges, identify possible solutions, share 
knowledge on best practices and ideas for future cooperation. 
Out of the three arrangements, only 4C functions as an intermediary as it institutes  
linkages between supplier and buyers. The arrangement regularly sends a list of licensed 
4C units to all members to facilitate supply and demand for 4C compliant coffee. WCF 
and SFP only function indirectly as intermediaries with projects and forums providing 
stakeholders along the chain with the possibility to create new markets. In addition, SFP 
organises ‘Fisheries Forums’ where retailers get the opportunity not only to speak to 
suppliers, but also to business ‘competitors’ about experiences with fisheries 
improvement projects, challenges of aquaculture and specific sustainability requirements. 
Thereby, they can develop relationships and start new projects, creating market 
opportunities for fisheries and guaranteeing future supply for retailer (Bush, Toonen, 
Oosterveer, & Mol, 2013). 
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Particularly, WCF and 4C lend their identity to members and partners as their logos 
are utilised in demonstration of allegiance and membership to the organisations. 
According to a representative of 4C, 4C membership creates better access to finance some 
financial loans. Through important and influential partners (e.g. Bill & Melinda Gates 
foundation, governments), WCF has received a respectable reputation which in turn is 
important to partner companies as it may influence their customers. 
Mainstreaming 
The arrangements are involved in mainstreaming activities when they aim at acceptance, 
inclusion and/or harmonisation of the meta-governor’s own normative and regulatory 
framework or those it supports. From the three cases, only 4C sets standards and verifies 
compliance. It considers its baseline code as a literal baseline and recommends further 
improvement. 4C helps verified producers to step-up to other, more stringent, standards. 
An assessment of the compatibility of the standards is made, after which farmers are 
informed on consequent steps. 4C’s pre-competitive character has attracted standards 
setters criticising the 4C code to apply for membership (like UTZ in 2011 and Fairtrade 
in 2012). In 2013, the 4C tripled its volumes in compliant coffee, with a total volume of 
over 39 million bags of coffee (4C Association, 2014), making it one of the most purchased 
verified coffees. Particularly, the benchmarking practices with UTZ and RA have led to 
strong increase in 4C compliant coffee produce. Nonetheless, according to an interviewee, 
this does not create additional sustainable coffee production, because farmers involved in 
benchmarking are already certified by stricter standards. 
Sustainable fisheries partnership developed six stages for fishery improvement 
projects, the final optional step being MSC certification. Referring to MSC certification as 
the most robust and rigorous seafood eco-label, MSC serves as the basis for FishSource 
scores. According to another fisheries standard setter, other standards also receive 
increased awareness of industry through SFP improvement projects, reports, forums and 
briefings. Because of its expertise and influence in the sector, SFP participated in the 
development of ASC and GAA standards. While SFP does not set standards and does not 
oblige partners to certification, it does support stringent standards. WCF does not have 
standards on sustainable cocoa production and takes a neutral stance towards certification. 
All three arrangements support harmonisation of standards. 4C’s code was developed 
after an assessment of existing standards to avoid differences in auditing and identify 
overlap. As a member of the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and 
Labelling Alliance, a non-governmental membership organisation for multi-stakeholder 
arrangements committed to making sustainability standards systems more effective and 
more widely adopted, 4C had to strengthen its efforts towards consistency between 
standards in the coffee sector. 4C enhanced efforts to align audits and benchmarking with 
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other standards to avoid multiple audits and provided already certified producers access 
to 4C markets. This enables certified producers to apply for a 4C license without additional 
costs or efforts. SFP initiated a project to understand equivalencies and potential for 
benchmarking and harmonisation of three different aquaculture standard setters. Within 
the project, different tilapia farms in several countries were compared on aquaculture 
certification schemes, and according to interviewees feedback has been incorporated in 
newer versions of the standards. WCF also supports harmonisation of standards and 
certification schemes and with the initiation of the CocoaMAP tool, the arrangement has 
made efforts to compare indicators and measurement methodologies from different cocoa 
certification schemes (WCF, n.d.-b). Even so, WCF regards certification to be a part of a 
companies’ competitive pole which it does not want to interfere with. 
All arrangements are involved in lobbying, and particularly 4C and WCF seek 
platforms outside their respective sectors to communicate their message. WCF, for 
instance, sought partnership opportunities with origin country governments, the World 
Economic Forum and inter-American development bank on agricultural development. 
The CocoaAction project initiated in 2014 is an unprecedented project for productivity 
enhancing and community development interventions of the cocoa sectors, for which the 
governments of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have formally endorsed the project as industry’s 
aligned effort to support their national coca sustainability plans (WCF, 2015). 
4.6  Conclusion 
The case studies elucidate that private governance arrangements employ all meta-
governance mechanisms for sustainable change, albeit to a limited degree. Besides case-
specific differences, which will be discussed shortly hereafter, the arrangements are 
particularly suited for activities geared towards process management strategies, activating 
actors and resources, and arranging and facilitating interactions amongst stakeholders. 
Meta-governors particularly create associational value through the mechanisms of 
networking, by engaging in collaborative relationships (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). In 
addition to having been able to attract key multi-national corporations, the arrangements 
have increased their number of partners over time. This is an accomplishment as each of 
their sectors are rife with different institutions and standard setters for sustainability in 
their value chains (e.g., for cocoa, fisheries and aquaculture, and coffee, respectively Bitzer 
et al., 2012; Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013; Reinecke, Manning, & von Hagen, 2012). The 
pre-competitive space allows businesses and other actors to meet, share, learn and 
support each other through the different forums and projects. Working relationships 
should however not be idealised, as interviewees point out that antitrust lawyers may be 
present at meetings and conflicts do occur. Furthermore, various stakeholders from all 
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domains and across the sectors are reached through partnership meetings and symposia. 
By providing platforms and spaces for engagement, the meta-governors serve as 
facilitators for sustainable development. 
A second mechanism, the private meta-governors lend themselves most to, is 
capacity building. The collaborative value that arises from this is mainly resource 
complementarity, in that access is created to resources that most partners do not possess 
(Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). The arrangements produce new and, above all, professional 
information for uptake in the industry. Besides knowledge production, the efforts are also 
aimed at knowledge transfer. The distribution and accessibility of the information to 
partners are seen as part of the solution to sustainability problems within the chains. 
The potential for mainstreaming is largely unfulfilled. Specifically, while there is 
support for shared content and harmonisation of standards by all arrangements, they do 
not employ (stringent) regulatory frameworks. The formulation of issue-specific 
problems and possible solutions are often negotiated, and goal congruence is sought 
rather than obligating stringent cognitive-normative and regulatory frameworks. SFP and 
WCF were not developed to set clear and hard-cut sustainability criteria, and 4C 
standards are one of the least stringent in its issue field (Pierrot, Giovannucci, & 
Kasterine, 2011). This supports the proposition that the meta-governance proposed by 
private actors is more concerned with dialogue and achieving negotiated consent than 
reaching (other) goals (Jessop, 2011). This suggests that membership and reach of the 
meta-governors in their respective issue-fields is inversely related with stringency on 
sustainability standards. This would be in line with empirical transnational governance 
research where higher stringency tends to be associated with rather limited uptake 
(Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013; Kolk, 2013). 
The reciprocal relationship between the arrangements and their partners also limits  
private meta-governance potential for framing the global discourse, particularly in its 
main focus on those issues that lie at the heart of protecting industry interests (e.g. 
productivity concerns). Standards, policies and strategic direction are not merely 
imposed, but are to differing degrees collaboratively thought and carried out. Although 
such conditions are central to participatory policy-making along sustainable lines 
(Meadowcroft, 2007), it makes private meta-governance very vulnerable to the 
representation of established interests. Particularly in arrangements without multi-
stakeholder and democratic governance boards, it weakens claims of representativeness 
and legitimacy. The influence of key multi-nationals on meta-governors should not be 
undervalued, as some of the key industry member companies (for WCF) have assumed 
prominent roles in terms of initiation, implementation and funding (Bitzer, 2012). 
The case studies have also revealed that the mechanisms for change are used in 
different ways and to varying degrees. Taking the mechanism of networking as an example, 
the arrangements have different attitudes on the topics of inclusiveness of civil society 
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organisations, and in how far the arrangements intermediate in connecting suppliers to 
retailers. Linking this to the characteristics of the issue-specific fields, we consider two 
causes to underlie such differences. The first is functional, and relates to perceived 
sustainability problems that cause dysfunction and need being addressed. For instance, if 
an arrangement considers a lack of information as the main cause of unsustainability, 
offered solutions and practices are likely to be geared towards alleviation of this problem. 
The second is ideational, and relates to normative viewpoints. To extent the previous 
example, if a corporate social responsibility approach is taken to the problem of 
information deficit on the side of sourcing businesses, the focus will expectedly centre on 
industry actors which are projected to source sustainably when information is available. 
The arrangements are furthermore not reducing fragmentation in the sense that 
partners (of WCF and 4C) also are part of (other) standard setting sustainability 
initiatives. Many of the meta-governor partners only see a (small) part of their value 
chains covered, because the meta-governors are focused on specific issue fields and lead 
firms often make use of value chains across sectors. This supports the view that private 
meta-governance is geared towards domain-specific objectives and are limited in scope 
(Steurer, 2013). In addition, as partnerships are also voluntary, this poses a constant threat 
of businesses leaving the meta-governance arrangement. Furthermore, the meta-
governors under study largely remain governance actors horizontally next to other 
initiatives, and in this sense even reproduce the problems of self-organised governance it 
is supposed to address (Fransen, 2015). Overlapping membership across different 
initiatives, one form of fragmentation of governance systems is consequently not reduced 
by the arrangements. 
This analysis shows that private uptake of meta-governance mechanisms for change  
particularly relate to networking and capacity building, and are mostly geared towards 
process management strategies, activating actors and resources, and arranging and 
facilitating interactions amongst stakeholders. Lacking in command and control 
authority and abilities, business-oriented voluntary arrangements create a tension 
between strong sustainability approaches, which may include stringent sustainability 
standards on the one hand, and participation on the other. As private meta-governors 
manoeuvre within this context, it curbs the operationalisation of change mechanisms. 
Even so, stringency of regulatory frameworks is not necessarily positively correlated to 
the effectiveness of meta-governance (Cafaggi, 2016). Refraining from further discussion 
on stringency or effectiveness, this study leads us to recognise that private meta-
governance can be strengthened in their efforts to frame the global sustainability 
discourse and through further mainstreaming of (stricter) sustainability goals. Further 
research may investigate the current transformations in an analytical and critical sense, 
and especially evaluate its relative performanc  
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5.1  Introduction 
In governance concerning the production of global goods, for instance of garments and 
foods in global value chains, there are various sources of authority and power 
(Meadowcroft, 2007). Next to mandatory laws and regulations by public actors, also more 
flexible and voluntary forms of regulation and implementation are offered by private actors 
(e.g., Abbott, 2012; Bartley, 2011). The entirety of formal and informal rules is considered 
a highly disaggregated and only a minimally coordinated system of governance (Rosenau, 
2003). This phenomenon has led to the observation that many policy domains are 
characterised by fragmentation (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009). The 
concept of fragmentation denotes the diversity, multiplicity, divergence and distribution 
of regulatory powers in the overall institutional settings and resulting policies of different 
international and transnational policy domains (Pekdemir, 2018). In this way, the concept 
of fragmentation denotes a particular state of affairs of governance systems. 
Fragmentation can be regarded as positive. It may for instance lead to multiple  
routes of intervention on the same policy issue. If diverse actors are involved, the issue 
can be addressed not only in multiple but also in different ways, as each actor has its own 
interests, values, and competencies (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014). It may also lead to 
regulatory innovation, for instance when governance arrangements can learn from one 
another (Cafaggi, 2016). It can furthermore allow for the adjustment of standards and 
procedures to local and regional circumstances (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Pekdemir, 2018). 
Fragmentation may however be problematic if it impedes the effectiveness of governance 
of a policy issue. For instance, when the capacity of governments or international 
organisations are weakened in their desired effects (Ivanova & Roy, 2007) or more 
generally, if it constrains the efficient and effective realisation of generally accepted public 
values (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014). 
To counter negative effects of fragmentation, initiatives and policy efforts have been 
developed to induce more regulatory cohesion. These efforts attempt to change the 
fragmented state of affairs from the understanding that a certain level of cohesion is 
necessary to achieve shared values. Examples of these are metagovernance initiatives  
(Fransen, 2015; Pekdemir, Glasbergen, & von Gagern, 2016) and regional standards 
(Pekdemir, 2018). Certain tensions however emerge through the quest for cohesion. We 
postulate that these tensions are 1) dependent on the system characteristics of 
fragmentation of an issue field and 2) dependent on the ways in which cohesion is sought. 
This paper seeks to examine these tensions in two distinct issue areas, namely the 
global governance of labour rights and organic production. In the field of labour rights, 
fragmentation   leads to the inadequate protection of workers’ rights. In the governance 
of organic production, fragmentation has led to insecurity about the trustworthiness of 
organic products and to difficulties in market access. In this paper, we investigate what 
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tensions emerge in the quest for cohesion in these two governance systems and what their 
causes are. After a delineation of the research methods, the global governance systems of 
the two cases will be introduced. The subsequent sections explore several tensions for each 
issue field. In conclusion, some final considerations regarding the tensions that emerge 
out of the quest for more cohesion are discussed. 
5.2  Research Methods 
The analysis is based on desk-research and in-depth interviews with experts. The 
exploration is grounded in governance theory and the operational definition of global 
governance used in this paper, which was also corresponded to the experts, specifically 
refers to all processes of governing, whether undertaken by governments, businesses, or 
civil society actors. The two issue fields, the global governance of labour rights and 
organic production, serve as cases to explore the tensions from efforts to foster cohesion. 
The comparison will function as an inductive exploration by bringing into focus the 
contrasts as well as similarities between the cases. The issue fields are grounded in 
different historical contexts and are concerned with different topics. Nonetheless, both 
governance domains are concerned with the production of goods in global value chains. 
As part of concept-formation for governance theory, the comparative method may offer 
an understanding into generalities across different contexts. 
In this study, we draw on forty-six experts that were interviewed between May 2013 
and October 2017. Twenty-four experts with experience in policy-making and evaluation 
in global labour rights were interviewed on the topic of global labour governance. 
Through purposeful sampling, information-rich experts were identified and snowball 
sampling was used to get into contact with other experts from the network of the 
respondents. The distribution of affiliations is as follows: public actors (4 from 
intergovernmental organisations), private actors (3 from companies, 2 from employer’s 
organisations, 1 from a worker’s organisation, 8 from non-governmental organisations), 
and 6 from academia and/or research institutes. Concurrent, twenty-two experts with 
experience in policy-making and evaluation in organic production were interviewed on 
the topic of global governance for organic production. A similar approach to sampling 
was used as on the topic of labour governance. The affiliations of the experts on organic 
production is as follows: public actors (5 from governments, and 7 from 
intergovernmental organisations), and private actors (5 from companies, and 5 from civil 
society organisations). 
The experts have here been grouped in terms of the most relevant affiliation or 
primary occupation. This categorisation does however not sufficiently capture the 
different experiences and richness in affiliations the experts have in global governance. 
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To illustrate, in the field of labour governance, some experts from academia or research 
institutes have extensive working backgrounds in intergovernmental organisations or 
workers’ organisations. In the field of organic production, some experts are for instance  
affiliated to a civil society organisation and a company. 
Questions revolved around different drivers of global governance, as well as an 
inquiry into perceptions of the global governance system. Characteristics of the 
governance system, including understandings of important and powerful actors in the 
field, the similarities and differences in the norms and standards, and the level of 
collaboration between different organisations of the two governance systems were 
inquired. In addition, visions for the future were explored with experts, and questions 
addressed what would be needed to get to a desired future for the governance issue, 
including: i) actions, ii) actors of change, iii) agents making the realisation difficult, iv) 
values underlying its accomplishment. 
Through desk research, public documents of organisations – including white papers, 
manifestos, and project reports – were examined. The two-day symposium organised by 
the ILO, The Future of Work We Want: A Global Dialogue, on 6 and 7 April 2017 provided 
further input. The software program MAXQDA facilitated the analysis of the interviews 
manuscripts. Segments of the transcripts were categorised and provided with codes as a 
way to facilitate the analysis. In this paper, those segments that specifically relate to 
tensions in fragmentation and cohesion will be elaborated. For this purpose, quotes have 
been used relatively sparingly as a way to illustrate findings and provide perspectives to 
the overall narrative. Each expert has been coded with a unique number and the coding 
numbers in-text refer to the order in which the interviews were held. 
5.3  Case Studies 
Labour rights 
For an important part, labour rights protection rests on a public approach as labour 
regulations are largely enacted by states. Nonetheless, in many accounts of the origins and 
operation of labour law, other actors are regarded to play a significant role too (Arthurs, 
2011). This is primarily on account of the tripartite constituency of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), which was established in 1919 with the aim of developing 
international policies and norms on labour related issues. As a tripartite cross-sector 
arrangement, the ILO brings together governments, employers and workers of 187 
member states. The ILO takes a central role in international labour governance. It sets 
standards, develops policies, and devises programs in promotion of decent work (ILO, 
n.d.). ILO conventions, recommendations, and protocols – sometimes also referred to as 
international labour standards (La Hovary, 2018) –  have conventionally been regarded 
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as the primary sources of international labour standards (e.g., Hendrickx, Marx, Rayp, & 
Wouters, 2016). Significant shortcomings within the international labour domain are 
related to the implementation capacity and enforcement of standards. Weak enforcement 
mechanisms of the ILO (Elliott, 2000), and the absence of an international court trying 
multinational corporations can be considered testimony to this.  
In light of continued violations of labour rights and consumer protests, private fair 
labour arrangements have been initiated in the last several decades. Different from the 
ILO, they directly address businesses. While they base their work on ILO norms and 
standards, there is a variety in these initiatives and standards themselves. While their 
objectives are related, they have divided the issue field in different fractions through their 
sectoral (e.g. garment), country (e.g. Bangladesh), or thematic (e.g. fire and building) 
focus. Furthermore, they also compete for market share of businesses. Regardless of 
whether they are considered effective, they only account for the fraction of the issue field, 
which is tied to specific company clients and the sectoral focus. Private arrangements have 
a stake in the labour rights domain for their continued existence. Attempts to bring in 
more cohesion amongst the private arrangements through metagovernance in the past 
have failed (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014). 
Not only private arrangements have increasingly assumed responsibility for the 
protection of global labour rights, other intergovernmental and even economic 
institutions engage in global standard and norm setting as well. The term global labour 
governance has therefore become increasingly relevant in debates about globalisation and 
labour standards (Hassel, 2008; Meardi & Marginson, 2014). At the same time, an 
understanding has arisen that the shift from international to transnational labour 
protection has resulted in fragmentation (Blackett & Trebilcock, 2015; Hepple, 2005; 
Zumbansen, 2006). The new actors add to the regulatory complexity of the governance 
system and in effect create more fragmentation. The global character of labour law is 
characterised as a form of multi-level governance, as it includes regulations and standards 
on the transnational, international, regional, national, and even the shop level. It is 
signified by complexity, diversity, and asymmetries across time and space (Blackett & 
Trebilcock, 2015). Sources of law are questioned in terms of their authority and legitimacy 
(e.g., La Hovary, 2015), which have alerted practitioners and academics alike. 
Organic production 
Standards for organic production grew out of private initiatives. The Demeter standard 
was the first to be introduced in 1928, which was developed to grow farm produce based 
on a biodynamic value system. From the 1950s onwards, associations of farmers and 
consumers started developing guidelines and standards based on organic principles  
(Courville, 2006). From the 1970s, private organic labels spread across Europe and the 
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United States. The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM) was founded around this era by growers’ associations as their transnational roof 
organisation (Schmidt, 2011). IFOAM has maintained its central character within the 
governance system for organic production and lobbies for the organic movement. It has 
various regional offices throughout the world and engages in partnerships with 
developments agencies and donors. IFOAM issued its ‘Basic Standards for Organic 
Agriculture’ in 1980, which has been subject to change over the years. Through the world-
wide uptake by both public and private actors of the standard (Pekdemir, 2018) it is 
regarded a gold standard. 
The rise of organic standards also increased the number of private certification 
bodies due to needs for independent guarantee of compliance to organic standards 
(Courville, 2006). The different organic standards and certifications appeared to be an 
obstacle to move organic foods into the mainstream food marketing channels (Ikerd, 
2006). The organic movement itself initiated political movements for public regulations. 
In the European context, this was specifically motivated to offer a more effective basis for 
enforcing labelling claims, countering free-riding and fraud (Gibbon, 2008). It 
particularly requested the European Commission to use its competence for legislative  
initiative to define organic labelling requirements (Schmidt, 2011). 
While several states in the United States had adopted organic legislation in the 1970s, 
Denmark was the first country to adopt comprehensive legislation on organic farming in 
1987. Present day, 87 countries have organic standards (Willer & Lernoud, 2018), quite a 
number of them in (mandatory) regulation. Next to national standards, private standards 
continue to be used in markets across the world. The plethora of available standards, 
labels, and certifications, however, has led to a complex and fragmented regulatory 
system. Governments, traders, and certification bodies have developed complex pathways 
to facilitate trade in this context. Moreover, the continued proliferation of standards is 
considered to be a challenge for the organic market (Sahota, 2018). There is however a 
continuing process of seeking equivalence and harmonisation by both public initiatives  
and IFOAM as a way to improve coherence amongst standards. These come in the forms 
of regional standards, organic trade agreements, and the IFOAM Family of Standards 
(Bowen & Holmes, 2013; IFOAM, 2016; Pekdemir, 2018). 
Overview of case characteristics 
In table 5.1, an overview is provided of characteristics of the two issue fields. The table 
captures relevant characteristics discussed in the previous case study sections, but also 
includes governance system characteristics to further contextualise the cases and facilitate  
a meaningful elaboration and comparison arising from tensions in efforts to strengthen 
cohesion in the discussion and conclusion.   
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Table 5.1 Characteristics of the two issue fields 
 Labour rights Organic production 
Issue origins Started as a public issue in face of bad 
working conditions during the industrial 
revolution 
Started in the private sphere as an alternative 
way of farming against conventional and 
industrialised farming methods  
Governance 
approach origins 
From national origins to early international 
focus through the creation of the ILO in 
1919 
 
Top-down 
In early 20th century, pioneers focused on 
individual and local implementation  
 
 
Bottom-up 
Actors origins ILO’s tripartite structure brought together 
representatives of governments, employers 
and workers 
Practitioners of scientific and farming 
backgrounds 
Rights-based 
approach 
Human right, ‘group right’ Individual liberty 
Modus operandi 
civil society 
Scandals, advocacy groups, tackling abuses Advocacy groups, alternative life style, world-
view  
Actors present-day Many actors involved in global governance, 
including governments, intergovernmental 
organisations, workers’ organisations, 
employers’ organisations, certification 
schemes and businesses 
 
Authority of international labour law and 
enforcement of rights dispersed 
Although influence of industry non-
negligible, main actors are farmer’s 
organisations, governments and certification 
schemes 
 
 
 
Authority of standards and enforcement 
structures clear 
Sustainability 
discourse 
Development, human rights, part of the 
sustainable development goals (SDG’s) 
discourse 
Sustainable agriculture including 
environmental stewardship and principles of 
health and fairness, indirectly part of the 
SDG’s discourse 
5.4  Tensions 
Labour rights 
Tension: Regulatory uncertainty 
A first tension is visible between different forms of public regulation. Besides the ILO and 
private arrangements, other public international actors have increasingly started to define 
and adopt labour policies (e.g. International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European 
Union (EU)). Labour provisions have also become more commonplace in trade 
agreements. However, policies and provisions are not always formulated in accordance  
with ILO standards (see Agust, Ebert, & Le Clerq, 2014; Ebert, 2014, 2018; ILO, 2017), 
creating regulatory uncertainty. A case in point are trade agreements, of which in 2016 
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there were a reported 77 trade agreements with labour provisions that in total cover 136 
economies (ILO, 2016). The provisions take different forms. While the majority of trade 
agreements with labour provisions refer to the ILO and the core labour rights, there are 
more than a few trade agreements that do not (ILO, 2017). Furthermore, some 
agreements take a more promotional approach based on dialogue and cooperation rather 
than being hard clauses (Marx, Brando, & Lein, 2017). Moreover, many of the trade 
agreements do not refer to the ILO Conventions, but rather to ILO’s 1998 Declaration. 
The content of the Declaration is not as specific compared to the ILO Conventions 
(Alston, 2004), which results in a risk of legal uncertainty and an application of these 
labour provisions that is in fact inconsistent with the application of the ILO supervisory 
machinery itself (Agust et al., 2014).  
Experts operating in the legal domain considered the existence of dissimilar and 
conflicting standards obstructive in getting a complete picture of all relevant and 
applicable laws, regulations, and standards that are operative in transnational labour law. 
Public organisations were also accused of sustaining this lack of harmonisation. Experts 
remarked in this context:  
Sometimes you get the impression that the ILO is just doing something, the OECD 
another thing, and the other UN bodies and the European Commission, and so on 
… without having the complete picture of what is going on in other bodies. 
[Interview 18, advisor] 
… [They should be] harnessing much more the ILO's knowledge about 
employment and labour issues then they often do. Often it is very striking to see 
what work the [World] Bank, or the OECD, or even the IMF do in regards to 
labour standards, and what kind of statements they issue. Recognising that there 
is of course the ILO agency at the international level with the largest expertise. But 
… for some reason [they are] not really referring to that expertise, just coming up 
with their own vision of certain things and that is unfortunate from many 
perspectives. [Interview 19, researcher] 
Tension: The limitations of the ILO in promoting cohesion 
A second tension that is observed are certain limitations of the ILO in promoting 
cohesion, both in relation to the internal as well as external functioning of the ILO and its 
constituents. The ILO is by and large considered the most central and influential 
organisation for the global governance of labour rights. There is however also wide 
acceptance that coherence in norms and standards is a difficult task for the ILO to realise. 
Internally, the tripartite character of the ILO has many merits as well as disadvantages 
(see La Hovary, 2015). In reaching agreement on standards, the differences in perspectives 
of ILO constituents is a democratic value underlying the arrangement. That agreement is 
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difficult or at times impossible to reach, is part of the bargain. However, the discussions 
among workers and the employers have been regarded as becoming tenser, even hostile, 
over the past decades. Particularly the clash between employers and workers during the 
International Labour Conference in 2012 is considered substantial in this regard (see La 
Hovary, 2015, 2018; Maupain, 2013). Here employers challenged that the right of strike 
was protected by Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. Furthermore, they also 
questioned the authority of ILO’s most important quasi-judicial body (the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Convention Recommendations) to interpret a right when 
it is not explicit in a convention. The crisis is considered to not only having shaken the 
very foundations of tripartism, but also having revealed a much deeper dissatisfaction 
with international labour standards and their supervision (La Hovary, 2015). It also 
enticed questions whether all the tripartite constituents share a sufficient willingness for 
changes that would improve the effectiveness and coherence of the supervisory system 
(Maupain, 2013). 
The topic of external cohesion and the failure to achieving it strikes right at the heart 
of enduring labour violations and limits in sanctioning thereof. This inability contributes 
to regulatory uncertainty. The topic of coherence on labour standards concerns the ILO, 
not in the least because other policies and standards often allure to ILO standards while 
not necessarily conforming to relevant or most recent conventions (e.g., ILO, 2016; 
Pekdemir, Glasbergen, & Cörvers, 2015). High-level officials from the ILO have expressed 
the urgent need for closer cooperation and coherence between the ILO, the IMF and the 
EU (Mola, 2016). This is for instance reflected in a formal declaration that came out of 
the European Regional Meeting of the ILO in 2013. Here a means of action for the ILO 
was identified to promote synergies and policy coherence with international and regional 
organisations and institutions, namely the IMF, OECD, the World Bank, the EU and the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, through fora such as the G20 (ILO, 2013). In the 
meantime, further calls have been made that serious consideration should be given to the 
ways in which the ILO could regulate the use and appropriation of its standards by private 
actors, so that it contributes rather than undermines ILO’s efforts to advance States’ 
legislation and implementation (Maupain, 2015). 
Tension: Limitations in the responsiveness of the ILO 
A third tension is observed in the responsiveness of the ILO to global challenges. To start 
with, breaches of ILO labour standards are not penalised with any real sanctions except 
for global criticism. In this respect, the ILO is often perceived as toothless. Beyond this, 
there is also an argument of timeliness which arguably applies to labour regulations in 
general which are often considered to be catching-up on developments in the world of 
work, or as an interviewee noted “labour legislation is an instrument of protection [and] 
will always follow the development of industry”. [interview 20, researcher] 
The quest for cohesion in global governance: An exploration of tensions 
113 
An interesting case in point is the issue of the changing character of production and 
employment. There are extensive studies on the future of work (see Balliester & Elsheikhi, 
2018) which for a large part also deal with the issue of the changing character of 
production and employment and the accompanying role of technology and innovation. 
The ‘modernisation’ or ‘future’ debate is regarded to have pushed labour law into a sort 
of regulatory crisis (Hendrickx, 2018), and responding to the challenges ahead is on the 
top of the minds of the experts interviewed. These trends transcend national boundaries 
and according to many necessitate its governance on a global level. In run-up to its 
centenary mark, the ILO launched the ‘Future of Work’ initiative and provided a platform 
to discuss these and other issues affecting the world of work in the future. In the 
meantime, however, the largely unregulated matters challenge the ILO and its 
constituents for an appropriate response. Regulatory responses to precarious work as 
represented by Uber and the like are starting to come from local and national jurisdictions 
(McGaughey, 2018). 
The urgency of tackling the precarious working conditions as presented by 
companies such as Uber and Deliveroo was widely held by the experts, nonetheless, there 
was also worry that the responsiveness of the ILO to these developments may take too 
long. An important reason for this lies in the ILOs tripartite functioning. In general, the 
reaction of the ILO was regarded as “being limited by [it’s] slowest tripartite member”. 
[interview 10, researcher] It was also viewed “that anything that comes out of the ILO has 
to be a negotiated comprise which supresses most key issues in conflict”. [interview 11, 
researcher] As another interviewee stated:  
The employers and workers sometimes will block each other … a freezing of 
positions that makes it impossible for the secretariat to put forward certain ideas 
that might have merit. But they do not even come forward because the secretariat 
knows: “No, no, no. Either the employers or the workers will kill this”. [Interview 
21, consultant] 
Organic production 
Tension: Generalising organic farming conditions and organic values 
A first tension is that generalising farming conditions is to some extent at odds with 
organic values. Organic products have entered the mainstream as the global market 
continues to grow and consumer demand is further increasing. According to the market 
research company Ecovia Intelligence, the sales of organic food and drinks are reported 
to have increased from less than 15 billion to almost 90 billion US dollars over the past 
two decades (as cited in Willer & Lernoud, 2018). The scaling-up of organic production, 
particularly by the large-scale agro-food industry, is considered to water down organic 
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standards and is contradictory with some of the core values of organic farming (e.g. the 
practice of organic monoculture versus conserving biodiversity). The weakening of 
organic standards by industrial interests has comprised a critical part of scholarly work 
on organic governance (e.g., Guthman, 2004; Mutersbaugh, 2005). The political economy 
of organic products is important, as the large-scale agro-food industry has the power in 
overtaking and watering down what is considered “natural” in organic production 
(DuPuis & Gillon, 2009).  
Although core organic values are to a certain extent unfixed (Alrøe & Kristensen, 
2004) and contested (De Wit & Verhoog, 2007), different values and interests at the core 
of the organic movement as opposed to the large-scale agro-food industry are evident. 
For the latter, keeping production costs low is key to the success at the conventional 
retailers’ aisle. While premiums may still be pocketed, the price needs to be competitive. 
From the organic movement, there is a call to keep the prices of organic produce fair 
throughout the whole value chain. In order for the marketplace for organic products not 
to become further distorted, it is argued that both the positive and negative externalities 
need to be reflected in the price as to fairly account for the costs and benefits to the 
environment, biodiversity, human health, society and culture of any production system 
and farming method (Arbenz, Gould, & Stopes, 2016). Particularly the push for 
monoculture farming of organic produce, as opposed to crop rotation, is critically 
divergent from organic values as upheld by the organic movement. The positive role of 
crop rotation and the role it has on biological diversity in enhancing agricultural 
sustainability is well established (Bezdicek & Granatstein, 1989). Crop rotation is 
considered a critical feature of all organic cropping systems because it provides the 
principal mechanism for building healthy soils, a major way to control pests, and a variety 
of other benefits (Mohler, 2009). The clear deviation in values and interests is considered 
to hinder the potential for agreement with the industry or, to paraphrase one expert: the 
proposal of monoculture renders the discussion on the sustainability of organic 
production and standards meaningless. [interview 1, coordinator] 
Tension: Trustworthiness, overregulation and uniformity 
A second tension is that the quest for reliability in organic production and labelling leads 
to inefficiency. In order to guarantee the trustworthiness of the organic sector, regulation 
on organic production is enacted by various governments. In these countries, products 
can generally only be labelled as organic if the public standards are respected (Arcuri,  
2015). Private organic standards also continue to operate in domestic markets. National 
organic regulations function as benchmarks because in case a private label wants to claim 
it has been produced according to organic standards, it must first conform to the 
production methods from the public organic regulation.  
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While the system of assurance and verification is intended to enhance the level of 
trust in organic products, it conversely places a degree of distrust at the level of producers. 
Criticism against the certification system is that it impedes dedicated farmers, bullies 
them with rules and regulations that pose additional administrative burdens. While the 
organic sector is plagued by fraudulent labelling (USDA, n.d.), the trust that both 
consumers and farmers seek poses a quandary in protecting the organic sector while 
maintaining the integrity of organic farmers. This system also runs the risk of 
overregulating, as for instance the level of detail within provisions can become restrictive  
to organic certifications. Organic farming originated from various innovative farmers 
worldwide, and regulation is considered to hamper innovation and experimentation 
(Vogl, Kilcher, & Schmidt, 2005). In this context, one expert stated the following:  
While you could say that the EU regulation is a kind of floor on which you can add 
on, the problem is that the regulation is deeply detailed and so restrictive [for] 
practices. It limits innovation a lot. I mean, if you want to use a new method, or 
new input, or something that has not been used before, the process to get that one 
approved in the EU regulation is enormous. (…) incremental development is not 
possible with EU regulation in mind. So, it is not only about that it is too low, or 
not good enough, it’s as much that it is really trying to put in organic in extreme 
detail. And people are not happy with that. [Interview 16, consultant] 
While the organic market is attracting more retailers and consumers, it risks losing the 
legitimacy of well-established organic stakeholders. This also came to the fore in the 
interviews. For instance, the Swedish organic Krav label, which entered the organic 
market in 1985, contemplated in 2017 whether to detach or decouple themselves from the 
EU regulation. Having a reported 98 percent awareness level of the label among Swedish 
consumers (KRAV, 2018), the label felt it was capable to not certify its products as organic 
as certain farming practices would not be allowed under the new EU regulation. If this 
had been opted for, efforts of the organisation would have been put in educating 
consumers on what the standard would exactly entail.  
Tension: Equivalence case of the strongest economies 
A third tension is that equivalence between organic regulations is a privilege benefitting 
the strongest economies. Equivalence has been identified as an important mechanism to 
overcome challenges that the various standards on organic production pose for trade. 
Both governments and IFOAM seek ways through which equivalence can be established. 
Although the EU, North American countries, and Japan have established trade and 
equivalency agreements, producers outside the “trading blocs” have to consider several 
certifications to access different export markets (Sahota, 2018). Adversely however, out 
of the at least 2.7 million organic producers in 2016, more than 87% are from developing 
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countries and emerging countries (Willer & Lernoud, 2018). Multiple certifications pose 
a regulatory burden, and creates barriers for uptake and compliance particularly for many 
smallholders (Gould, 2015). For instance, an Indonesian organic coffee producer would 
have to adopt the EU regulations, National Organic Program of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and Japanese Agricultural Standard to access markets in Europe, the United 
States, and Japan respectively (Sahota, 2018). The EU currently has recognised thirteen 
non-EU countries, so-called ‘third’ countries, as having equivalent organic production 
rules and control systems (listed in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 1235/2008). Out of 
these five countries are from the Global South. 
As from 1 January 2021, the new EU regulation will go into effect which will replace 
the system of equivalence with a compliance system. This means that private certification 
bodies in third countries have to comply with EU production and control rules when 
deciding whether a product exported to the EU market is organic or not (Council of the 
EU, 2017). Equivalence would only be allowed for third countries as part of a trade 
agreement (European Parliament, 2017). Currently, out of the various countries having 
reciprocal equivalence agreements, only one Global South country (Tunisia) has a 
reciprocal arrangement with the EU. 
Due to its merits, equivalence is however also considered a strategic option for 
countries of the Global South (Pekdemir, 2018). Several regional standards have been 
initiated by more than 50 countries from the Global South. Through a common regional 
standard or the harmonisation and recognition of each other’s national standards, 
regionalisation is assumed to bring more cohesion in the codification of organic 
production and stimulating trade between countries. Some regional standards have been 
recognised by the IFOAM Family of Standards as being equivalent to the IFOAM Basic 
Standard (Bowen & Holmes, 2013; IFOAM, 2016; Pekdemir, 2018). Possibilities to enter 
the markets of countries however, is still through complying with the standards of the 
strongest economies engaging in organic production. This then begs the question why a 
farmer or producer exporting to two or more countries with an equivalence agreement 
would need to go through the system of assurance separately for each market. This is 
essentially not only an inefficient system for organic farmers and producers, but also an 
exclusionary one. 
5.5  Discussion and Conclusion 
In global governance, fragmentation is dysfunctional when it impedes the adequate 
realisation of policy goals. It is therefore valuable to understand the nature and the causes 
underlying fragmentation. To this end, we interviewed actors from various societal 
domains who showed many commonalities in terms of their perceptions of the specific 
The quest for cohesion in global governance: An exploration of tensions 
117 
governance systems. In this study, we observe that certain tensions emerge through quests 
for cohesion. We postulate that these tensions are dependent on the system characteristics  
of fragmentation of an issue field, as well as being dependent on the ways in which 
cohesion is sought. In this way, the approach taken in this study is aligned with calls in 
scholarly work proposing to analyse the drivers, causes and consequences of 
fragmentation, and move beyond debating the merits or demerits of different types and 
degrees of fragmentation in normative terms (Gupta, Pistorius, & Vijge, 2016; Zelli & van 
Asselt, 2013).  
In terms of system characteristics of fragmentation, we identify that the approach to 
the protection of workers through labour standards lies for a large part in the public 
sphere. Many standard setting private arrangements have been initiated in the past 
decades, which have divided the issue fields in fractions. Furthermore, also public 
intergovernmental organisations and international finance institutions have started to 
take up on labour provisions. One of the results of the fragmented and multi-layered 
regulatory field of fair labour is that it causes regulatory uncertainty. This falls in a larger 
debate, where there is arguably large agreement on the very broad concepts and norms 
concerning labour standards. Disagreement predominantly exists on how those norms 
are best realised and the necessary governance tools that should accompany them. To 
exemplify, there is increasing consensus that workers should earn a living wage. 
Consensus however lacks on critical questions of calculating the wage and the 
distributional question of which actor(s) take responsibility for realising that norm within 
the value chain. As such, it is subject to political considerations (Parker, Arrowsmith, 
Fells, & Prowse, 2016). Actors are looking for a meta-governance role to be fulfilled, but 
the ILO is not able to deliver the level of cohesiveness that is sought. The ILO is confined 
in its role, and among other issues, its tripartite character and lag in responsiveness are 
considered impeding factors. 
In the issue field of organic production, ways are sought which permit the diversity 
in standards. From the organic movement, there is an imperative to do this based on 
organic principles, which do not only do justice to organic values but also to the variety 
of actors within the issue field. Approaches are sought that also offer opportunities to 
(smallholder) farmers. The way in which organic farming conditions are generalised 
through mainstreaming is however at odds with organic principles. It has given rise to the 
conventionalisation hypothesis (see Guthman, 2004; Rosin & Campbell, 2009), which 
purports that organic farming is becoming a marginally modified model of conventional 
agriculture (Best, 2008). National regulations also pose another predicament to organic 
stakeholders through defining boundaries. When conflicts over these boundaries arise, 
the legitimacy of the market can be threatened (DuPuis & Block, 2008). In a study on the 
organic market as a mode of governance in the United States, DuPuis and Gillon (2009) 
observe that the extent to which an alternative market expands is largely dependent on 
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whether or not buyers and sellers find them worth participating in. While the organic 
market is attracting more retailers and consumers, it risks losing the legitimacy of well-
established organic stakeholders as the example of the Swedish organic Krav label 
illustrates. Furthermore, we have argued in this paper that regulatory responses to 
guarantee trustworthiness can be regarded as inefficient and favourable to Northern 
markets. 
Just as the causes underlying fragmentation are different in the two issue fields, so 
are the solutions that are offered to counter fragmentation. They each bring forth their 
own set of problems. In labour rights, the rapprochement of organisations and countries 
to labour standards through for instance various economic instruments can be considered 
a positive development (Zandvliet & van der Heijden, 2015). From a coherence point of 
view, various standards and policies are becoming normatively aligned as standards from 
both public and private actors allude to ILO standards. The way in which standards are 
referred to and given effect are important in this regard. Private arrangements divide the 
field of protection in fractions. As the example of trade agreements revealed, the 
provisions take many different forms (ILO, 2016) which poses inconsistencies with the 
application of the ILO supervisory machinery (Agust et al., 2014). Since fragmentation 
continues the inadequate protection of workers’ rights, harmonisation is recognised to be 
a more desirable mechanism for cohesion. If there is acceptance that the ILO is the most 
central and authoritative organisation, then the standards and policies developed by other 
public or private arrangements should be literally in line with ILO standards. For this to 
occur, strategic interaction and particularly the strengthening of collaborations between 
standard setting arrangements warrants focus.  
In the governance of organic production, fragmentation initially led to insecurity 
about the trustworthiness of organic products and to difficulties in market access. While 
historically, the push against fraudulent claims and for organic regulations came from the 
organic movement, existing regulations paradoxically pose new concerns to the 
governance of organic production. First, there is the question how organic principles can 
be protected from watering down by standards that were once created to protect the 
integrity of organic values. Second, like a straightjacket, regulations are considered to 
confine and restrict organic standards that are more innovative and experimental in 
nature. Globalised value chains and the appeal of furthering trade may give the 
impression that identical standards, and therefore production methods, are preferable. 
Diversity does however not seem reconcilable with harmonisation of organic standards. 
Besides hampering innovative and experimental approaches, local and regional 
conditions in organic production run the risk of being disregarded. As this compromises 
an important element of organic production, in this field equivalence of standards are a 
preferred mechanism for policy coherence. It not only resolves issues of fragmentation, 
but also mitigates problems that regulatory measures have created in terms of trade. If the 
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basis on which equivalency is based is reputable, the integrity of organic standards and 
principles can be maintained. Access to external markets can also be provided to actors 
that currently have less advantageous conditions for doing so in the current regulatory 
system. While strategic interactions take place, they are still largely excluding Southern 
actors and smaller markets. 
Concluding, the focus on tensions informs the discussion on fragmentation and 
cohesion in several novel ways. First, in the quest for cohesion, it is of importance what 
type of intervention is proposed. Sometimes, policies aimed at strengthening a policy goal 
(e.g. labour provisions in trade agreements) sort an opposite effect through further 
fragmenting the issue field. Second, mechanisms for cohesion offer policy choices that are 
not only instrumental but normative as well, as they carry a particular vision for reaching 
cohesion. A choice for a certain policy mechanism has consequences. For instance, 
equivalence allows for more diversity in standards and therefore in practices, whereas 
harmonisation strives for unity in standards and as a result in practices as well. Third, the 
choice for a policy mechanism can be informed by the functionality for a particular issue 
field, namely, whether the consequences are suited to solve the problems associated with 
fragmentation in the issue field. For instance, what is the extent to which equivalence in 
labour standards can univocally protect labour rights of workers around the globe? If 
harmonisation serves the purpose of protecting labour rights better, what differences 
amongst governance actors and their standards would need to be overcome? These types 
of questions then lead to a fourth point, in that they call for a deliberative process amongst 
governance actors as a way of informing policymaking. Various tensions that arise 
through the quest for cohesion in governance systems stem from nonalignment between 
actors and their respective standards and expectations. Both cases, the global governance 
of labour rights and organic production, show that for achieving policy cohesion, there is 
ample room to seek partnerships and strengthen collaborative efforts. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and reflection 
 
 
 
… 
 
There are certain ideas of uniformity, which sometimes strike great geniuses ... but 
infallibly make an impression on little souls. They discover therein a kind of perfection, 
because it is impossible for them not to discover it; the same weights in the police, the same 
measures in commerce, the same laws in the state, the same religion in all its parts. But is 
this always right, and without exception? Is the evil of changing always less than that of 
suffering? And does not a greatness of genius consist rather in distinguishing between those 
cases in which uniformity is requisite, and those in which there is a necessity for 
differences? … If the people observe the laws, what signifies it whether these laws are the 
same? 
Montesquieu, 1748 
The Spirit of Laws (p. 378) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Navigating between fragmentation and cohesion: An exploration of tensions and policy 
mechanisms for cohesion in global governance for sustainability. [Manuscript in 
preparation based on chapters 1, 5, and 6]  
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6.1  Introduction 
Just as Montesquieu postulated in 1748, not all laws have to be uniform. Not even in 
contemporary times which, compared to the times in which The Spirit of Laws was 
written, have undergone immense processes of globalisation and are characterised by the 
interaction and integration of people, organisations, and indeed, laws and regulations as 
well. An important element of Montesquieu’s argument for non-uniformity lies in the 
supposition that laws are observed. Laws are, however, not always present. Even in case 
of existence, they are not necessarily enacted or observed. Furthermore, how should one 
identify those cases in which uniformity is requisite and those cases in which there is a 
necessity for differences? Within the context of this dissertation, this concluding chapter 
sets forth the argument that a valid and logical approach for defining whether uniformity 
or differences are required rests on its evaluation. Three specific characteristics and the 
way they interlink are important in this appraisal, namely the topic and issue at hand, the 
governance context, and the consequences of (non-) uniformity. This argument will be 
elaborated in the remainder of this concluding chapter.  
This dissertation started with the observation that issue areas concerned with sustainable 
practice are characterised by a growing number of standards and regulations. Particularly 
around the production of global public goods (Ruggie, 2004), the new global public 
domain has been subject to contending centres of economic and political power (Gereffi, 
Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). Many elements of the regulatory process have been 
transferred to both public and private actors in global governance, on topics as diverse as 
human rights, the environment, health, trade and finance. 
In consequence, global governance for sustainable development is considered as 
having various sources of authority and power (Meadowcroft, 2007). Next to mandatory 
laws and regulations also more flexible and voluntary forms of regulation and 
implementation are offered (e.g., Abbott, 2012; Bartley, 2011). This phenomenon has led 
to the observation that many policy domains in international relations are characterised 
by fragmentation (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009). Fragmentation is 
regarded as problematic when the capacity of governments or international organisations 
is weakened in their desired effects (Ivanova & Roy, 2007) or more generally, if it 
constrains the efficient and effective realisation of generally accepted public values (Derkx 
& Glasbergen, 2014). 
The changes in global governance and the accompanying growth in regulatory 
complexity also spurred the quest for cohesion, sometimes also referred to as 
‘convergence’ (e.g., Vogel & Kagan, 2002). Initiatives for cohesion and the development 
of common global standards have brought the interests of public and private interests 
together in areas such as environmental, labour and social issues (Nadvi, 2008). Cohesion 
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in regulations is considered favourable in the production for global public goods, for 
instance when standards, certification requirements and mutual recognition agreements 
converge in global value chains (OECD, 2013). 
Characteristics of fragmentation and cohesion can be observed in many different 
issue areas of sustainable development. Issue fields are rooted in specific institutional 
contexts. For this reason, many governance approaches have developed in distinctive  
ways. The governance systems of some issue areas appear to have more regulatory 
cohesion, whereas other issue areas appear fragmented. It is assumed that some 
governance systems are more conducive to realise sustainable change than others are. 
However, elaborate explorations why this is the case were identified to be lacking, and the 
formulated research questions intend to fill this knowledge gap. Several case studies were 
examined in order to answer the following research questions: 
 
i. What tensions between fragmentation and cohesion manifest themselves in various 
global governance systems? 
ii. How do these tensions influence the governance capacity of these systems? 
iii. What attempts have been made to handle these tensions and how are they able to 
contribute to the governance capacity? 
 
This concluding chapter will first provide a brief overview of the different cases and 
specify the research methodology that is applied toward the study of fragmentation and 
cohesion. The three subsequent sections provide an answer to one research question 
respectively. In the section that follows, the implications of the key findings are addressed. 
In the last section, some final reflections and outlooks for further research are elaborated. 
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6.2  The Various Approaches to Theorizing Fragmentation and 
Cohesion 
In this dissertation, the concept of fragmentation signifies the diversity, multiplicity, and 
distribution of regulatory powers of the overall institutional settings of different 
international and transnational policy domains. The term cohesion functions as its 
counterpart, and regulatory coherence is understood as a system of governance in which 
policies are aligned resulting in concerted aims and actions. In absence of a non-
fragmented, universal, and coordinated system of global governance structured around 
coherent sets of rules, full coherence on the global level is considered a theoretical 
construct. The pursuit for alignment as a way to create policy coherence has been analysed 
through the notions of harmonisation, equivalence, and metagovernance.  
In the first case study on private fair labour arrangements (chapter 2), dimensions 
along which fragmentation and cohesion of governance systems can be studied have been 
identified. This resulted in a conceptual framework, which advances that relations within 
governance systems can be observed from three levels, namely the organisational, 
normative, and relational level. On the organisational level, the governance system is 
regarded as structured by the activities and respective organisational goals of actors who 
share a stake in the issue. This structuration may or may not be coordinated. On the 
normative level, the governance system is composed of ideas and norms that the different 
actors hold. Differences in these may exist, and can transpire in the way problems are 
defined and the strategies proposed to deal with them. On the relational level, the 
governance system is shaped by the power dependence between actors and strategic 
responses to the issue and each other. In this dynamic field, relations may develop into 
collaborations and partnerships, but may as well be adversarial. The conceptual 
framework served as an analytical basis to understand the regulatory system of global 
labour rights. Based on an investigation of the private transnational arrangements for fair 
labour, the fragmentation recognisable on the three dimensions were considered to 
impair the transformative capacity of the governance system of the fair labour issue field. 
The second case (chapter 3) analysed the regionalisation of standards on organic 
production as a way in which public and private actors aim to bring more cohesion in the 
governance system on the global level. By examining all the existing initiatives from across 
the world, it evaluates if the promise of regionalisation can make the regulatory field of 
organic standards more cohesive and whether it is conducive for regional and 
international trade. Regionalisation as a system of governance is considered to contribute 
to normative coherence within the issue field while allowing for the regional adaptation 
– which in principle is considered a merit in the world of organic production. In this 
chapter, it is argued that ineffective enforcement and inadequate allocation of legal, 
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political, and funding resources seriously imperil the institutional alignment necessary 
for international trade purposes. 
The third case study (chapter 4) explored the concept of metagovernance as a way to 
bring more cohesion in governance systems on the global level. Based on a literature study 
on meta-organisations and meta-governance, a conceptual framework was developed 
with the potential repertoire of change mechanisms. The different metagovernance 
activities were categorised into four mechanisms: (re)framing the (global) discourse, 
capacity building, networking and mainstreaming. The practices of private governance 
arrangements having the ambition to be key for the advancement of sustainable 
production in three diverse global value chains were analysed in terms of these 
mechanisms. From the analysis, it became apparent that the mechanisms for change are 
used in different ways and to varying degrees across the different case studies. Generally, 
the private uptake of meta-governance mechanisms for change are considered to relate to 
networking and capacity building. These are mostly geared towards process management 
strategies, activating actors and resources, and arranging and facilitating interactions 
amongst stakeholders. It was found that private metagovernors could be strengthened in 
their efforts to frame the global sustainability discourse and mainstreaming of 
sustainability goals. 
The fourth case study (chapter 5) examined the ways in which tensions in global 
governance systems manifest themselves through the quest for cohesion. In this chapter, 
it is postulated that the emerging tensions are dependent on the system characteristics of 
fragmentation in an issue field. Furthermore, these tensions are considered shaped by the 
ways in which cohesion is sought. By examining the global governance of labour rights 
and the global governance of organic production, it is found that a cause for these tensions 
emerging out of a quest for cohesion, ironically, stem from non-alignment itself as 
particularly strategic coordination between actors is often lacking. Both case studies 
illustrate that for achieving policy cohesion, whether in the form of equivalency or 
harmonisation, there is ample room to seek partnerships and strengthen collaborative 
efforts. It is concluded that collaborative roadmaps for cohesion in the global governance 
of production of global goods should not be treated alike, and require an issue based 
analysis for collaborative roadmaps to be functional for the governance systems itself.  
What tensions between fragmentation and cohesion manifest themselves in 
various global governance systems? 
The results of the various cases uncover that tensions between fragmentation and 
cohesion of global governance systems manifests themselves in several ways. The first 
tension area relates to the difficulties encountered in the relational aspect of governance 
in the transnational sphere. Specifically, while there is an understanding that 
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collaboration and partnership can be beneficial, the governance arrangements have 
difficulties in arranging and maintaining collaborative efforts that can sustain and amplify 
their own working methods. Here several examples are provided from the various cases 
that exemplify this case in point. The case of private fair labour arrangements elucidated 
that for the main private governance arrangements operating in standard setting for fair 
labour, a governmentally funded joint initiative was organised in 2003 to explore whether 
efficiency and effectiveness could be realised. In a trial project in a producing country, the 
arrangements explored whether fragmentation could be reduced by, for instance, 
eliminating and reducing the duplication of efforts. Cohesion was specifically sought 
through identifying where collaboration between the arrangements could be 
strengthened. The pilot turned out to be unsuccessful and aggravations spilled over to the 
convergence element of the collaboration. Although the working methods are quite 
similar, up until this day, the fragmentation between private fair labour arrangements 
continues to exist. In addition, the case study on tensions in global governance systems 
revealed that public international institutions in labour governance also underscore the 
need for collaboration. While the International Labour Organization (ILO) is considered 
the most central institution on this topic, the usages of different labour provisions in 
standards has led to regulatory uncertainty. Closer cooperation and working towards 
synergies and policy coherence with international and regional organisations and 
institutions has been identified by the ILO as granting further attention. Another example 
was discussed in the case on regional standards for organic production. While several 
regional standards have been established which aspire to function as a common standard, 
its effectuation poses difficulties for most regional standards. While the intra-regional 
elements of the partnerships can be described to be successful from a relational and 
collaborative point of view, the inter-regional collaborative element that is to be 
negotiated and applied beyond the region, a crucial element in setting up an international 
trade agreement, has proven hitherto to be a bridge too far.  
This ties in with another tension area between fragmentation and cohesion, namely, 
despite the quest for cohesion across the issue fields, the approach to achieving policy 
coherence is by and far not a settled issue amongst actors operating in them. As a result, the 
different working methods of the governance actors and their preferred ways for realising 
coherence is sometimes not only a non-shared endeavour, the preferred working methods 
also sustain or deepen the fragmented character of governance systems. This became 
evident in the case on regional standards for organic production. Particularly, compliance 
with organic standards is the main method set by governance actors. Equivalence is a 
method that permits the recognition of different standards fulfilling common objectives. In 
the field of organic production, this means that differences in standards across national and 
local divides can be allowed. While many countries have engaged in regional organic 
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standards, most of these standards are not operational. Furthermore, only a handful of 
countries recognise each other’s organic standards as equivalent. 
Another tension area between fragmentation and cohesion can be observed between 
inclinations toward either global or local methods. To continue the previous example, the 
case on regional standards for organic production and the case on tensions in the global 
governance systems elucidated that globalisation has been a major factor behind the 
internationalisation of organic standards. The globalisation of supply chains has 
accompanied an increase in the volumes of trade of organic produce. The global trade in 
organic is considered both a reason for the increase in organic standards, as well as a 
catalyst for harmonising standards. However, within the organic movement, a counter 
reaction to the interdependent and integrated global supply chains and food systems is 
present. The value of local or regional organic food systems is underscored which refers 
to the method of food production and distribution that is geographically localised. 
Standards that are local in scope, such as national or regional standards, are considered 
to allow for variations that are relevant in terms of local practices and circumstances. Also 
in the field of labour rights, which has been discussed in the case on private fair labour 
arrangements and the case on tensions in the global governance systems, local approaches 
received support in the wake of the Rana Plaza commercial building collapse in 
Bangladesh, where many working in deplorable circumstances for international brands 
lost their lives. The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the Alliance  
for Bangladesh Worker Safety, the two western buyers' platforms working to improve 
workplace safety in Bangladesh readymade garment sector, are both local and thematic in 
their approach. These examples show that while an overarching, normative application 
of standards is often desired on the global level by transnational actors, these same actors 
stress the importance of the adaptation of standards to local characteristics as a way to 
safeguard their applicability and effectiveness. 
How do these tensions influence the governance capacity of these systems? 
Governance capacity was construed as an evaluative concept encompassing several 
elements. Beyond the applicability of the concept to the transnational and international 
sphere, we distinguished defining characteristics of governance capacity as the ability to 
contribute to policies, to implement policies, to put in certain resources, to achieve certain 
outcomes, and linked to the latter, the criterion of success. The influence of the tensions 
on the governance capacity of arrangements has been discussed in several ways 
throughout this dissertation. A general observation is that in most parts of the world, 
many transnational arrangements are tolerated to contribute and implement policies. An 
efficient and effective realisation of goals within issue fields are hard to achieve due to 
insufficiencies in (sharing) resources and concerted actions. 
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In the field of labour rights, while there is largely a desire for cooperation between 
the governance arrangements, the international and transnational system is largely 
characterised by the lack thereof, whether within the public and private domains 
themselves, or across it. In the development and implementation of policies, 
arrangements largely focus on their own resources and capabilities as a way to contribute 
primarily to the social value for individuals, organisations and societies. For private 
labour arrangements, the inability or unwillingness to cooperate has divided the issue 
field in different fractions through their focus on particular sectors. Furthermore, they 
also compete for market share of businesses and the arrangements make a case for their 
relevance and impact within the labour rights domain for their continued existence. 
Regardless of whether they are considered effective, each arrangement only accounts for 
a fraction of the issue field, which is tied to specific company clients and the sectoral foci. 
In an analysis of public international actors, it was found that next to the ILO other 
international actors have increasingly started to define and adopt labour policies.  
However, formulations and reference to normative standards in provisions and policies 
differ, resulting from a reported lack of synergies for policy coherence. One of the main 
conclusions of the case on private fair labour arrangements and the case on tensions in 
global governance systems was that the characteristics of the governance system as a 
whole point to problems related to the fragmentation of the system. In this regard, the 
variety amongst the actors themselves, the lack of accountability, the uncoordinated 
efforts amongst various arrangements, and the weak links between and across the public 
and private divide, were all signified as unconducive to induce the envisioned changes. 
The field of organic production is also a field that is rife of standards and many actors 
are involved with drafting and implementing standards and regulations. The case on 
private fair labour arrangements showed that resources and capabilities are shared in 
regional arrangements for standard setting. Also in terms of alignment between standards, 
two normative standards – one from the public and another one from the private sphere – 
were considered to contribute to the regional standards development. The organic farmers’ 
roof association puts in quite a lot of its efforts to policy development and implementation. 
In the private sphere, diversity in standards is valued in so far as they are recognised to be 
in line with organic values. This can also be seen reflected in the endorsement of 
equivalency. In this regard, standards can be specifically adapted to the local context. The 
approach of public arrangements differs. Next to having organic regulations, major 
organic markets and developed nations have a strong implementing capacity. The 
approach to other major developed markets is cooperative. While major markets engage 
in equivalence agreements, other actors have to conform to the compliance regime. For 
developing countries, we observe that the development and implementation capacity of 
countries may vary significantly from country to country. Equivalency is aspired, but is not 
a reality for most countries. As a system of governance then, the issue-field of organic 
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production has many elements of collaborations and partnerships between both public and 
private actors. The governance system as a whole however, cannot be described as cohesive 
due to the excluding characteristics of major public actors. Also discussed in the case on 
tensions in global governance systems, there is not a negotiated view on how to go forward 
in terms of the regulatory approach to cohesion, and actors go about exploring the avenues 
most beneficial for them in terms of international trade. In terms of successfulness, the 
regulation of organic production shows successful as well as unsuccessful characteristics. 
The degree to which the sector is protected from fraudulent claims can be marked as quite 
effective. However, regulatory complexity and concerns of Southern inclusivity remain to 
be challenges for the overall sector.  
What attempts have been made to handle these tensions and how are they able 
to contribute to the governance capacity? 
Various attempts have been undertaken by both public and private actors to handle the 
tensions arising from particularly fragmented state of governance affairs. In the empirical 
chapters, different approaches to reaching policy coherence were examined namely 
equivalence, harmonisation, common standard adoption, and metagovernance. 
Under the equivalence model, actors accept each other’s standards as if they are the 
same. Differences in provisions and variations in formulations are allowed. For this 
reason, the purpose of equivalence lies within its functionality. In standards for organic 
production, the European Union for instance has both unilateral as well as reciprocal 
equivalency agreements. One standard may be used as a normative standard which other 
standards need to be equivalent with. The International Federation of Organic 
Agricultural Movements’ Family of Standards is an example of such an equivalency 
network framework. Although currently only a theoretical construct, multilateral 
processes are at present propositioned by major developed markets to address challenges 
with developing and managing multiple equivalence arrangements (see Figure 6.1 for an 
overview of the policy coherence mechanisms). With harmonisation, actors bring 
different standards in line with one common standard or regulatory framework. This way, 
a system of standards operates efficiently without inconsistencies or inequalities. With 
adopting a common standard, actors agree that one standard applies to all parties. In 
principle, there is not a necessity to duplicate the standard. Regional standards for organic 
production are examples of common standards. Metagovernance can bring in more 
cohesion in the activities and regulatory processes within an issue field through a wide 
array of guidance mechanisms. Metagovernors can therefore employ any of the policy 
coherence mechanisms previously described. The International Social and 
Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL), which is recognised by 
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scholars as a sustainability metagovernor, endorses the ISEAL’s Credibility Principles ,  
which for instance works according to the harmonisation mechanism. 
The way in which policy mechanisms contribute to governance capacity are 
multiple. First, they offer a means in which expectations of actors concerning policy 
coherence can be managed. Once an approach is agreed upon, it furthermore offers a way 
in which the governance system can be structured. In that sense, the policy mechanisms 
are indicative of strategic relationships. Very simply put, in a bilateral equivalency 
agreement there is a basis of reciprocity in terms of demands, expectations, and benefits. 
While these elements may of course be present in unilateral equivalence agreements, they 
are not reciprocative. This ties in with another observation, which is that the policy 
mechanisms and the agreements struck reveal where power lies. To stay with the example 
of equivalence, power lies with those actors with whom equivalence agreements want to 
be struck with and those who are part of reciprocal equivalency agreements.   
Analogously, the way a metagovernance organisation employs mechanisms for 
policy coherence discloses the governance capacity that the metagovernor itself has, as 
well as that of its members. For instance, with the harmonisation model of ISEAL’s  
Credibility Standards, standards endorsed by other actors need to comply with certain 
principles of ISEAL to be regarded a sustainability standard. As a metagovernor, it 
employs a regulatory mode to its members. In a typology of interplay management, 
Oberthür (2009) distinguishes between two modes of interplay management, namely 
regulatory and enabling. ISEAL employs the former mode through its employment of a 
more hierarchical, regulatory, and top-down approach to its normative standard. 
However, the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership recommends the Marine Stewardship 
Council as a common standard, but does not mandate or enforce this. As the case on 
private metagovernance has demonstrated, the private arrangements investigated offer 
many different activities through which concerted aims and actions could be sought, and 
these activities lay mainly in networking and capacity building. This working method 
resonates with the enabling mode of interplay management, as its governance approach 
is non-hierarchical, communicative, voluntary, and enabling. If no other policy 
mechanism is offered for policy coherence by a metagovernance organisation, it signals 
that in terms of governance capacity, the organisations lack regulatory power and are 
therefore too weak to be considered governors. Therefore, in this concluding chapter we 
propose that besides employing a variety of the mechanisms of change as detailed in the 
case on tensions in global governance systems, metagovernors should employ one of the 
policy cohesion mechanisms, whether equivalence, harmonisation, or a common 
standard in order to be considered a metagovernor. In effect, this would contribute to the 
governance capacity of metagovernance arrangements and potentially to the governance 
system as a whole. 
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Figure 6.1 Mechanisms for policy cohesion 
6.3  Implications of Key Findings 
The manifestations of fragmentation and cohesion and the associated tensions deriving 
from them have been explored and contextualised through several case studies in this 
dissertation. It is our understanding that the main observations, analyses, and insights  
have an extendibility to other issue areas of global governance as well. Regardless of the 
level or the degree to which there is fragmentation within diverse issue fields in the 
production of global goods, fragmentation is omnipresent in global governance. Can we 
even expect that the diversity of actors engaged with the global governance of the 
production of global goods (including companies, civil society organisations, and polity 
in different cultures) would aspire the same? What is regarded as sustainable is often 
dependent on geographic, spatial, temporal matters. Even in cases where there is wide 
consensus on what is sustainable, trajectories for development may differ. There is value 
in diversity of actors and governance approaches to sustainable development, and in this 
particular sense, to fragmentation as well. 
Fragmentation becomes problematic when the issues of sustainability and 
development become unmanageable. The concepts of fragmentation and cohesion within 
this study have been regarded normatively in so far that fragmentation was understood 
as being unconducive to realising societal goals as it may diffuse, or be counterproductive  
for, concerted aims and action. Contrarily, efforts for cohesion have been understood 
positively in so far that partnerships and cooperation can overcome the condition of 
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fragmentation, enhance concerted aims and action, and result in regulatory coherence. 
When previously established values codified in laws and regulations are obscured or 
infringed upon, it is of crucial importance to understand the drivers and the 
accompanying agendas attached to them. While policy cohesion may be desired, the level 
and the extent to which will need to be determined. This can aid in the agenda to 
distinguish associated management efforts which tackle fragmentation (Zelli & van 
Asselt, 2013). It is central then to navigate between fragmentation and cohesion in order 
to deal effectively with diversity and the tensions this poses on the governability of 
sustainable development. While universal coordination may be lacking, central and 
authoritative actors can take a key role in fostering policy coherence.  
Three approaches may be instructive in navigating between fragmentation and 
cohesion. First, fragmentation can be approached as an organisational problem. In this 
approach, it is not only important to identify actors and their responsibilities, but also to 
suggest where responsibilities lie, or shift, redistribute, and reorganise responsibilities. 
Second, fragmentation can be approached as a problem emanating from normative issues. 
A general normative framework may be required. In case this is present, not only more 
stringent or encompassing standards can be called for, but also a normative framework on 
the mechanism of policy coherence. Third, fragmentation can be approached as a 
relational problem. Collaborations and interactions between governance actors need to be 
fostered. Interplay management then becomes an important concept in this regard, which 
refers to the conscious efforts by any relevant actors or group of actors, regardless of form 
and forum, to address institutional interaction and its effects (Oberthür & Stokke, 2011). 
Each of these approaches may however bring forth tensions, such as those relating to 
legitimacy and accountability (see e.g., Biermann & Gupta, 2011). Nonetheless, for steering 
societies across the world towards sustainable trajectories, systemic transformation 
remains one of the biggest governance challenges of our times. 
6.4  Reflections and Outlook 
Just as the quote of Montesquieu inferred, it might be tempting to think that uniformity 
is desirable. In this dissertation, we particularly nuance the intuitive assumption that a 
higher level of uniformity in policy cohesion strategies is preferable. On basis of the 
research findings of this dissertation, we argue that the type of cohesion that should be 
sought depends on the characteristics of underlying fragmentation and the issue at stake. 
The case study on regional standards for organic production demonstrated that diversity 
is arguably a valued characteristic for the standards system. For this reason, equivalence 
as a mechanism for policy coherence is a suitable system. However, for labour rights, 
harmonisation or a common standard of core labour standards is preferable as regulatory 
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fragmentation leads to the continued violation of labour rights. The obscuring of 
normative standards in other regulations and policies rekindles the ineffective labour 
rights protection system. Within the context of governance for sustainable development, 
little is known about the advantages and disadvantages of the policy mechanisms for 
policy cohesion. In what ways can the policy mechanisms be of use within different issue 
fields, and what would be their advantages and disadvantages? Since this avenue in 
research is largely unexplored, these questions merit further academic and policy-
oriented research.  
Furthermore, in interviewing governance actors on the various cases, some visions 
for the future were explored with experts. Specifically, interview questions explored what 
would be needed to get a desired future for a relevant governance issue, and included 
questions on the actions, actors of change, agents making the realisation difficult, and 
values underlying its accomplishment. These types of questions link very well with 
foresight studies. As different national and international, public and private organisations 
have the task or ambition to explore the long term (see e.g., van Asselt, van 't Klooster, 
van Notten, & Smits, 2010), foresight studies on policy coherence approaches with 
relevant stakeholders could provide a concrete step toward defining a shared future. 
Through developing futures according to the different policy coherence mechanisms, 
scenario exercises may for instance contribute to evaluating whether policies approaches 
are robust, whether there would be consensus or conflict between the various perspectives 
in policy coherence approaches, and to the identification of possible solutions in case of 
conflict and explore various options available.  
Lastly, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the United Nations, which 
is pursued by the Sustainable Development Goals − successor to the Millennium 
Development Goals − is the most recent universally acclaimed normative agenda. While 
countries remain the ultimate addressees, the inclusion of partnerships as a development 
goal is considered part and parcel for the realisation of the rest of the normative agenda. 
In order to contribute to the same policy agenda, whether now or in the future, the search 
for policy coherence by governance actors will remain of eminent relevance. In a world 
critically divided on many issues, it is our hope that this dissertation can contribute to the 
search of suitable governance approaches for sustainable development. 
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Appendix 
Case study interviews 
This dissertation is based on four case studies supported by information from research 
subjects. In principle, all interviewees have been offered confidentiality of information. 
To make identities unidentifiable, the following has been done. First, the names of the 
interviewees have been left out of the overview below. Second, many of the interviewees 
have multiple jobs or take on various roles and functions in relation to the topic for which 
they were interviewed. While this has contributed to the richness in insights on the 
interview topics, stipulating the combination of diverse roles, functions, and 
organisations and/or companies would lead to make the interviewees more identifiable. 
In the overview below, one main or most relevant role is mentioned. On several occasions, 
determining the main or most relevant role has felt somewhat arbitrary, as the different 
jobs, roles and functions could be considered equally relevant and weighty. Last, the titles 
of the main or most relevant positions have been categorised. The following 
categorisations have been used: policymaker, coordinator, advisor, consultant, analyst, 
and manager. The category of manager was further characterised with top-level (referring 
to the highest-ranking executives responsible for entire organisation) and mid-level 
(referring to managers who head specific departments, business units or who serve as 
project managers in flat organisations). 
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Case study 1 – Private fair labour arrangements 
N Organisation Domain Position Survey type  Date 
1 Fair Wear Foundation Civil Society Manager (top-level) 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
May 14, 2013 
2 International Labour 
Organization 
Public Manager (mid-level) Skype interview June 4, 2013 
3 Clean Clothes Campaign Civil Society  Coordinator 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
June 6, 2013 
4 Social Accountability 
International 
Civil Society  Advisor Telephone 
interview 
June 19, 2013 
5 Worldwide Responsible 
Accredited Production 
Civil Society  Manager (top-level) Telephone 
interview  
September 5, 
2013 
6 Worker Rights Consortium Civil Society  Manager (mid-level) 
 
Telephone 
interview  
November 22, 
2013 
7 Fair Labor Association Civil Society  Manager (top-level) 
 
Skype interview  November 26, 
2013 
8 Business Social Compliance 
Initiative 
Civil Society  Manager (mid-level) 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
February 20, 
2014 
Case study 2 – Regional standards for organic production 
N Organisation Domain Position Survey type  Date 
1 United Nations Forum on 
Sustainability Standards 
Public Coordinator Skype interview April 24 & 
August 24, 2015 
2 International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture 
Movements, Organics 
International 
Civil Society Advisor Skype interview October 14, 
2015 
3 Organic Alliance Malaysia Civil Society Manager (top-level) Skype interview March 4, 2016 
4 International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture 
Movements, Organics Asia 
Civil Society Manager (top-level) Skype interview March 15, 2016 
5 National Bureau of 
Agricultural Commodity and 
Food Standards, Thailand 
Public Manager (mid-level) Skype interview March 22, 2016 
6 Organic Certification Centre 
of the Philippines 
Civil Society Manager (top-level) Skype interview April 6, 2016 
7 Women in Business 
Development Inc., Samoa 
Civil Society Manager (top-level) Written response 
to interview 
questions 
April 7, 2016 
8 Thailand Organic Trade 
Association 
Civil Society Manager (top-level) Skype interview April 15, 2016 
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N Organisation Domain Position Survey type  Date 
9 Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Forestry, Fisheries 
and Biosecurity, Vanuatu 
Public Manager (top-level) Telephone 
interview 
April 16, 2016 
10 Philippine Bureau of 
Agriculture and Fishery 
Standards 
Public Manager (mid-level) Written response 
to interview 
questions 
April 18, 2016 
11 Kastom Gaden Association, 
Solomon Islands 
Civil Society Manager (top-level) Written response 
to interview 
questions 
April 25, 2016 
12 Ministry of Agriculture, 
Indonesia 
Public Manager (mid-level) WhatsApp 
interview 
April 26, 2016 
13 Pacific Organic and Ethical 
Trade Community 
Public Coordinator Skype interview April 27, 2016 
14 International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture 
Movements, Organic 
International 
Civil Society Manager (mid-level) Skype interview May 5, 2016 
15 European Commission Public Policymaker Telephone 
interview 
May 27, 2016 
16 Grolink Private Consultant Skype interview August 12, 2016 
17 Kenya Organic Agriculture 
Network 
Civil Society Manager (top-level) Skype interview August 18, 2016 
18 United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
Public Advisor Telephone 
interview 
August 25, 2016 
19 African Organisation for 
Standardisation 
Public Manager (mid-level)  Skype interview July 20, 2017 
20 Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry of Republic of 
Panama 
Public Coordinator Telephone 
interview 
July 28, 2017 
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Case study 3 – Private metagovernance 
N Organisation Domain Position Survey type Date Conducted by 
1 The Common Code 
for the Coffee 
Community 
Association 
Civil Society Manager 
(mid-level) 
Written response 
to interview 
questions  
June 6, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
2 Rainforest Alliance Civil Society  Manager 
(top-level)  
Skype interview June 10, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
3 Racafe & CIA S.C.A.  Private Manager 
(top-level)  
Skype interview June 12, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
4 Kenya Coffee 
Research Foundation 
Public Manager 
(mid-level)  
Written response 
to interview 
questions  
June 18, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
5 UTZ Certified Civil Society Manager 
(top-level)  
Skype interview June 25, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
6 Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
GmbH 
Public Manager 
(mid-level)  
Skype interview July 2, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
7 Tchibo GmbH Private Manager 
(top-level)  
Skype interview July 9, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
8 Sustainable Fisheries 
Partnership 
Civil Society Manager 
(mid-level)  
Written response 
to interview 
questions  
June 4, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
9 Marine Stewardship 
Council 
Civil Society Advisor Written response 
to interview 
questions  
June 26, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
10 Global Good 
Agricultural Practices 
Civil Society Manager 
(mid-level)  
Written response 
to interview 
questions 
June 27, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
11 International 
Fishmeal and Fish Oil 
Organisation 
Civil Society Manager 
(mid-level) 
Skype interview July 4, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
12 International Council 
for the Exploration of 
the Sea 
Public Manager 
(mid-level)  
Skype interview July 4, 2013 Sophie von 
Gagern 
13 Aquaculture 
Stewardship Council 
Civil Society Coordinator Skype interview July 11, 
2013 
Sophie von 
Gagern 
14 Global Aquaculture 
Alliance 
Civil Society Manager 
(mid-level) 
Skype interview July 16, 
2013 
Sophie von 
Gagern 
15 World Cocoa 
Foundation 
Civil Society Manager 
(top-level)  
Telephone 
interview 
May 29, 
2014 
Ceren 
Pekdemir 
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16 Olam International Private Manager 
(mid-level) 
Skype interview 
 
June 9, 2014 Ceren 
Pekdemir 
17 Guittard Chocolate Private Manager 
(mid-level) 
Telephone 
interview 
June 12, 2014 Ceren 
Pekdemir 
18 Cargill Company Private Manager 
(mid-level) 
Telephone 
interview 
June 26, 2014 Ceren 
Pekdemir 
19 Toms Group Private Manager 
(mid-level) 
Telephone 
interview 
July 8, 2014 Ceren 
Pekdemir 
20 Rainforest Alliance Civil Society Manager 
(top-level)  
Skype interview September 3, 
2014 
Ceren 
Pekdemir 
21 UTZ Certified Civil Society Manager 
(top-level)  
Telephone 
interview 
October 9, 
2014 
Ceren 
Pekdemir 
 
Case study 4a – Tensions in global governance systems: labour rights 
N Organisation Domain Position Survey type Date 
1 Clean Clothes Campaign 
International Office 
Civil Society Coordinator Questionnaire &  
Skype interview 
May 9, 2017 
2 University of Virginia Research Researcher Questionnaire &  
Skype interview 
May 19, 2017 
3 London School of Economics 
and Political Science 
Research Researcher Skype interview May 29, 2017 
4 Pennsylvania State University Research Researcher Questionnaire &  
Skype interview  
May 30, 2017 
5 International Labour 
Organization 
Public Advisor Questionnaire &  
Skype interview  
June 2, 2017 
6 Federatie Nederlands  
Vakbeweging 
Civil Society Manager 
(top-level) 
Face-to-face 
interview 
June 26, 2017 
7 TZoro IBC 
 
Private Manager 
(top-level)  
Questionnaire & 
telephone interview 
August 24, 
2017 
8 International Labour 
Organization 
Public Analyst Questionnaire &  
Skype interview 
August 25, 
2017 
9 International Labour 
Organization 
Public Advisor Questionnaire &  
Skype Interview 
September 4, 
2017 
10 Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise 
Civil Society Advisor Questionnaire & 
telephone interview 
September 7, 
2017 
11 University of Cape Town Research Researcher Questionnaire &  
Skype interview  
September 
19, 2017 
12 Centre de droit international 
de Nanterre 
Private Consultant Questionnaire &  
Skype interview  
September 
22, 2017 
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13 Randstad Private Manager 
(top-level) 
Questionnaire &  
face-to-face 
interview 
September 
25, 2017 
14 Randstad Private Manager 
(mid-level) 
Questionnaire &  
face-to-face 
interview 
September 
25, 2017 
15 Institute for Human 
Development, New Delhi 
Research Researcher Questionnaire &  
Skype interview  
September 
26, 2017 
16 Max Planck Institute Research Researcher Questionnaire & 
telephone interview 
November 
10, 2017 
 
Case study 4b – Tensions in global governance systems: organic production 
N Organisation Domain Position Survey type Date 
1 Grolink Private Consultant Questionnaire & 
Skype interview  
September 
11, 2017 
2 International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture 
Movements 
Civil Society Manager 
(mid-level)  
Questionnaire September 7, 
2017 
3 Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations 
Public Coordinator Questionnaire & 
WhatsApp interview  
September 
15, 2017 
4 Earth Net Foundation Civil Society Manager 
(top-level)  
Questionnaire & 
Skype interview  
September 
15, 2017 
5 Organic Certification Center 
of the Philippines 
Private Manager 
(top-level) 
Questionnaire September 
22, 2017 
6 Circle Indonesia Private Consultant Questionnaire & 
Skype interview  
September 
23, 2017 
7 United Nations Forum on 
Sustainability Standards 
Public Coordinator Questionnaire October 3, 
2017 
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Introduction 
Issue areas concerned with sustainable practice are characterised by a growing number of 
standards and regulations. Particularly around the production of global public goods, the 
new global public domain has been subject to contending centres of economic and 
political power. Many elements of the regulatory process have been transferred to both 
public and private actors in global governance, on topics as diverse as human rights, the 
environment, health, trade and finance. 
In consequence, global governance for sustainable development is considered as 
having various sources of authority and power. Next to mandatory laws and regulations, 
also more flexible and voluntary forms of regulation and implementation are offered. This 
phenomenon has led to the observation that many policy domains in international 
relations are characterised by fragmentation. Fragmentation is regarded as problematic 
when the capacity of governments or international organisations is weakened in their 
desired effects or more generally, if it constrains the efficient and effective realisation of 
generally accepted public values. 
The changes in global governance and the accompanying growth in regulatory 
complexity also spurred the quest for cohesion, sometimes also referred to as 
‘convergence’. Initiatives for cohesion and the development of common global standards 
have brought the interests of public and private interests together in areas such as 
environmental, labour and social issues. Cohesion in regulations is considered favourable 
in the production for global public goods, for instance when standards, certification 
requirements and mutual recognition agreements converge in global value chains. 
Characteristics of fragmentation and cohesion can be observed in many different 
issue areas of sustainable development. Issue fields are rooted in specific institutional 
contexts. For this reason, many governance approaches have developed in distinctive  
ways. The governance systems of some issue areas appear to have more regulatory 
cohesion, whereas other issue areas appear fragmented. It is assumed that some 
governance systems are more conducive to realise sustainable change than others. 
However, elaborate explorations why this is the case were identified to be lacking, and the 
formulated research questions intend to fill this knowledge gap. Through qualitative 
analysis, based on over seventy semi-structured in-depth interviews and document 
analysis, several case studies were examined in order to answer the following research 
questions: 
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i. What tensions between fragmentation and cohesion manifest themselves in various 
global governance systems? 
ii. How do these tensions influence the governance capacity of these systems? 
iii. What attempts have been made to handle these tensions and how are they able to 
contribute to the governance capacity? 
Theorizing fragmentation and cohesion 
In this dissertation, the concept of fragmentation signifies the diversity, multiplicity, and 
distribution of regulatory powers of the overall institutional settings of different 
international and transnational policy domains. The term cohesion functions as its 
counterpart, and regulatory coherence is understood as a system of governance in which 
policies are aligned resulting in concerted aims and actions. In absence of a non-
fragmented, universal, and coordinated system of global governance structured around 
coherent sets of rules, full coherence on the global level is considered a theoretical 
construct. The pursuit for alignment as a way to create policy coherence has been analysed 
through the notions of harmonisation, equivalence, and metagovernance. The following 
case studies were central in this examination.       
In the first case study on private fair labour arrangements (chapter 2), dimensions 
along which fragmentation and cohesion of governance systems can be studied have been 
identified. This resulted in a conceptual framework, which advances that relations within 
governance systems can be observed from three levels, namely the organisational, 
normative, and relational level. In this dynamic field, relations may develop into 
collaborations and partnerships, but may as well be adversarial. The conceptual 
framework served as an analytical basis to understand the regulatory system of global 
labour rights. Based on an investigation of the private transnational arrangements for fair 
labour, the fragmentation recognisable on the three dimensions were considered to 
impair the transformative capacity of the governance system of the fair labour issue field. 
The second case (chapter 3) analysed the regionalisation of standards on organic 
production as a way in which public and private actors aim to bring more cohesion in the 
governance system on the global level. By examining all the existing initiatives from across 
the world, it evaluates if the promise of regionalisation can make the regulatory field of 
organic standards more cohesive and whether it is conducive for regional and 
international trade. Regionalisation as a system of governance is considered to contribute 
to normative coherence within the issue field while allowing for the regional adaptation. 
In this chapter, it is argued that ineffective enforcement and inadequate allocation of legal, 
political, and funding resources seriously imperil the institutional alignment necessary 
for international trade purposes. 
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The third case study (chapter 4) explored the concept of metagovernance. Based on 
a literature study, a conceptual framework was developed with a categorisation into four 
change mechanisms: (re)framing the (global) discourse, capacity building, networking 
and mainstreaming. Three private governance arrangements aspiring a key role in the 
advancement of sustainable production in diverse global value chains were analysed in 
terms of these mechanisms. It was found that the private uptake of meta-governance 
mechanisms for change are considered to relate to networking and capacity building, 
being mostly geared towards process management strategies, activating actors and 
resources, and arranging and facilitating interactions amongst stakeholders. In addition, 
efforts to frame the global sustainability discourse and mainstreaming of sustainability 
goals could be strengthened. 
The fourth case study (chapter 5) examined the ways in which tensions in global 
governance systems manifest themselves through the quest for cohesion. It is postulated 
that the emerging tensions are dependent on the system characteristics of fragmentation 
in an issue field and are shaped by the ways in which cohesion is sought. By examining 
the global governance of labour rights and the global governance of organic production, 
it is found that a cause for these tensions, ironically, stem from non-alignment itself as 
particularly strategic coordination between actors is often lacking. Both case studies 
illustrate that there is ample room to seek partnerships and strengthen collaborative 
efforts. It is concluded that collaborative roadmaps for cohesion in global governance 
should not be treated alike, and require an issue based analysis to be functional for the 
governance systems itself. 
What tensions between fragmentation and cohesion manifest 
themselves in various global governance systems? 
The results of the various cases uncover that tensions between fragmentation and 
cohesion of global governance systems manifests themselves in several ways. The first 
tension area relates to the difficulties encountered in the relational aspect of governance 
in the transnational sphere. Specifically, while there is an understanding that 
collaboration and partnership can be beneficial, the governance arrangements have 
difficulties in arranging and maintaining collaborative efforts that can sustain and amplify 
their own working methods. 
This ties in with another tension area between fragmentation and cohesion, namely, 
despite the quest for cohesion across the issue fields, the approach to achieving policy 
coherence is by and far not a settled issue amongst actors operating in them. As a result, 
the different working methods of the governance actors and their preferred ways for 
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realising coherence is sometimes not only a non-shared endeavour, the preferred working 
methods also sustain or deepen the fragmented character of governance systems. 
Another tension area between fragmentation and cohesion can be observed between 
inclinations toward either global or local methods. While an overarching, normative 
application of standards is often desired on the global level by transnational actors, these 
same actors stress the importance of the adaptation of standards to local characteristics 
as a way to safeguard their applicability and effectiveness. 
How do these tensions influence the governance capacity of these 
systems? 
Governance capacity was construed as an evaluative concept encompassing several 
elements. Beyond the applicability of the concept to the transnational and international 
sphere, we distinguished defining characteristics of governance capacity as the ability to 
contribute to policies, to implement policies, to put in certain resources, to achieve certain 
outcomes, and linked to the latter, the criterion of success. The influence of the tensions 
on the governance capacity of arrangements has been discussed in several ways 
throughout this dissertation. A general observation is that in most parts of the world, 
many transnational arrangements are tolerated to contribute and implement policies. An 
efficient and effective realisation of goals within issue fields are hard to achieve due to 
insufficiencies in (sharing) resources and concerted actions. 
In the field of labour rights, while there is largely a desire for cooperation between 
the governance arrangements, the international and transnational system is largely 
characterised by the lack thereof. Next to the ILO, other international actors have 
increasingly started to define and adopt labour policies. Private arrangements largely 
focus on their own resources and capabilities, divide the issue field into different fractions 
through their focus on particular sectors, and compete for market share of businesses. An 
exploration into other intergovernmental organisations also revealed that formulations 
and reference to normative standards in provisions and policies differ, resulting from a 
reported lack of synergies for policy coherence. The characteristics of the governance 
system as a whole point to problems related to the fragmentation of the system. In this 
regard, the variety amongst the actors themselves, the lack of accountability, the 
uncoordinated efforts amongst various arrangements, and the weak links between and 
across the public and private divide, were all signified as unconducive to induce the 
envisioned changes. 
The field of organic production is also rife of standards. An examination of regional 
organic standards showed that resources and capabilities are shared. Also in terms of 
alignment between standards, two normative standards – one from the public and 
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another one from the private sphere –contribute to the regional standards development. 
The organic movement values diversity in standards if these are in line with organic 
values, and the endorsement of equivalency as a method allows standards to be adapted 
to the local context. The approach of public arrangements differs. Amongst major organic 
markets and developed nations, equivalence agreements exist but other actors must 
conform to the compliance regime. As a system of governance, the issue-field has many 
elements of collaborations and partnerships between both public and private actors. The 
system cannot however be described as cohesive due to the excluding characteristics of 
major public actors, and a divided view on the regulatory approach to achieving cohesion. 
The degree to which the sector is protected from fraudulent claims can be marked as quite 
effective, while regulatory complexity and concerns of Southern inclusivity remain 
challenging for the overall sector.  
What attempts have been made to handle these tensions and how are 
they able  to contribute to the governance capacity? 
Various attempts have been undertaken by both public and private actors to handle the 
tensions arising from particularly fragmented state of governance affairs. In the empirical 
chapters, different approaches to reaching policy coherence were examined namely 
equivalence, harmonisation, common standard adoption, and metagovernance. 
Under the equivalence model, actors accept each other’s standards as if they are the 
same. Differences in provisions and variations in formulations are allowed. For this reason, 
the purpose of equivalence lies within its functionality. One standard may be used as a 
normative standard which other standards need to be equivalent with. With 
harmonisation, actors bring different standards in line with one common standard or 
regulatory framework. This way, a system of standards operates efficiently without 
inconsistencies or inequalities. With adopting a common standard, actors agree that one 
standard applies to all parties. In principle, there is not a necessity to duplicate the standard. 
Metagovernance can bring in more cohesion in the activities and regulatory processes 
within an issue field through a wide array of guidance mechanisms. Metagovernors can 
therefore employ any of the policy coherence mechanisms previously described. 
The way in which policy mechanisms contribute to governance capacity are 
multiple. First, they offer a means in which expectations of actors concerning policy 
coherence can be managed. Once an approach is agreed upon, it furthermore offers a way 
in which the governance system can be structured. In that sense, the policy mechanisms 
are indicative of strategic relationships. This ties in with another observation, which is 
that the policy mechanisms and the agreements struck reveal where power lies.  
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Analogously, the way a metagovernance organisation employs mechanisms for 
policy coherence discloses the governance capacity that the metagovernor itself has, as 
well as that of its members. Besides employing a variety of the mechanisms of change, 
metagovernors should employ one of the policy cohesion mechanisms, whether 
equivalence, harmonisation, or a common standard in order to be considered a 
metagovernor. In effect, this would contribute to the governance capacity of 
metagovernance arrangements and potentially to the governance system as a whole. 
Implications and reflections  
Fragmentation becomes problematic when the issues of sustainability and development 
become unmanageable. The concepts of fragmentation and cohesion within this study 
have been regarded normatively in so far that fragmentation was understood as being 
unconducive to realising societal goals as it may diffuse, or be counterproductive for, 
concerted aims and action. Contrarily, efforts for cohesion have been understood 
positively in so far that partnerships and cooperation can overcome the condition of 
fragmentation, enhance concerted aims and action, and result in regulatory coherence. 
When previously established values codified in laws and regulations are obscured or 
infringed upon, it is of crucial importance to understand the drivers and the 
accompanying agendas attached to them. While policy cohesion may be desired, the level 
and the extent to which will need to be determined. This can aid in the agenda to 
distinguish associated management efforts which tackle fragmentation. It is central then 
to navigate between fragmentation and cohesion in order to deal effectively with diversity 
and the tensions this poses on the governability of sustainable development. While 
universal coordination may be lacking, central and authoritative actors can take a key role 
in fostering policy coherence. 
On basis of the research findings of this dissertation, we argue that the type of 
cohesion that should be sought depends on the characteristics of underlying 
fragmentation and the issue at stake. The case study on regional standards for organic 
production demonstrated that diversity is arguably a valued characteristic for the 
standards system. For this reason, equivalence as a mechanism for policy coherence is a 
suitable system. However, for labour rights, harmonisation or a common standard of core 
labour standards is preferable as regulatory fragmentation leads to the continued 
violation of labour rights. The obscuring of normative standards in other regulations and 
policies rekindles the ineffective labour rights protection system.  
Three approaches may be instructive in navigating between fragmentation and 
cohesion. First, fragmentation can be approached as an organisational problem. In this 
approach, it is not only important to identify actors and their responsibilities, but also to 
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suggest where responsibilities lie, or shift, redistribute, and reorganise responsibilities.  
Second, fragmentation can be approached as a problem emanating from normative issues. 
A general normative framework may be required. In case this is present, not only more 
stringent or encompassing standards can be called for, but also a normative framework 
on the mechanism of policy coherence. Third, fragmentation can be approached as a 
relational problem. Collaborations and interactions between governance actors need to 
be fostered. Interplay management then becomes an important concept in this regard, 
which refers to the conscious efforts by any relevant actors or group of actors, regardless 
of form and forum, to address institutional interaction and its effects. Each of these 
approaches may however bring forth tensions, such as those relating to legitimacy and 
accountability. Nonetheless, for steering societies across the world towards sustainable 
trajectories, systemic transformation remains one of the biggest governance challenges of 
our times. 
  
   
 169 
Samenvatting 
  
   
Samenvatting 
171 
Introductie 
Mondiale beleidssystemen die zich bezighouden met duurzaamheidspraktijken worden 
gekenmerkt door een groeiend aantal standaarden en regelgeving. Veel elementen van het 
regelgevingsproces zijn daarbij verdeeld over publieke en private actoren, met betrekking 
tot bijvoorbeeld mensenrechten, het milieu, gezondheid, en handel.  
Dit heeft als gevolg dat mondiale sturing van duurzame ontwikkeling meerdere 
bronnen van autoriteit en macht kent. Naast de verplichte wetten en regelgeving, zijn ook 
meer flexibele en vrijwillige vormen van regelgeving en implementatie ontwikkeld. Veel 
mondiale beleidssystemen worden gekarakteriseerd door fragmentatie. Fragmentatie wordt 
gezien als problematisch wanneer de capaciteit van overheden of internationale organisaties 
verzwakt is wat betreft het bereiken van het gewenste effect, of meer in het algemeen, als het 
de realisatie van efficiënte en effectieve algemene publieke waarden hindert.  
De veranderingen in mondiale sturing en de bijkomende groei in de complexiteit 
van de regelgeving hebben tevens de zoektocht naar cohesie bevorderd, een proces dat 
ook wel ‘convergentie’ genoemd wordt. Initiatieven voor cohesie en de ontwikkeling van 
gedeelde, mondiale standaarden hebben de belangen van publieke en private actoren 
nader bij elkaar gebracht op het gebied van het milieu, arbeid en sociale beleidsterreinen. 
Cohesie in regelgeving wordt als overwegend positief gezien in de context van de 
productie van mondiale, publieke goederen, bijvoorbeeld in gevallen waarbij 
standaarden, certificeringseisen en wederzijdse erkenningsovereenkomsten convergeren 
in mondiale waardeketens. 
Eigenschappen van fragmentatie en cohesie zijn waarneembaar in verschillende  
beleidssystemen van duurzame ontwikkeling. Ieder beleidssysteem heeft een specifieke, 
institutionele context, en is op idiosyncratische wijze ontwikkeld. Sommige systemen 
lijken meer cohesie te vertonen op het gebied van regelgeving, waar andere 
beleidssystemen meer gefragmenteerd lijken te zijn. Aangenomen wordt dat de mate van 
fragmentatie/cohesie van invloed is op de mogelijkheden om duurzame verandering te 
bewerkstelligen. Duidelijk onderbouwde uitleg waarom dit het geval is, lijkt echter te 
ontbreken. De onderhavige onderzoeksvragen beogen deze ontbrekende kennis aan te 
vullen. Door middel van kwalitatieve analyse, gebaseerd op meer dan zeventig 
semigestructureerde diepte-interviews en documentanalyse, zijn verschillende  
casestudies onderzocht om te komen tot antwoorden op de volgende vragen: 
 
1. Welke spanningsvelden tussen fragmentatie en cohesie zijn waarneembaar in 
verschillende mondiale beleidssystemen? 
2. Hoe beïnvloeden deze spanningsvelden de sturingscapaciteit van deze systemen? 
3. Welke pogingen zijn ondernomen om de spanningsvelden weg te nemen en hoe 
dragen deze pogingen bij aan de sturingscapaciteit? 
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Theoretiseren van fragmentatie en cohesie 
Het concept fragmentatie in dit proefschrift duidt de diversiteit, de veelheid en de 
verspreiding van regelgevende machten aan in het kader van verschillende internationale  
en transnationale beleidssystemen. Er is sprake van cohesie, en coherentie in regelgeving, 
wanneer beleid op elkaar is afgestemd met als resultaat gecoördineerde doelen en acties. 
Aangezien een niet-gefragmenteerd, universeel en gecoördineerd systeem van mondiale 
sturing - geënt op coherente regelgeving - ontbreekt, wordt volledige coherentie op 
mondiaal niveau hier beschouwd als theoretisch construct. Het streven naar afstemming 
met als doel coherentie in beleid, is geanalyseerd middels de noties van harmonisatie, 
equivalentie en metagovernance. De hierna genoemde casestudies stonden centraal in 
deze analyse. 
In de eerste casestudy inzake private initiatieven voor betere arbeidsomstandigheden 
(hoofdstuk 2) zijn drie dimensies geïdentificeerd waarlangs fragmentatie en cohesie 
bestudeerd kunnen worden: organisatorisch, normatief en relationeel. In dit dynamische 
veld kunnen relaties zich ontwikkelen tot samenwerkingsverbanden, maar ook tot 
vijandige relaties. Het conceptueel raamwerk fungeert als analytisch kader om de 
regelgevende systemen van het mondiale arbeidsrecht te begrijpen. Op basis van een 
onderzoek naar de private, transnationale afspraken voor betere arbeidsomstandigheden 
kan fragmentatie gezien worden als obstakel voor de transformationele capaciteit van het 
beleidssysteem voor betere arbeidsomstandigheden.  
De tweede casestudy (hoofdstuk 3) analyseert de regionalisatie van standaarden voor 
biologische productie als een manier waarop publieke en private actoren trachten meer 
cohesie aan te brengen in het beleidssysteem op mondiaal niveau. Door het onderzoeken 
van alle bestaande initiatieven, wordt bekeken of de belofte van regionalisatie meer 
cohesie kan brengen in de regelgeving rondom biologische standaarden en of het 
bevorderlijk is voor regionale en internationale handel. Regionalisatie blijkt bij te dragen 
aan normatieve coherentie binnen het beleidsdomein, onderwijl ruimte biedend voor 
regionale aanpassingen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt betoogd dat ineffectieve handhaving en 
inadequate toewijzing van juridische, politieke en financiële middelen een ernstige 
bedreiging vormen voor de institutionele afstemming die nodig is voor het bereiken van 
beoogde internationale handelsdoelstellingen.  
De derde casestudy (hoofdstuk 4) verkent het concept metagovernance. Op basis van 
een literatuurstudie is een conceptueel raamwerk ontwikkeld met een categorisatie in vier 
verandermechanismen: (her)formulering van (mondiale) discours, capaciteitsopbouw, 
netwerken en veralgemenisering. Drie private sturingsinitiatieven die een sleutelrol 
wilden zijn in het bevorderen van duurzame productie in verschillende mondiale 
waardeketen werden geanalyseerd op basis van deze vier mechanismen. Geconcludeerd 
werd dat de private verwezenlijking van metagovernance mechanismen voor verandering 
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gerelateerd zijn aan netwerken en capaciteitsopbouw. Deze verandermechanismen zijn 
voornamelijk gericht op procesmanagementstrategieën waarbij actoren en middelen 
geactiveerd worden en ook wordt getracht interactie te faciliteren tussen stakeholders. De 
inspanningen omtrent de inkadering van het globale duurzaamheidsdiscours, alsook het 
nader veralgemeniseren van duurzaamheidsdoelen, zouden geïntensiveerd kunnen 
worden. 
De vierde casestudy (hoofdstuk 5) onderzoekt de manier waarop spanningsvelden in 
mondiale beleidssystemen waarneembaar zijn in de zoektocht naar cohesie. Aangenomen 
wordt dat de vigerende spanningsvelden afhankelijk zijn van de systeemeigenschappen van 
fragmentatie in een beleidssysteem en gevormd worden door de manier waarop cohesie 
wordt nagestreefd. Door de mondiale sturing van arbeidsrecht en de mondiale sturing van 
biologische productie te onderzoeken, wordt duidelijk dat deze spanningen ironisch genoeg 
veroorzaakt worden door de niet-afstemming zelf, gegeven het feit dat duidelijke, 
strategische coördinatie tussen actoren vaak ontbreekt. Beide casestudies illustreren het feit 
dat er voldoende ruimte bestaat om samenwerkingsverbanden op te zetten en 
samenwerking te intensiveren. Geconcludeerd wordt dat plannen voor samenwerking ten 
behoeve van cohesie in mondiale sturing niet gegeneraliseerd kunnen worden, en een 
analyse behoeven om functioneel te kunnen zijn voor het beleidssysteem waartoe ze 
behoren. 
Welke spanningsvelden tussen fragmentatie en cohesie zijn 
waarneembaar in verschillende mondiale beleidssystemen? 
De uitkomsten van de verschillende cases laten zien dat spanningsvelden tussen 
fragmentatie en cohesie in mondiale beleidssystemen op verschillende manieren 
waarneembaar zijn. Het eerste spanningsgebied is gelinkt aan de moeilijkheden in het 
relationele aspect van governance in de transnationale sfeer. Specifiek houdt dit in dat, 
hoewel begrepen wordt dat samenwerking en samenwerkingsverbanden de sturing 
kunnen versterken, het moeilijk is om samenwerking te initiëren en te onderhouden die 
de eigen manier van werken voortzet en versterkt. 
Dit is gelieerd aan een ander spanningsveld tussen fragmentatie en cohesie, namelijk 
dat er geen overeenstemming bestaat tussen de verschillende actoren over hoe coherentie 
in beleid te bereiken is. Als gevolg hiervan, zijn de verschillende werkwijzen van de 
governance-actoren en de verschillende voorkeuren voor hoe coherentie te realiseren 
soms niet alleen een niet-gedeelde onderneming, maar heeft de geprefereerde 
werkmethode ook als gevolg dat het gefragmenteerde karakter van een 
governancesysteem voortduurt of verdiept wordt. 
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Een ander spanningsveld tussen fragmentatie en cohesie is waarneembaar bij de 
voorkeur voor mondiale of lokale methoden. Hoewel een overkoepelende, normatieve 
toepassing van standaarden vaak gewenst is op het mondiale niveau door transnationale 
actoren, zijn het juist deze actoren die het belang onderstrepen van het aanpassen van 
standaarden aan lokale omstandigheden om op die manier de toepasbaarheid en 
effectiviteit te waarborgen. 
Hoe beïnvloeden deze spanningsvelden de sturingscapaciteit van deze 
systemen? 
Sturingscapaciteit is een evaluatief concept bestaande uit verschillende elementen. Het 
concept is toepasbaar op de transnationale en internationale sfeer. Kenmerkend zijn de 
mogelijkheid om bij te dragen aan beleid, beleid te implementeren, middelen in te 
brengen, bepaalde uitkomsten te bewerkstelligen en, gelinkt aan dit laatste punt, 
succescriteria. De invloed van de spanningsvelden op de sturingscapaciteit is op 
verschillende manieren tot uitdrukking gekomen in dit proefschrift. Het is moeilijk om 
tot een efficiënte en effectieve realisatie van doelen binnen beleidsdomeinen te komen 
door tekortkomingen in (het delen van) middelen en op elkaar afgestemde acties. 
Op het gebied van arbeidsrecht is het internationale en transnationale systeem 
grotendeels te karakteriseren door een absentie van samenwerking tussen 
sturingsinitiatieven, ondanks dat er een verlangen bestaat dit te realiseren. In navolging 
van de ILO zijn ook andere internationale actoren zich meer gaan richten op het 
definiëren en implementeren van arbeidsbeleid. Private initiatieven die zich grotendeels 
concentreren op de eigen middelen en capaciteiten, verdelen het beleidsdomein in 
verschillende fracties door hun focus op specifieke sectoren en beconcurreren elkaar voor 
marktaandeel onder bedrijven. Een verkenning van intergouvernementele organisaties 
toont ook aan dat formuleringen van en referenties naar normatieve standaarden en 
bepalingen verschillen als gevolg van een gebrek aan coherentie in beleid. De kenmerken 
van het sturingssysteem wijzen op problemen gelieerd aan de fragmentatie van het 
systeem. In dit opzicht, kunnen de diversiteit van de actoren, het gebrek aan 
verantwoordingsmechanismen, de ongecoördineerde acties binnen verschillende  
initiatieven en de zwakke links tussen de actoren in het publieke en private domein en 
tussen de domeinen, allen aangemerkt worden als niet bevorderlijk voor het 
bewerkstelligen van de beoogde veranderingen.  
Op het gebied van biologische productie zijn ook vele standaarden ontwikkeld. Een 
onderzoek naar regionale biologische standaarden laat zien dat middelen en capaciteiten 
gedeeld worden. Ook in termen van afstemming tussen standaarden, twee normatieve 
standaarden – een vanuit de publieke, de ander vanuit de private sfeer – dragen bij aan de 
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ontwikkeling van regionale standaarden. De biologische beweging hecht waarde aan 
diversiteit in standaarden als deze in lijn liggen met biologische waarden. Tevens staat het 
ondersteunen van equivalentie als methode toe dat standaarden aangepast kunnen 
worden aan de lokale context. De aanpak van publieke initiatieven verschilt. Tussen de 
meest ontwikkelde biologische markten en ontwikkelde naties bestaan er 
equivalentieovereenkomsten, maar andere actoren moeten zich wel conformeren aan 
nationale standaarden. Het beleidssysteem kent veel elementen van samenwerking en 
samenwerkingsverbanden tussen zowel publieke als private actoren. Het systeem kan 
echter niet worden gekwalificeerd als coherent aangezien de publieke actoren met de 
meest ontwikkelde biologische markten niet inclusief zijn en er een verdeelde visie binnen 
het beleidssysteem bestaat op hoe cohesie te verwezenlijken is. De mate waarin de sector 
beschermd is tegen frauduleuze claims kan beoordeeld worden als vrij effectief. Zorgen 
over inclusiviteit van markten van het mondiale zuiden, alsmede de complexiteit van de 
regelgeving blijven echter uitdagingen voor de gehele sector. 
Welke pogingen zijn ondernomen om de spanningsvelden weg te 
nemen en hoe dragen deze pogingen bij aan de sturingscapaciteit? 
Er zijn verschillende pogingen ondernomen door zowel publieke als private actoren om de 
spanningsvelden die voortvloeien uit fragmentatie te adresseren. In de empirische 
hoofdstukken zijn de verschillende aanpakken om beleidscoherentie te bereiken, te weten 
equivalentie, harmonisatie, gezamenlijke standaardadoptie en metagovernance, onderzocht. 
In het equivalentiemodel, accepteren actoren elkaars standaarden alsof ze hetzelfde zijn. 
Verschillen in voorwaarden en variaties in formuleringen zijn toegestaan. Functionaliteit is 
het voornaamste doel van het equivalentiemodel. Een standaard kan worden gebruikt als een 
normatieve standaard, waar andere standaarden equivalent aan moeten zijn. In het 
harmonisatiemodel brengen actoren verschillende standaarden samen en stemmen ze af 
binnen een gedeelde standaard of regelgevingskader. Op deze manier kan een standaarden-
systeem efficiënt opereren zonder inconsistenties. Bij het gezamenlijk adopteren van een 
standaard, stemmen actoren ermee in dat één standaard geldt voor alle partijen. 
Metagovernance, wat gedefinieerd kan worden als de governance van governance-actoren, 
kan zorgen voor meer cohesie in de activiteiten en regelgevingsprocessen binnen een 
beleidsdomein middels een breed scala aan richtlijnen. Metagovernors kunnen daarom alle 
eerdergenoemde beleidscoherentiemechanismen inzetten. 
Er zijn veel manieren waarop beleidsmechanismen bijdragen aan sturingscapaciteit.  
Ten eerste, bieden ze een manier waarop verwachtingen van de actoren aangaande 
beleidscoherentie kunnen worden gemanaged. Zodra er overeenstemming is over de 
aanpak, biedt het vervolgens ook een manier waarop het sturingssysteem kan worden 
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gestructureerd. Dit is gerelateerd aan een andere observatie, namelijk dat 
beleidsmechanismen en de gesloten overeenkomsten onthullen waar de macht 
(daadwerkelijk) ligt en kan dan ook indicatief zijn voor strategische relaties tussen actoren 
onderling.  
Analoog hieraan, laat de manier waarop een metagovernance organisatie  
beleidsmechanismen inzet zien wat de sturingscapaciteit is van de metagovernor. Buiten 
het aanwenden van verschillende mechanismen voor veranderingen, zouden 
metagovernors één van de beleidscoherentiemechanismen moeten inzetten, of dit nu 
equivalentie, harmonisatie of gezamenlijke standaardadoptie is, zodat zij als meta 
‘governor’ aangemerkt kunnen worden. Dit draagt dan effectief bij aan de 
sturingscapaciteit van een metagovernance initiatief zelf, en hierdoor mogelijk ook aan 
het sturingssysteem in z’n totaliteit. 
Implicaties en overwegingen 
Fragmentatie wordt problematisch wanneer problemen rondom duurzaamheid en 
ontwikkeling niet langer te beheersen zijn. De concepten fragmentatie en cohesie zijn in 
de context van deze (de onderhavige) studie normatief geïnterpreteerd in de zin dat 
fragmentatie gezien werd als niet-bevorderlijk voor het bereiken van maatschappelijke  
doelen, daar het verdeeldheid zaait, of contraproductief is met betrekking tot 
gecoördineerde doelen en acties. Omgekeerd worden pogingen om cohesie te 
bewerkstelligen in een positief licht gezien in de zin dat samenwerkingsverbanden en 
samenwerking de staat van fragmentatie kunnen doen veranderen, afstemming van 
doelen en acties kan bevorderen en kan resulteren in coherentie in regelgeving. Wanneer 
gevestigde waarden gecodificeerd in wetten en regels vervagen of overtreden worden, is 
het van cruciaal belang dat de motivaties, aanleidingen en agenda’s behorend bij 
dergelijke ontwikkelingen begrepen worden. Hoewel beleidscoherentie wenselijk is, dient 
de mate waarin en het niveau waarop vastgesteld te worden. Bestaande pogingen om 
fragmentatie te managen zouden hierbij gebaat zijn. Het is essentieel om te navigeren 
tussen fragmentatie en cohesie om zo effectief om te kunnen gaan met diversiteit en de 
spanningsvelden die dit oplevert voor de sturing van duurzame ontwikkeling. 
Gebaseerd op de bevindingen in dit proefschrift, stellen wij dat het type cohesie dat 
nagestreefd dient te worden, afhangt van de kenmerken van de onderliggende 
fragmentatie en het beleidsdomein. De casestudy over regionale standaarden voor 
biologische productie liet zien dat diversiteit mogelijk een waardevol kenmerk kan zijn 
voor een standaardsysteem. Om deze reden, is equivalentie een passend systeem voor 
beleidscoherentie. Voor het beleidsdomein van arbeidsrecht heeft harmonisatie of een 
gezamenlijke standaard echter de voorkeur gegeven het feit dat beleidsfragmentatie leidt 
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tot blijvende schendingen van arbeidsrecht. Het ineffectieve arbeidsrechtensysteem op 
mondiaal niveau wordt niet geholpen door het vervagen van normatieve standaarden van 
nieuwe en andere regels en beleidskaders. 
Drie aanpakken zijn mogelijk leerzaam in het navigeren tussen fragmentatie en 
cohesie. Ten eerste kan fragmentatie benaderd worden als een organisatorisch probleem. 
In deze aanpak is het niet alleen belangrijk om de actoren en hun verantwoordelijkheden 
te identificeren, maar ook om te verkennen waar de verantwoordelijkheden gelegd, 
verschoven, of gereorganiseerd zouden moeten worden. Ten tweede kan fragmentatie 
benaderd worden als een probleem dat zijn wortels heeft in normativiteit. Een algemeen 
normatief raamwerk kan nodig zijn. Indien dit al aanwezig is, kan niet alleen gepleit 
worden voor strengere en verder reikende standaarden, maar ook voor overeenstemming 
voor een beleidscoherentiemechanisme. Ten derde kan fragmentatie benaderd worden als 
een relationeel probleem. Samenwerkings-management is in deze context een belangrijk 
concept en refereert naar de bewuste inspanning door een relevante actor of groep actoren, 
ongeacht de vorm of forum, om de institutionele interactie en de daar bijbehorende 
effecten te adresseren. Al deze benaderingen kunnen spanningen veroorzaken, 
bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van legitimiteit en accountability. Desalniettemin, in het sturen 
van mondiale beleidssystemen in de richting van duurzame paden, blijven systemische 
transformaties een van de grootste uitdagingen van onze tijd.  
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Article 22 of the Maastricht University Regulation Governing the Attainment of Doctoral 
Degrees prescribes that a doctoral candidate adds a valorisation addendum to the 
dissertation. In this regulation, knowledge valorisation is described as referring to the 
“process of creating value from knowledge, by making knowledge suitable and/or 
available for social (and/or economic) use and by making knowledge suitable for 
translation into competitive products, services, processes and new commercial activities” 
(adapted definition based on the National Valorisation Committee, 2011, p. 8). In the 
following sections, three main issues in relation to valorisation of this dissertation are 
addressed. The first section relates to the social relevance of the research results that go 
beyond its scientific relevance. The second section concerns the societal groups other than 
the scientific community for which the research results may be of interest. The third 
section details the concrete activities in relation to disseminating research relevance and 
results beyond those activities that have specifically been undertaken for the scientific 
community. 
Social relevance 
The governance of sustainable development is characterised by a growing number of 
standards. In international and regional value chains, standards, regulations, and 
certification schemes from public, private and public-private actors and partnerships, 
have gained prominence. This trend can be observed in various policy domains and 
sectors of trade. The governance of some issue areas demonstrates more regulatory 
cohesion than others. It has been argued in this dissertation that the assessment of 
regulatory cohesion and fragmentation is pivotal in understanding whether the system of 
governance is conducive to realise sustainable development. One of the research results 
presented in this dissertation has been a mapping of different policy mechanisms that, 
based on the organisational, normative and collaborative context of a sustainability 
concern, can be considered desirable for creating policy cohesion. In this way, this 
dissertation offers a basis for making an assessment on whether a proposed policy 
mechanism for cohesion can be considered conducive to realise sustainable change. 
More generally, the social relevance of the research results is to inform policy and 
decision-making for sustainable development. Particularly the role of collaboration and 
coordination (and the absence thereof in policy domains), both between but also across 
actors from the different societal domains, may specifically inform actors on the current 
drawbacks and future possibilities for policy and decision-making for sustainable 
development. The research results of this dissertation may be used as leverage points, that 
is, as an indication of places within various governance systems for sustainable 
development where policy is considered either too fragmented or too cohesive for the 
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conducive realisation of sustainable change. In the following paragraphs, the various 
societal groups for which this dissertation is of particular relevance will be detailed. 
Societal groups 
The results of this research are of interest to those who govern, those who are governed, 
as well as those who are affected by sustainability standards more generally. Here we 
identify three particularly relevant societal groups, namely public actors from 
governmental or intergovernmental organisations, and private actors from civil society 
groups and the business domain. The first group of public actors increasingly deal with 
governance actors from the private sphere. Since the origins and solutions to 
sustainability problems transcend national boundaries, in an ever-globalising world, 
public actors must be informed on international, transnational, regional, and various 
national sources of authority. In advancing the public good, public actors must also 
recognise the ways in which fragmentation or cohesion in global governance may advance 
or impede their objectives. As for instance the case on tensions in global governance 
systems (chapter 5) illustrated, fragmentation or the choice for an ill fitted policy 
mechanism to foster cohesion – which may (un)purposefully be stimulated by public 
actors – can counter affect the efforts of public policy. This dissertation provides insight 
on the fact that tensions not only arise on basis of system characteristics of a policy 
domain, but may equally arise through the ways in which cohesion is sought. The 
concluding chapter of this dissertation offers an overview of various policy mechanisms 
actors can endorse to advance sustainable development.   
The research results are also relevant for civil society groups. The case on private fair 
labour arrangements (chapter 2) showed that standard-setting and particularly certifying 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may diffuse and counteract the fulfilment of 
sustainability goals as some governance arrangements deviate from well-established 
standards and regulations. Coupled with the fact that certifying NGOs compete for 
market share and offer different compliance and enforcement mechanisms, the 
transformative capacity of certifying NGOs is questioned. Civil society groups which 
engage in standard-setting and certification may take from this that deviation on the 
content of standards, may very well be a way to self-preserve the organisation, but can 
counteract the broader goal of inducing transformative sustainable change. In addition to 
the case on private fair labour arrangements (chapter 2), which illustrated that advocacy 
groups not only raise awareness on misconduct or try to influence public opinion, the 
case on regional standards for organic production (chapter 3) also illustrates that the 
standards of civil society groups can be normative in international and transnational 
standard setting.  
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Actors from the business domain are also a societal relevant group in relation to this 
research. In general, the objective of businesses is creating an environment that is suitable 
for business conduct, which may or may not be aligned with values for sustainable 
development. Present day, it is not abnormal for businesses to engage in partnerships with 
public or civil society actors, and an increasing number of businesses see a value for 
business in participating in governance arrangements and certification schemes as the 
case on fair labour arrangements (chapter 2) and the case on private metagovernance 
(chapter 4) has shown. The research results of this dissertation may inform businesses on 
the type of governance arrangement they want to align with, as well as inform them on 
possible private metagovernance mechanisms of change. As the case on private fair labour 
arrangements (chapter 2) showed that standard-setting and particularly certifying NGOs 
can deviate from well-established standards and regulations, the research results can raise 
awareness amongst businesses in understanding how their engagement in such 
certification schemes may diffuse and counteract the fulfilment of sustainability goals. 
Activities 
Research progress and results have been presented at academic conferences and 
international journals. However, I have also participated in a couple of debates in which I 
have communicated my research results to a wider academic audience. One such occasion 
was an event in April 2015 organized by Amnesty International students from Maastricht 
University, entitled ‘Should I buy fair-trade products?’ Here I participated as a panellist, 
presenting information on the case on private fair labour arrangements (chapter 2) and 
detailing the different approaches by fair labour arrangements. The student audience was 
particularly interested in finding out, which certification schemes in general are to be 
trusted and understanding whether buying certified products contributes to sustainable 
development. One of the key messages I brought to the table was that there is reason for 
some optimism on the work of fair trade labels, although we cannot assume that they hold 
the answer to bring about the necessary systemic change to alleviate fair labour violations 
on a global level. Another critical part of the discussion centred on the recognition of the 
audience that there may be trade-offs in the consumer choices they make, e.g. organic or 
fair trade products from distant countries as opposed to local produce. 
Another event for which I was invited as a panellist was a debate café on responsibility 
and sustainability in December 2018. Organised by Studium Generale in close collaboration 
with the Green Office students of Maastricht University, the event was entitled ‘Whose 
responsibility is it anyway? Making a sustainable world’ and attendance was open for the 
academic community, as well as residents of the Maastricht area. The central themes of the 
debate concerned the relation between individual action towards a sustainable world, the 
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responsibility of governments and big companies, the ways individuals can make impact 
through individual actions, and collective action to influence companies. In relation to the 
topic of this dissertation, the cases on private fair labour arrangements (chapter 2) and on 
tensions in global governance systems (chapter 5) have been relevant. These include the 
positions that: 1) all actors, whether public, private, individual or collective identities, are 
responsible for making this world more sustainable; 2) both individual and collective action 
is important for raising awareness and inducing change on corporate level; 3) although 
some levels of fragmentation in global governance can be conducive in striving for 
sustainable change, fragmentation also leads to adverse effects, such as regulatory 
uncertainty. In this regard, it is important that all actors adhere to well-established 
international norms and standards so as not to diffuse and counter the effective realisation 
of sustainable change. 
Another way in which knowledge is disseminated is through education. For example, 
in a lecture for the course Governance for Sustainable Development, several aspects of this 
dissertation are used to explain and exemplify issues concerning partnerships and standard-
setting by public and private actors. In the future, educational tasks can possibly be further 
developed specifically relating to the fragmentation and cohesion debate in global 
governance.  
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